Two treatises of government

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TWO

TREATISES

OF

GOVERNMENT.

BY

JOHN LOCKE.

SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO.

A NEW EDITION CORRECTED.

LONDON

PRINTED FOR WIHTMORE AND FENN, CHARING CROSS; AND
C. BROWN, DUKE STREET, LINCOLN'S-INN FIELDS.

MDOCCXXI.

ADVERTISEMENT

To the Present Edition.

- ♦ »

Perhaps the Annals of History do not
furnish a period, more appropriate for the
dissemination of the political opinions of
the Immortal Locke, than the present; when
Sovereigns and Governmemts, are eagerly
waiting, and readily embracing every opportu-
nity to increase their Power ; and when many
of the Governed are equally impatient under
the wholesome, as well as the more oppressive
Laws of those that govern ; to lay before both
parties, the real origin of the power of the One,
and for what purpose it was granted ; and the
just obedience due by the Other ; when those
purposes tend to the preservation, and good of
society in general.

London, January, 1821-

TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.

IN THE FORMER

THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND

FOUNDATION OF

SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS

FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND

OVERTHROWN.

THE LATTER
IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE
TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

PREFACE.

HEADER, thou hast here the beginning and
end of a discourse concerning government;
what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers
that should have fdled up the middle, and
were more than all the rest, it is not worth
while to tell thee. These, which remain, I
hope are sufficient to establish the throne of
our great restorer, or present King William ;
to make good his title, in the consent of the
people, which being the only one of all lawful
governments, he has more fully and clearly,
than any prince in Christendom ; and to
justify to the world the people of England,
whose love of their just and natural rights,
with their resolution to preserve them, saved
the nation when it was on the very brink of
slavery and ruin. If these papers have that
evidence, I flatter myself is to be found in
them, there will be no great miss of those
which are lost, and my reader may be satisfied
without them : for 1 imagine, I shall have

Vlll

neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my
pains, and till np the wanting part of my
answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through
all the windings and obscurities, which are to
be met with in the several branches of his
wonderful system. The king, and body of the
nation, have since so thoroughly confuted his
Hypothesis, that I suppose no body hereafter
will have either the confidence to appear
against our common safety, and be again an
advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be
deceived with contradictions dressed up in a
popular stile, and well-turned periods : for if
any one will be at the pains, himself, in those
parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir
Robert's discourses of the flourish of doubtful
expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words
to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and
then compare them one with another, he will
quickly be satisfied, there was never so much
glib nonsense put together in well-sounding
English. If he think it not worth while to
examine his works all through, let him make
an experiment in that part, where lie treats of
usurpation ; and lot him try, whether he can,
with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible,
and consistent with himself, or common sense.
J should not speak so plainly of a gentlemen.

IX

long since past answering, had not the pulpit,
of late years, publicly owned his doctrine, and
made it the current divinity of the times. It is
necessary those men, who taking on them to
be teachers, have so dangerously misled others,
should be openly shewed of what authority this
their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly
followed, so that they may either retract what
upon so ill grounds they have vented, and
cannot be maintained ; or else justify those
principles which they preached up for gospel ;
though they had no better an author than
an English courtier: for [ should not have
writ against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to
shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want
of (what he so much boasts of, and pretends
wholly to build on) scripture- proofs, were there
not men amongst us, who, by crying up his
books, and espousing his doctrine, save me
from the reproach of writing against a dead
adversary. They have been so zealous in this
point, that, if I have done him any wrong, 1 can-
not hope they should spare me. I wish, where
they had done the truth and the public wrong,
they would be as ready to redress it, and allow
its just weight to this reflection, viz. that there
cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and
people, than the propagating wrong notions

X

concerning government: that so at last all
times might not have reason to complain of
the drum ecclesiastic. If any one, concerned
really for truth, undertake the confutation of
my hypothesis, I promise him either to recant
mistake, upon fair conviction ; or to answer
his difficulties. But he must remember two
things.

First, That cavilling here and there, at some
expression, or little incident of my discourse,
is not an answer to my book.

Secondly, That I shall not take railing for
arguments, nor think either of these worth my
notice: Though 1 shall always look on my-
self as bound to give satisfaction to any one
who shall appear to be conscientiously scru-
pulous in the point, and shall shew any just
grounds for his scruples.

I have nothing more, but to advertise the
reader, that Observations stands for Observa-
tions on Hobbes, Milton, &c. and that a bare
quotation of pages always mean Pages of his
Patriarcha. Edit. 1680.

CONTENTS

OF

BOOK I.

Chapter. Page.

I. The Introduction • 1

II. Of Paternal and Regal Power 5

III. Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty

by Creation . • 15

IV. Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty

by Donation, Gen. i. 28. 23

V. Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty

by the Subjection of Eve 48

VI. Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty

by Fatherhood . 55

VII. Of Fatherhood and Property, con-
sidered together as Fountains of
Sovereignty . 83

VIII. Of the Conveyance of Adam's So-
vereign Monarchical Power 90

IX. Of Monarchy, by Inheritance from

Adam . . 94

X. Of the Heir to Adam's Monar-
chical Power . . H6

XI. Who Heir? . U9

CONTENTS

OF

BOOK II.

Chapter.

Page.

I.

The Introduction

187

II.

Of the State of Nature

189

III.

Of the State of War

200

IV.

Of Slavery

205

V.

Of Property

208

VI.

Of Paternal Power

230

VII.

Of Political or Civil Society

252

VIII.

Of the Beginning of Political

Societies . . 20.0

IX. Of the Ends of Political Society

and Government . 294

X. Of the forms of a Commonwealth 300
XI. Of the Extent of the Legislative

Power . . 301

XII. Of the Legislative, Executive,
and Federative Power of the
Commonwealth . 313

XIII. Of the Subordination of the

Powers of the Commonwealth 310

XIV. Of Prerogative . 327
XV. Of Paternal, Political and Despo-

tical Power, considered together 330
XVI. Of Conquest . 340

XVII. Of Usurpation . 358

XVIII. Of Tyranny 360

XIX. Of the Dissolution of Govern-
ment . . . 370

OF GOVERNMENT.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

§. 1. Slavery is so vile and miserable an
estate of man, and so directly opposite to the
generous temper and courage of our nation ;
that it is hardly to be conceived, that an Eng-
lishman, much less a gentleman, should plead
for it. And truly I should have taken Sir
Robert Filmers Patriarcha, as any other trea-
tise, which would persuade all men, that they
are slaves, and ought to be so, for such another
exercise of wit, as was his who writ the en-
comium of Nero; rather than for a serious
discourse meant in earnest, had not the gravity
of the title and epistle, the picture in the front
of the book, and the applause that followed it,
required me to believe, that the author and
publisher were both in earnest. I therefore
took it into my hands with all the expectation,
and read it through with all the attention due
to a treatise that made such a noise at its
coming abroad, and cannot but confess myself
mightily surprised that in a book, which v, is

2 OF GOVERNMENT.

to provide chains for all mankind, I should find
nothing but a rope of sand, useful perhaps
to such, whose skill and business it is to raise
a dust, and would blind the people, the better
to mislead them ; but in truth not of any force
to draw those into bondage who have their eyes
open, and so much sense about them as to
consider, that chains are but an ill wearing,
how much care soever hath been taken to file
and polish them.

§. 2. If any one think I take too much liberty
in speaking so freely of a man, who is the great
champion of absolute power, and the idol of
those who worship it ; I beseech him to make
this small allowance for once, to one, who, even
after the reading of Sir Robert's book, cannot
but think himself, as the laws allow r him, a
freeman : and I know no fault it is to do so,
unless any one better skilled in the fate of it,
than I, should have it revealed to him, that this
treatise, which has lain dormant so long, was,
when it appeared in the world, to carry, by
strength of its arguments, all liberty out of it ;
and that thenceforth our author's short model
was to be the pattern in the mount, and the
perfect standard of politics for the future. His
system lies in a little compass, it is no more
but this,

That all government is absolute monarchy.
And the ground he builds on, is this,

That no man is born free.

%. 3. In this last age a generation of men has

OF GOVERNMENT. 3

sprung up amongst us, that would flatter
princes with an opinion, that they have a
divine right to absolute power, let the laws
by which they are constituted, and are to
govern, and the conditions under which they
enter upon their authority, be what they will,
and their engagements to observe them never so
well ratified by solemn oaths and promises. To
make way for this doctrine, they have denied
mankind a right to natural freedom ; whereby
they have not only, as much as in them lies,
exposed all subjects to the utmost misery of
tyranny and oppression, but have also unset-
tled the titles, and shaken the thrones of
princes : (for they too by these men's system,
except only one, are all born slaves, and by
divine right are subjects to Adams right heir;)
as if they had designed to make war upon all
government, and subvert the very foundation
of human society, to serve their present turn.

§. 4. However we must believe them upon
their own bare words, when they tell us, we
are all born slaves, and we must continue so,
there is no remedy for it ; life and thraldom
we entered into together, and can never be
quit of the one, till we part with the other.
Scripture or reason I am sure do not any where
say so, notwithstanding the noise of divine
right, as if divine authority hath subjected us
to the unlimited will of another. An admi-
rable state of mankind, and that which they
have not had wit enough to find out till this

b 2

4 OF GOVERNMENT.

latter age. For, however Sir Robert Filmet
seems to condemn the novelty of the contrary
opinion, Pair. p. 3. yet 1 believe it will be hard
for him to find any other age, or country of
the world, but this, which has asserted mo-
narchy to be jure divino. And he confesses,
Patr. p. 4. That Heyivard, Blackwood, Bar-
clay, and others, that have bravely vindicated the
right of Icings in most points, never thought
of this, but with one consent admitted the natural
liberty and equality of mankind.

§. 5. By whom this doctrine came at first
to be broached, and brought in fashion amongst
us, and what sad effects it gave rise to, I leave
to historians to relate, or to the memory of
those, who were contemporaries with Sibthorp
and Mantuering, to recollect. My business at
present is only to consider what Sir Robert
Filmer, who is allowed to have carried this
argument farthest, and is supposed to have
brought it to perfection, has said in it ; for him
every one, who . would be as fashionable as
French was at court, has learned, and runs
away with this short system of politics, viz.
Men are not born free, and therefore could
never have the liberty to choose either governors,
or forms of government . Princes have their
power absolute, and by divine right ; for slaves
could never have a right to compact or consent.
Adam was an absolute monarch, and so arc all
princes ever since.

OF GOVERNMENT. O

CHAPTER II

Of Paternal and Regal Power.

§. (>. Sir Robert Filmers great position is,
that men are not naturally free. This is the;
foundation on which his absolute monarchy
stands, and from which it erects itself to such
an height, that its power is above every power,
caput inter nubila, so high above all earthly and
human things, that thought can scarce reach it;
that promises and oaths, which tie the infinite
Deity, cannot confine it. But if this foundation
fails, all his fabric falls with it, and governments
must be left again to the old way of being
made by contrivance, and (he consent of men
('A»'fyw7nV>/ Kriair) making use of their reason to
unite together into society. To prove this grand
position of his, he tells us, p. 12. Men are
horn in subjection to their parents, and therefore
eannot be free. And this authority of parents
he calls royal authority, p. 12, 14. Fatherly
authority, right of fatherhood, p. 12, 20. One
Mould have thought he would, in the beginning of
such a work as this, on which was to depend
the authority of princes, and the obedience of
subjects, have told us expressly, what that
fatherly authority is, have defined it, though
not limited it, because in some other treatises
of his he tells us, it is unlimited and unlimit-

6 OF GOVERNMENT.

able* ; he should at least have given us such
an account of it, that we might have had an
entire notion of this fatherhood, or fatherly au-
thority, whenever it came in our way in his
writings : this I expected to have found in the
first chapter of his Patriarcha. But instead
thereof, having, 1. en passant, made his obey-
sance to the arcana imperii, p. 5. 2. made his
compliment to the rights and liberties of this or
any other nation, p. 6. which he is going pre-
sently to null and destroy ; and, 3. made his
leg to those learned men, who did not see so
far into the matter as himself, p. 7. he comes
to fall on Bellarmine, p. 8. and, by a victory
over him, establishes his fatherly authority
beyond any question. Bellarmine being routed
by his own confession, p. 11. the day is clear
got, and there is no more need of any forces :
for having done that, I observe not that he
states the question, or rallies up any arguments
to make good his opinion, but rather tells us
the story, as he thinks fit, of this strange kind
of domineering phantom, called the father-
hood, which whoever could catch, presently
got empire, and unlimited absolute power. He
assures us how this fatherhood began in Adam f

* In grants and gifts that have their original from God or
nature, as the power of the father hath, no inferior power of
man can limit, nor make any law of prescription against
them. Observations, 158.

The scripture teaches, that supreme power was originally
in the father, without any limitation. Observations, 245.

OF GOVERNMENT.

continued its course, and kept the world in
order all the time of the patriarchs till the flood,
got out of the ark with Noah and his sons,
made and supported all the kings of the earth
till the captivity of the Israelites in Egypt, and
then the poor fatherhood was under hatches,
till God, by giving the Israelites kings, re-esta-
blished the ancient and prime right of the lineal
succession in paternal government. This is his
business from p. 12, to p. 19. And then obvia-
ting an objection, and clearing a difficulty or
two, with one half reason, p. 23. to confirm
the natural right of regal power, he ends the
first chapter. I hope it is no injury to call an
half quotation an half reason ; for God says,
Honour thy father and mother ; but our author
contents himself with half, leaves out thy mo-
ther quite, as little serviceable to his purpose.
But of that more in another place.

§. 7. I do not think our author so little skilled
in the way of writing discourses of this nature,
nor so careless of the point in hand, that he by
oversight commits the fault, that he himself, in
his Anarchy of a mixed Monarchy, p. 239. ob-
jects to Mr. Hunton in these words : Where
first I charge the author, that he hath not given
us any definition, or description of Monarchy in
general; for by the rules of method he should
have first defined. And by the like rule of me-
thod Sir Robert should have told us, what his
fatherhood or fatherly authority is, before he
had told us, in whom it was to be found, and

8 OF GOVERNMENT.

talked so much of it. But perhaps Sir Robert
found, that this fatherly authority, this power
of fathers, and of kings, for he makes them
both the same, p. 24. would make a very odd
and frightful figure, and very disagreeing with
what either children imagine of their parents,
or subjects of their kings, if he should have
given us the whole draught together in that
gigantic form, he had painted it in his own
fancy; and therefore, like a wary physician,
when he would have his patient swallow some
harsh or corrosive liquor, he mingles it with a
large quantity of that which may dilute it; that
the scattered parts may go down with less
feeling, and cause less aversion.

§. 8. Let us then endeavour to find what
account he gives us of this fatherly authority,
as it lies scattered in the several parts of his
writings. And first, as it was vested in Adam,
he says, Not only Adam, but the succeeding
patriarchs, had, by right of fatherhood, royal
authority orcr their children, p. 1*2. This lord-
ship which Adam by command had orcr the
whole uorld, and by right descending from him
the patriarchs did enjoy, was as large and ample
as the absolute dominion of any monarch, which
hath been since the creation, p. 13. Dominion
of life and death, making war, and concluding
peace, p. 13. Adam and the patriarchs had
absolute power of life and death, p. 35. Kings,
in the right of parents, succeed to the exercise
of supreme jurisdiction, p. 19. As kingly power

OF GOVERNMENT.

is by the law of God, so it hulk no inferior fate
to limit it ; Adam was lord of all, p. 40. The
father of a family governs by no other lair, than
by his own will, p. 78. The superiority of
princes is above laws, p. 79. The unlimited
jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by
Samuel, p. 80. Kings are above the laws, p. 03.
And to this purpose see a great deal more
which our author delivers in JBodins words :
It is certain, that all laws, privileges, and grants
of princes, have no force, but during their life;
if they be not ratified by the express consent, or
by sufferance of the prince following, especially
privileges, Observations, p. 279. The reason,
why laws have been also made by kings,was this ;
when kings were either busied with tears, or dis-
tracted with public cares, so that every private
man could not have access to their pjersons, to
learn their wills and pleasure, then were laws of
necessity invented, that so every particular sub-
ject might find his prince s pleasure dccyphcrcd
unto him in the tables of his lairs, p. 02. In a
monarchy, the king must by necessity be above
the laws, p. 100. A perfect kingdom is that,
wherein the king rules all things according to
his own will, p. 100. Neither common nor
statute laics are, or can be, any diminution of
that general power, which kings have over their
people by right of fatherhood, p. 115. Adam
was the father, king, and lord over his family ;
a son, a subject, and a servant or slave, were one
and the same thing at first. The father had

10 OF GOVERNMENT.

power io dispose or sell his children or servants ;
whence ive find, that the first reckoning up of
goods in scripture, the man-servant and the maid-
servant, are numbered among the possessio?is and
substance of the owner, as other goods were,
Observations Pref. God also hath given to the
father a right or liberty, to alien his power over
his children to any other ; whence we find the
sale and gift of children to have been much in
use in the beginning of the ivorld, when men had
their servants for a possession and an inheritance,
as well as other goods ; whereupon we find the
power of castrating and making eunuchs much
in use in old times, Observations, p. 155. Lata
is nothing else but the will of him that hath the
power of the supreme father, Observations, p.
223. It teas God's ordinance that the supre-
macy should be unlimited in Adam, and as large
as all the acts of his will; and as in him so in
all others that have supreme power, Observa-
tions, p. 245.

§. 9. I have been fain to trouble my reader
with these several quotations in our author's
own words, that in them might be seen his own
description of his fatherly authority, as it lies
scattered up and down in his writings, which
he supposes was first vested in Adam, and by
right belongs to all princes ever since. This
fatherly authority then, or right of fatherhood,
in our author's sense, is a divine unalterable
right of sovereignty, whereby a father or a
prince halh an absolute, arbitrary, unlimited.

OF GOVERNMENT. J 1

and unlhnitable power over the lives, liberties,
and estates of his children and subjects ; so
that he may take or alienate their estates, sell,
castrate, or use their persons as he pleases, they
being all his slaves, and he lord or proprietor
of every thing, and his unbounded will their law.
§. 10. Our author having placed such a
mighty power in Adam, and upon that sup-
position founded all government, and all power
of princes, it is reasonable to expect, that he
should have proved this with arguments clear
and evident, suitable to the weightiness of the
cause ; that since men had nothing else left
them, they might in slavery have such undeni-
able proofs of its necessity, that their con-
sciences might be convinced, and oblige them
to submit peaceably to that absolute dominion,
which their governors had a right to exercise
over them. Without this, what good could
our author do, or pretend to do, by erecting
such an unlimited power, but flatter the natural
vanity and ambition of men, too apt of itself to
grow and encrease with the possession of any
power? and by persuading those, who, by the
consent of their fellow-men, are advanced to
great, but limited degrees of it, that by that
part which is given them, they have a right to
all, that was not so ; and therefore may do
what they please, because they have authority
to do more than others, and so tempt them
to do what is neither for their own, nor the

12 OF GOVERNMENT.

good of those under their care; whereby great
mischiefs cannot but follow.

§. 11. The sovereignty of Adam, being that
on which, as a sure basis, our author builds
his mighty absolute monarchy, I expected, that
in his Patriarcha, this his main supposition
would have been proved, and established with
all that evidence of arguments, that such a
fundamental tenet required ; and that this, on
which the great stress of the business depends,
would have been made out with reasons sufti-
cient to justify the confidence with which it
was assumed. But in all that treatise, I could
find very little tending that way ; the thing i>
there so taken for granted, without proof, that
I could scarce believe myself, when, upon at-
tentive reading thai treatise, I found there so
mighty a structure raised upon the bare sup-
position of this foundation : for it is scarce
credible, that in a discourse, where he pretends
to confute the erroneous principle of man's
natural freedom, he should do it by ;i bare
supposition of Adam's authority, without offer-
ing any proof for that authority. Indeed he
confidently saj s, that Adam had royal authority,
p. 12, and 13. absolute lordship and dominion
°f Hfo fill d death, p. 13. an universal monarchy,
p. 33. absolute power of life and death, p. 35.
He is very frequent in such assertions ; but,
what is strange, in all his whole Patriarcha 1
find not one pretence of a reason to establish

OF GOVERNMENT. 13

this his great foundation of government; noi
an) thing that looks like an argument, but

these words : To con/um this natural right of
regal power, tee find in the Decalogue, that the
law which enjoins obedience to kings, is delivered
in the terms, Honour thy father, as if all power
were originally in the father. And why nia\
I not add as well, that in the Decalogue, the
law that enjoins obedience to queens, is de-
livered in the terms of Honour thy mother, as
if all power were originally in the mother 1
The argument, as Sir Robert puts it, will hold
as well for one as the other: but of this, more
in its due place.

§. 12. All that I take notice of here, is, that
this is all our author says in his first, or any oi
the following chapters, to prove the absolute
power of Adam, which is his great principle:
and yet, as if he had there settled it upon sure
demonstration, he begins his second chapter
with these words, 13y conferring these proofs
and reasons, drawn from the autho) ity of the
scripture. Where those proofs and reasons for
Adam's sovereignty are, bating that of Honour
thy father, above mentioned, I confess, I
cannot find; unless what he says, p. 11. In
these words we have an evident confession, viz. of
Bellarmine, that creation made man prince of
his posterity, must be taken for proofs and
reasons drawn from scripture, or for any sort
of proof at all: though from thence by a new
way < f inference, in the words immedia" ,_

14 OF GOVERNMENT.

following, he concludes, the royal authority of
Adam sufficiently settled in him.

§. 13. If he has in that chapter, or anywhere
in the whole treatise, given any other proofs of
Adams royal authority, other than by often
repeating it, which among some men, goes for
argument, I desire any body for him to shew
me the place and page, that I may be convinced
of my mistake, and acknowledge my oversight.
If no such arguments are to be found, I beseech
those men, who have so much cried up this
book, to consider, whether they do not give the
world cause to suspect, that it is not the force
of reason and argument, that makes them for
absolute monarchy, but some other by interest,
and therefore are resolved to applaud any au-
thor, that writes in favour of this doctrine,
whether he support it with reason or no. But
I hope they do not expect, that rational and
indifferent men should be brought over to their
opinion, because this their great doctor of it, in
a discourse made on purpose, to set up the
absolute monarchical power of Adam, in oppo-
sition to the natural freedom of mankind, has
said so little to prove it, from whence it is
rather naturally to be concluded, that there is
little to be said.

§. 14. But that I might omit no care to
inform myself in our author's full sense, I con-
sulted his Observations on Aristotle, Hobbes, §c.
to see whether in disputing with others he made
use of any arguments for this his darling tenet

OF GOVERNMENT. 15

of Adams sovereignty ; since in his treatise of
the Natural power of Kings, he hath been so
sparing of them. In his Observations on Mr.
Uobbess Leviathan, 1 think he has put, in
short, all those arguments for it together, which
in his writings I find him any where to make
use of: his words are these: If God created
only Adam, and of a piece of him made the
ivoman, and if by generation from them two, as
parts of them, all mankind be propagated:
if also God gave to Adam, not only the
dominion over the woman and the children
that should issue from them, but also over
all the earth to subdue it, and over all the
creatures on it, so that as long as Adam lived,
no man could claim or enjoy any thing but by
donation, assignation or permission from /tim,
I wonder, &c. Observations, p. 165. Here we
have the sum of all his arguments, for Adam's
sovereignty, and against natural freedom, which
I find up and down in his other treatises: and
they are these following ; God's creation of
Adam, the dominion he gave him over Eve, and
the dominion he had as father over his children:
all which I shall particularly consider.

CHAPTER III.

Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty by Creation.

§. 15. Sir Robert, in his preface to his Ob-
servations on Aristotle s Politics, tells us, A

J (J OF GOVERNMENT.

natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed
without the denial of the creation of Adam :
but how Adams being created, which was
nothing 1ml his receiving a being immediately
from omnipotence and the hand of God, gave
Adam a sovereignty over any thing-, I cannot
sec, nor consequently understand, how a sup-
position of natural freedom is a denial of 'Adam's
creation, and would be glad any body else
(since our author did not vouchsafe us the
fa \ our) would make it out for him: for 1 find
no difficulty to suppose thv freedom of mankind,
though I have always believed the creation of
Adam. He was created, or began to exist by
God's immediate power, without the interven-
tion ofparents or the pre-existence of any of the
same species to beget him, when it pleased
God he should ; and so did the lion, the king
of beasts, before him, by the same creating
power of God : and if hare existence by that
power, and in that way, will give dominion
without any more ado, our author, by this
argument, will make the lion have as good a
title to it, as he, and certainly the ancienter.
No! for Adam had his title by the appointment
of God, says our author in another place.
Then hare creation gave him not dominion,
and one might have supposed mankind free
without the denying the creation of Adam,
since it was God's appointment made him
monarch.

But let us see, hov ' puts his ct ea-

OF GOVERNMENT. 17

tion and this appointment together. By the

appointment of (rod, says Sir Robert, as soon
as Adam was created, lie teas monarch of the
world, though he had no subjects ; for though
there could not be actual government till there
were subjects, yet by (he right of nature it was
due to Adam to be governor of his posterity:
though not in act, yet at least in habit, Adam
was a king from his creation. I wish lie had
told us here, what he meant by God's appoint-
ment : for whatsoever providence orders, or
the law of nature directs, or positive revelation
declares, may be said to he by God's appoint-
ment : but I suppose it cannot be meant here
in the first sense, i. e. by providence ; because
that would be to say no more, but that as soon
as Adam was created he was dej'acto monarch,
because by right of nature it was due to Adam,
to be governor of his posterity. But he could
not de facto be by providence constituted the
governor of the world, at a time when there was
actually no government, no subjects to be go-
verned, which our author here confesses.
Monarch of the world is also differently used
by our author; for sometimes he means by
it a proprietor of all the world exclusive of
the rest of mankind, and thus he does in the
same page of his preface before cited : Adam.
says he, being commanded to multiply and peo-
ple the earth, and to subdue it, and having
dominion given him over all creatures, teas
thereby the monarch of the whole world; none

c

18 OF GOVERNMENT.

of his posterity had any right to possess any thing
but by his grant or permission, or by succession
from him. 2. Let us understand then by mo-
narch proprietor of the world, and by appoint-
ment Gods actual donation, and revealed posi-
tive grant made to Adam, Gen. i. 28. as we
see Sir Robert himself does in this parallel
place, and then his argument will stand thus :
by the positive grant of God, as soon as Adam
was created, he teas proprietor of the world,
because by the right of nature it was due to
Adam to be governor of his posterity. In which
way of arguing there are two manifest false-
hoods. First, It is false, that God made that
grant to Adam, as soon as he was created,
since, though it stands in the text immediately
after his creation, yet it is plain it could not
be spoken to Adam, till after Eve was made
and brought to him : and how then could he
be monarch by appoint ment as soon as created,
especially since he calls, if I mistake not, that
which God says to Eve, Gen. iii. 16, the ori-
ginal grant of government, which not being till
after the fall, when Adam was somewhat, at
least in time, and very much distant in con-
dition, from his creation, I cannot see, how our
author can say in this sense, that by God's ap-
pointment, as soon as Adam ivas created, he
was monarch of the world. Secondly, were it
true that God's actual donation appointed Adam
monarch of the world as soon as he icas created,
yet the reason here given for it, would not prove

OF GOVERNMENT. 19

ii ; but it would always be a false inference,
that God, by a positive donation, appointed
Adam monarch of the world, because by right
of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of
his posterity : for having given him the right
of government by nature, there was no need
of a positive donation ; at least it will never be
a proof of such a donation.

§. 17. On the other side the matter will not
be much mended, if we understand by God's
appointment the law of nature, (though it be a
pretty harsh expression for it in this place) and
by monarch of the ivorld, sovereign ruler of
mankind : for then the sentence under consi-
deration must run thus : By the law of nature,
as soon as Adam was created he was governor
of mankind, for by right of nature it was due to
Adam to be governor of his posterity ; which
amounts to this, he was governor by right of
nature, because he was governor by right of
nature: but supposing we should grant, that
a man is by nature governor of his children,
Adam could not hereby be a monarch as soon
as created : for this right of nature being found-
ed in his being their father, how Adam could
have a natural right to be governor, before he
was a father, when by being a father only he
had that right, is methinks, hard to conceive,
unless he will have him to be a father before
lie was a father, and to have a title before he
had it.

<§. 18. To this foreseen objection, our author
c 2

20 OF GOVERNMENT.

answers very logically, he was governor in
habit, and not in act: a very pretty way of
beins* a Governor without government, a father
without children, and a king without subjects.
And thus Sir Robert was an author before he
writ his book ; not in act, it is true, but in
habit; for when he had once published it, it
was due to him by the right of nature, to be
an author, as much as it was to Adam to be
governor of his children, when he had begot
them : and if to be such a monarch of the world,
an absolute monarch in habit, but not in act,
will serve the turn, I should not much envy
it to any of Sir Robert's friends, that he
thought fit graciously to bestow it upon, though
even this of acrand habit, if it signified any
thing but our author's skill in distinctions,
be not to his purpose in this place. For the
question is not here about Adams actual ex-
ercise of government, but actually having a
title to be governor. Government, says our
author, was due to Adam by the right of na-
ture: what is this right of nature? A right
fathers have over their children by begetting
them ; gcneratione jus acquiritur parentibus
in liberos, says our author out of Grotius,
Observations, '223. The right then follows
the begetting as arising from it ; so that, ac-
cording to this way of reasoning or distin-
guishing of our author, Adam, as soon as he
was created, had a title only in habit, and not
in act, which in plain English is, he had ac-
tually no title at all.

OF GOVERNMENT. 21

i: 19. To speak less learnedly, and more
intelligibly, one may say of Adam, he was in a
possibility of" being- governor, since it was
possible lie might beget children, and thereby
acquire that right of nature, be it what it will,
to govern them, that accrues from thence : but
what connection has this with Adams creation,
to make him say, that, as soon as he was created,
he was monarch of the world 1 , for it may be as
well said of Noah, that as soon as he was born,
he was monarch of the world, since he was in
possibility (which in our author's sense is
enough to make a monarch, a monarch in
habit,) to outlive all mankind, but his own
posterity. What such necessary connexion
there is betwixt Adams creation and his right
to government, so that a natural freedom of man-
kind cannot be supposed without the denial of
the creation of Adam, 1 confess for my part I
do not see; nor how those words, by the ap-
pointment, cj'c. Observations, 25 J. however
explained, can be put together, to make any
tolerable sense, at least to establish this posi-
tion, with which they end, viz. Adam was a
king from his creation; a king, says our author,
not in act but in habit, i. c actually no king
at all.

§. 20. I fear T have tired my reader's pa-
tience, by dwelling longer on this passage, than
the weightiness of any argument in it seems
to require; but I have unavoidably been
engaged in it by our author's way of writing,

22 OF GOVERNMENT.

•who, huddling several suppositions together,
and that in doubtful and general terms, makes
such a medley and confusion, that it is impos-
sible to shew his mistakes, without examining
the several senses wherein his words may be
taken, and without seeing how, in any of these
various meanings, they will consist together,
and have any truth in them : for in this present
passage before us, how can any one argue
against this position of his, that Adam teas a
king from his creation, unless one examine,
whether the words, from his creation, be to
be taken, as they may, for the time of the
commencement of his government, as the fore-
going words import, as soon as he was created
he ivas monarch ; or, for the cause of it, as he
says, p. 11. creation made man prince of his
posterity ? how farther can one judge of the
truth of his being thus king, till one has exa-
mined whether king be to be taken, as the
words in the beginning of this passage would
persuade, on supposition of his private do-
minion, which was, by Gods positive grant,
monarch of the world by appointment ; or king
on supposition of his fatherly power over his
offspring, which was by nature, due by the right
of nature ; whether, I say, king be to be taken
in both, or one only of these two senses, or in
neither of them, but only this, that creation
made him prince, in a way different from both
the other? For though this assertion, that
Adam was king from his creation, be due in no

OF GOVERNMENT. 23

sense, yet it stands here as an evident conclu-
sion drawn from the preceding- words, though
in truth it he but a bare assertion joined to
other assertions of the same kind, which confi-
dently put together in words of undetermined
and dubious meaning-, look like a sort of
arguing, when there is indeed neither proof nor
connection: a way very familiar with our
author: of which having given the reader a
taste here, I shall, as much as the argument
will permit me, avoid touching on hereafter;
and should not have done it here, were it not
to let the world see, how incoherences in
matter, and suppositions without proofs put
handsomely together in good words and a
plausible stile, are apt to pass for strong- reason
and good sense, till they come to be looked
into with attention.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty by Donation,
Gen. i. 28.

§. 21. Having at last got through the fore-
going passage, where we have been so long-
detained, not bv the force of arguments and
opposition, but by the intricacy of the words,
and the doubtfulness of the meaning ; let us
go on to his next argument for Adam's sove-
reignty. Our author tells us in the words of
Mr. Selaen, that ^idam hy donation from God,

24 OF GOVERNMENT.

Gen. i. 28. was made the general lord of all
things, not without such a private dominion to
himself, as without his grant did exclude his
children. This determination of Mr. Selden,
says our author, is consonant to the history of
the Bible, and natural reason, Observations
210. And in his Pref. to his Observations on
Aristotle, he says thus, The first government
in the ivorld was monarchial in the father of
all flesh, Adam being commanded to people and
multiply the earth, and to subdue it, and having
dominion given him over all creatures, was
thereby the monarch of the whole world: none
of his posterity had any right to possess any
thing, but by his grant or permission, or by
succession from him: The earth, saith the
Psalmist, hath he given to the children of men,
which shew the title comes from fatherhood ,

§. 22. Before I examine this argument, and
the text on which it is founded, it is necessary
to desire the reader to observe, that our au-
thor, according to his usual method, begins
in one sense, and concludes in another; he
begins here with Adam's propriety, or private
dominion, by donation; and his conclusion is,
which shew the title comes from fatherhood.

§. 23. But let us see the argument. The
words of the text are these : and God blessed
them, and God said unto them, be fruitful and
multiply, toid replenish the earth and subdue it,
and have dominion over the Jish of the sea, and
over the fowl of the air, and over every living

Ol GOVERNMENT. 25

thing' that moveth on the earth, Gen. i. *28. from
whence our author concludes, that Adam,
having here dominion given him over all crea-
tures, ivas therehy the monarch of the whole
world: whereby must he meant, that either
this grant of God gave Adam property, or as
our author calls it, private dominion over the
earth, and all inferior or irrational creatures,
and so consequently that he was thereby mo-
narch: or 2dly, that it gave him rule and
dominion over all earthly creatures whatso-
ever, and thereby over his children ; and so
he was monarch : for, as Mr. Selden has pro-
perly worded it, Adam was made general lord
of all things, one may very clearly understand
him, that he means nothing to be granted to
Adam here but property, and therefore he says
not one word of Adams monarchy . J3ut our
author says, Adam was hereby monarch of the
world, which, properly speaking, signifies so-
vereign ruler of all the men in the world ; and
so Adam, by this grant, must be constituted
such a ruler. If our author means otherwise,
he might with much clearness have said, that
Adam was hereby proprietor of the whole world.
But he begs your pardon in that point: clear
distinct speaking not serving every where to
his purpose, you must not expect it in him,
as in Mr. Selden, or other such writers.

§. 24. In opposition therefore to our author's
doctrine, that Adam was monarch of the whole
world, founded on this place, I shall shew,

26 OF GOVERNMENT.

1. That by this grant, Gen. i. 28. God gave
no immediate power to Adam over men, over
his children, over those of his own species;
and so he was not made ruler, or monarch, by
this charter.

2. That by this grant God gave him not
private dominion over the inferior creatures,
but right in common with all mankind ; so
neither was he monarch, upon the account of
the property here given him.

§. 25. That this donation, Gen. i. 28. gave
Adam no power over men, will appear if we
consider the words of it : for since all positive
grants convey no more than the express words
they are made in will carry, let us see which
of them here will comprehend mankind, or
Adam's posterity; and those, I imagine, if any,
must be these, evert/ living thing thai moveth :
the words in Hebrew are rwftin nvr i.e. JSes-
tiam Repfanlem, of which words the scripture
itself is the best interpreter: God having created
the fishes and fouls the fifth day, the beginning
of the sixth he creates the irrational inhabitants
of the dry land, which, v. 24. are described in
these words, let the earth bring forth the living
creature after his hind; cattle and creeping
things, and beasts of the earth, after his kind.
v. 2. And God made the beasts of the earth
after his hind, and cattle after their hind, and
every tiling that creepeth on the earth after his
hind: here, in the creation of the brute inhabi-
tants of the earth, he first speaks of them all

OF GOVERNMENT. 27

under one general name, of living creatures,
and then afterwards divides them into three
ranks, 1. Cattle, or such creatures as were or
might be tame, and so be the private posses-
sion of particular men ; 2. nvr which, vcr. 24
and 25. in our Bible, is translated beasts, and
by the Sepluagint 6>]pia, ivild beasts, and is the
same word, that here in our text, ver. 28.
where we have this great charter to Adam, is
translated living thins- and is also the same
word used, Gen. ix. 2. where this grant is
renewed to Noah, and there likewise transla-
ted beast. 5. The third rank were the creeping
animals, which ver. 24 and 25. are comprised
under the word JittfDTr, the same that is used
here, ver. 28. and is translated moving, but in
the former verses creeping, and by the Seplua-
gint in all these places, ip-ire-fr, or reptiles ; from
whence it appears, that the words which we
translate here in God's donation, ver 28. living
creatures moving, are the same, Which in the
history of the creation, ver. 24, 25. signify two
ranks of terrestrial creatures, viz. wild beasts
and reptiles, and are so understood by the
Septuagint .

§. 26. When God had made the irrational
animals of the world, divided into three kinds,
from the places of their habitation, viz. Jishcs
of the sea, fowls of the air, and living creatures
of the earth, and these again into cattle, wild
beasts, and reptiles, he considers of making
man, and the dominion lie should ha\e over

28 OF GOVERNMENT.

the terrestrial world, ver. 26. and then he
reckons up the inhabitants of these three king-
doms, but in the terrestrial leaves out the second
rank nrr or wild beasts : but here, ver. 28.
where he actually exercises this design, and
gives him this dominion, the text mentions the
fishes of the sea, and fowls of the air, and the
terrestrial creatures in the words that signify the
wild beasts and reptiles, though translated
living thing that movelh, leaving out cattle.
In both which places, though the word that
signifies wild beasts be omitted in one, and
that which signifies cattle in the other, yet,
since God certainly executed in one place,
what he declares he designed in the other, we
cannot but understand the same in both places,
and have here only an account, how the ter-
restrial irrational animals, which were already
created and reckoned up at their creation, in
three distinct ranks of cattle, wild beasts, and
reptiles, were here, ver. 28. actually put under
the dominion of man, as they were designed
ver. 26. nor do these words contain in them
the least appearance of any thing that can be
wrested to signify Gods giving to one man
dominion over another, to Adam over his
posterity.

*. 27. And this further appears from Gen.

ix. 2. where God renewing this charter to ISoah

and his sous, he gives them dominion over the

fouls of the air, and the fishes of the sea, and the

terrestrial creatures, expressed by rvn and t^DTT

OF GOVERNMENT. 29

wild beasts and reptiles, the same words that
in the text before us, Gen. i. 28. are translated
every moving thing, that moveth on the earth,
which by no means can comprehend man, the
grant being made to Noah and his sons, all the
men then living-, and not to one part of men
over another : which is yet more evident from
the very next words, ver. 3. where God gives
every W21 every moving thing, the very words
used, ch. i. 28. to them for food. By all which
it is plain that God's donation to Adam, ch. i.
28. and his designation, ver. 26. and his grant
again to Noah and his sons, refer to and con-
tain in them neither more nor less than the
works of the creation the fifth day, and the
beginning of the sixth, as they are set down
from the 20th to the 26th ver. inclusively of
the 1st chap, and so comprehend all the species
of irrational animals of the terraqueous globe,
though all the words, whereby they are ex-
pressed in the history of their creation, are no
where used in any of the following grants, but
some of them omitted in one, and some in
another. From whence I think it is past all
doubt, that man cannot be comprehended in
this grant, nor any dominion over those of his
own species be conveyed to Adam. All the
terrestrial irrational creatures are enumerated
at their creation, ver. 25. under the names
beasts of the earth, cattle and creeping things ;
but man being not then created, was not con-
tained under any of those names ; and there-

30 OF GOVERNMENT.

fore, whether we understand the Hebrew
words right or uo, they cannot be supposed to
comprehend man, in the very same history, and
the very next verses following, especially since
that Hebrew word ttfS") which, if any in this
donation to Adam, ch. i. 28. must comprehend
man, is so plainly used in contradistinction to
him, as Gen. vi. 20. vii. 14,21, 23. Gen. viii. 17,
19. And if God made all mankind slaves to
Adam and his heirs, by giving Adam dominion
over every living thing that movelhon the earth,
ch. i. 28. as our author would have it, methinks
Sir Robert should have carried his monarchial
power one step higher, and satisfied the world,
that princes might eat their subjects too, since
God gave as full power to Noah and his heirs,
ch. ix. 2. to eat every living tiling that move/ A,
us he did to Adam to have dominion over
them, the Hebrew words in both places being
the same.

§. 28. David, who might be supposed to
understand the donation of God in this text,
and the right of kings too, as well as our
author in his comment on this place, as the
learned and judicious Ainsivorth calls it, in the
8th Psalm, finds here uo such charter of mo-
narchial power : his words are, Thou hast made
him, i. e. man, the son of man, a little lower
than the angels; thou modest him to have
dominion over the works of thy hands ; thou hast
put all things under his feel, all sheep and oxen,
and the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the

OF GOVERNMENT. ,31

air, and fish of the sea, and whatsoever passeth
through the paths of the sea. In which words,
if any one can find out, that there is meant any
monarchial power of one man over another, but
only the dominion of the whole species of
mankind, over the inferior species of creatures,
he may, for aught I know, deserve to be one of
Sir Robert's monarch s in habit, for the rareness
of the discovery. And by this time, I hope it
is evident, that he that gave dominion over every
living thing that moveth on the earth, gave
Adam no monarchial power over those of his
own species, which will yet appear more fully
in the next thing I am to shew.

§. 29. 2. Whatever God gave by the words
of this grant, Gen. i. 28. it was not to Adam
in particular, exclusive of all other men : what-
ever dominion he had thereby, it was not a
private dominion, but a dominion in common
with the rest of mankind. That this donation
was not made in particular to Adam, appears
evidently from the words of the text, it being
made to more than one; for it was spoken in
the plural number, God blessed them, and said
unto them, Have dominion. God says unto
Adam and Eve, Have dominion ; thereby, says
our author, Adam was monarch of the world :
but the grant being to them, i. e. spoke to Eve
also, as many interpreters think with reason,
that these words were not spoken till Adam
had his wife, must not she thereby be lady, as
Mill as he lord of the world? If it be said, thai

32 OF GOVERNMENT,

Eve was subjected to Adam, it seems she was
not so subjected to him, as to binder her do-
minion over the creatures, or property in them:
for shall we say that God ever made a joint
grant to two, and one only was to have the
benefit of it I

§. 30. But perhaps it will be said, Eve was
not made till afterward : grant it so, what ad-
vantage will our author get by it? The text will
be only the more directly against him, and shew
that God, in this donation, gave the world to
mankind in common, and not to Adam in parti-
cular. The word them in the text must include
the species of man, for it is certain them can by
no means signify Adam alone. In the 26th
verse, where God declares his intention to give
this dominion, it is plain he meant, that he
would make a species of creatures, that should
have dominion over the other species of this
terrestrial globe : the words are, And God said,
Let ns make man in our image, after our like-
ness, and let them have dominion over the Jish,
<§c. They then were to have dominion. Who?
even those who were to have the image of God,
the individuals of that species of man, that
he was going to make; for that them should
signify Adam singly, exclusive of the rest that
should be in the world with him, is against
both scripture and all reason: and it cannot
possibly be made sense, if man in the former
part of the verse do not signify the same with
them in the latter ; only man there, as is usual,

OF GOVERNMENT. 33

is taken for the species, and them the indivi-
duals of that species: and we have a reason
in the very text. God makes him in his own
image, after his own likeness; makes him an
intellectual creature, and so capable of do-
minion: for whereinsoever else the image of
God consisted, the intellectual nature was
certainly a part of it, and belonged to the whole
species, and enabled them to have dominion
over the inferior creatures ; and therefore David
says in the 8th Psalm above cited, Thou hast
made him little lower than the angels, thou hast
made him to have dominion. It is not of Adam
king' David speaks here, for verse 4. it is plain,
it is of man, and the son of man, of the species
of mankind.

§.31. And that this grant spoken to Adam
was made to him, and the whole species of
man, is clear from our author's own proof out
of the Psalmist. The earth, saith the Psalmist,
hath he given to the children of men; which
shews the title comes from fatherhood. These
are Sir Roberfs words in the preface before
cited, and a strange inference it is he makes ;
God hath given the earth to the children of men,
ergo the title comes from fatherhood. It is pity
the propriety of the Hebrew tongue had not
used fathers of men, instead of children of men,
to express mankind, then indeed our author
might have had the countenance of the sound
of words, to have placed the title in the father-
hood. But to conclude, that the fatherhood

D

34 OF GOVERNMENT.

had the right to the earth, because God gave it
to the children of men, is a way of arguing
peculiar to our author : and a man must have
a great mind to go contrary to the sound as
well as the sense of the words before he could
light on it. But the sense is yet harder,
and more remote from our author's purpose :
for as it stands in his preface, it is to prove
Adam's being monarch, and his reasoning is
thus, God gave the earth to the children of men,
ergo Adam was monarch of the world. I defy
any man to make a more pleasant conclusion
than this, which cannot be excused from the
most obvious absurdity, till it can be shewn,
that by children of men, he who had no father,
Adam alone is signified ; but whatever our
author does, the scripture speaks not nonsense.

§. 32. To maintain this property and private
dominion of Adam, our author labours in the
following page to destroy the community grant-
ed to Noah and his sons, in that parallel
place, Gen. ix. 1, 2, 3, and he endeavours to
do it two ways.

1 . Sir Robert would persuade us against the
express words of the scripture, that what was
here granted to Noah, was not granted to his
sons in common with him. His words are,
As for the general community betiveen Noah and
his sons, which Mr. Selden will have to be
granted to them, Gen. ix. 2. the text doth not
warrant it. What warrant our author would
have, when the plain express words of scrip-

OF GOVERNMENT. 35

tare, not capable of another meaning, will not
satisfy him, who pretends to build wholly on
scripture, is not easy to imagine. The text
says, God blessed Noah and his sons, and said
unto them, i. e. as our author would have it,
unto him: for, saith he, although the sons are
there mentioned with Noah in the blessing, yet
it may best be understood, with a subordination
or benediction in succession, Observations, 21 J.
That indeed is best, for our author to be under-
stood, which best serves to his purpose; but
that truly may best be understood by any body
else, which best agrees with the plain construc-
tion of the words, and arises from the obvious
meaning of the place ; and then with subordi-
nation and in succession, will not be best under-
stood, in a grant of God, where he himself put
them not, nor mentions any such limitation.
But yet, our author has reasons, why it may
best be understood so. The blessing, says he
in the following words, might truly be fidjilled,
if the sons, either under or after their father,
enjoyed a private dominion, Observations, 211.
which is to say, that a grant, whose express
words give a joint title in present (for the text
says, into your hands they are delivered) may
best be understood with a subordination, or
in succession; because it is possible, that in
subordination, or in succession, it may be
enjoyed. Which is all one as to say, that a
grant of any thing in present possession, may
best be understood of reversion ; because it is

d 2

30 OF GOVERNMENT.

possible one may live to enjoy it in reversion.
Ifthe grant be indeed to a father and to his
sons after him, who is so kind as to let his
children enjoy it presently in common with
him, one may truly say, as to the event one
will be as good as the other ; but it can never
be true, that what the express words grant
in possession, and in common, may best be un-
derstood, to be in reversion. The sum of all his
reasoning amounts to this : God did not give to
the sons of Noah the world in common with
their father, because it was possible they might
enjoy it under, or after him. A very good
sort of argument against an express text of
scripture : but God must not be believed,
though he speaks it himself, when he says he
does any thing, which will not consist with Sir
Robert's hypothesis.

§. 33. For it is plain, however he would ex-
clude them, that part of this benediction, as he
would have it in succession, must needs be
meant to the sons, and not to Noah himself
at all : Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish
the earth, says God, in this blessing. This part
of the benediction, as appears by the sequel,
concerned not Noah himself at all : for we
read not of any children he had after the flood ;
and in the following chapter, where his posterity
is reckoned up, there is no mention of any ;
and so this benediction in succession was not
to take place till 350 years after : and to save
our author's imaginary monarchy, the peopling

OF GOVERNMENT. 37

of the world must be deferred 350 years ; for
this part of the benediction cannot be under-
stood with subordination, unless our author
will say, that they must ask leave of their father
Noah to lie with their wives. But in this one
point our author is constant to himself in all
his discourses, he takes great care there should
be monarchs in the world, but very little that
there should be people; and indeed his way of
government is not the way to people the
world : for how much absolute monarchy helps
to fulfil this great and primary blessing of God
Almighty, Be fruitful, and multiply, and re-
plenish the earth, which contains in it the
improvement too of arts and sciences, and the
conveniences of life, may be seen in those large
and rich countries which are happy under the
Turkish government, where are not now to be
found one third, nay, in many, if not most
parts of them one thirtieth, perhaps I might
say not one hundredth of the people, that were
formerly, as will easily appear to any one, who
will compare the accounts we have of it at this
time, with antient history. But this by the by.
§. 34. The other parts of this benediction, or
grant, are so expressed, that they must needs
be understood to belong equally to them all ;
as much to Noah's sons as to Noah himself,
and not to his sons ivith a subordination, or in
succession. The fear of you, and the dread of
you, says God, shall be upon every beast, &c.
Will any body but our author say, that the

38 OF GOVERNMENT.

creatures feared and stood in awe of Noah
only, and not of his sons without his leave, or
till after his death? And the following words,
into your hands they are delivered, are they to
be understood as our author says, if your
father please, or they shall be delivered into
your hands hereafter? If this be to argue from
scripture, I know not what may not be proved
by it ; and I can scarce see how much this
differs from that fiction and fansie, or how
much a surer foundation it will prove, than
the opinions of philosophers and poets, which
our author so much condemns in his preface.

§. 35. But our author goes on to prove, that
it may best be understood with a subordination,
or a benediction in succession ; for, says he, it is
not probable that the private dominion which
God gave to Adam, and by his donation, assig-
nation, or cession to his children, teas abrogated,
and a community of all things instituted between

Noah and his sons Noah was left the sole

heir of the world; tvhy shoidd it be thought
that God ivould disinherit him of his birth-
right, and make him of all men in the icorld
the only tenant in common with his children?
Observations, 211.

§. 36. The prejudices of our own ill-ground-
ed opinions, however by us called probable,
cannot authorise us to understand scripture
contrary to the direct and plain meaning of
the words. 1 grant, it is not probable, that
Adam's )>rivale dominion was here abrogated:

OF GOVERNMENT. ,*>■>

because it is more than probable, (for it will
never be proved) that ever Adam had any such
private dominion: and since parallel places of
scripture are most probable to make us know
how they may be best understood, there needs
but the comparing this blessing here to Noah
and his sons after the flood, with that to Adam
after the creation, Gen. i. 28. to assure any one
that God gave Adam no such private domi-
nion. It is probable, I confess, that Noah
should have the same title, the same property
and dominion after the flood, that Adam had
before it : but since private dominion cannot
consist with the blessing and grant God gave
to him and his sons in common, it is a suffi-
cient reason to conclude, that Adam had none,
especially since in the donation made to him,
there are no words that express it, or do in the
least favour it ; and then let my reader judge
whether it may best be understood, when in the
one place there is not one word for it, not to
say what has been above proved, that the text
itself proves the contrary ; and in the other,
the words and sense are directly against it.

§. 37. But our author says, Noah urns the
sole heir of the world ; why should it be thought
that God tvoidd disinherit him of his birth-
right? Heir, indeed, in England, signifies the
eldest son, who is by the law of England to
have all his father's land ; but Avhere God
ever appointed any such heir of the world,
our author would have done well to have

40 OF GOVERNMENT.

shewed us ; and how God disinherited him of
his birth-right, or what harm was done him if
God gave his sons a right to make use of a
part of the earth for the support of themselves
and families, when the whole was not only
more than Noah himself, but infinitely more
than they all could make use of, and the pos-
sessions of one could not at all prejudice, or,
as to any use, streighten that of the other.

§. 38. Our author probably foreseeing he
might not be very successful in persuading
people out of their senses, and, say what he
could, men would be apt to believe the plain
words of scripture, and think, as they saw,
that the grant was spoken to Noah and his
sons jointly; he endeavours to insinuate, as
if this grant to Noah conveyed no property,
no dominion ; because, subduing the earth and
dominion over the creatures are therein omit-
ted, nor the earth once named. And therefore,
says he, there is a considerable difference be-
tween these two texts ; the first blessing gave
Adam a dominion over the earth and all crea-
tures; the latter allows Noah liberty to use the
living creatures for food: here is no alteration
or diminishing of his title to a property of all
things, but an enlargement only of his com-
mons, Observations, 211. So that in our
author's sense, all that was said here to Noah
and his sons, gave them no dominion, no pro-
perty, but only enlarged the commons; their
commons, I should say, since God says, to you

OF GOVERNMENT. 41

are they given, though our author says his ; for
as for Noah's sons, they, it seems, by Sir Ro-
bert's appointment, during - their father's life-
time, were to keep fasting days.

§. 39. Any one but our author would be
mightily suspected to be blinded with preju-
dice, that in all this blessing to Noah and his
sons, could see nothing but only an enlarge-
ment of commons : for as to dominion which
our author thinks omitted, the fear of you, and
the dread of you, says God, shall be upon every
beast, which I suppose expresses the dominion^
or superiority was designed man over the
living creatures, as fully as may be ; for in that
fear and dread seems chiefly to consist what
was given to Adam over the inferior animals ;
who, as absolute a monarch as he was, could
not make bold with a lark or rabbet to satisfy
his hunger, and had the herbs but in common
with the beasts, as is plain from Gen. i. 2, 9,
and 30. In the next place, it is manifest that
in this blessing to Noah and his sons, property
is not only given in clear words, but in a
larger extent than it was to Adam. Into your
hands they are given, says God to Noah and
his sons ; which words, if they give not pro-
perty, nay, property in possession, it will be
hard to find words that can; since there is not
a way to express a man's being possessed of
any thing more natural, nor more certain, than
to say, it is delivered into his hands. And
ver. 3. to shew, that they had then given them

42 OF GOVERNMENT.

the utmost property man is capable of, which
is to have a right to destroy any thing by
using it ; Every moving thing that liveth, saith
God, shall be meat for you; which was not al-
lowed to Adam in his charter. This our au-
thor calls a liberty of using them for food, and
only an enlargement of commons, but no altera-
tion of property, Observations, 21 1. What other
property man can have in the creatures, but the
liberty of using them, is hard to be understood :
so that if the first blessing, as our author says,
gave Adam dominion over the creatures, and
the blessing to Noah and his sons, gave them
such a liberty to use them, as Adam had not;
it must needs give them something that Adam
with all his sovereignty wanted, something that
one would be apt to take for a greater proper-
ty ; for certainly he has no absolute dominion
over even the brutal part of the creatures ; and
the property he has in them is very narrow and
scanty, who cannot make that use of them,
which is permitted to another. Should any
one who is absolute lord of a country, have
bidden our author subdue the earth, and given
him dominion over the creatures in it, but not
have permitted him to have taken a kid or a
lamb out of the flock, to satisfy his hunger,
I guess, he would scarce have thought him-
self lord or proprietor of that land, or the
cattle on it; but would have found the dif-
ference between having dominion, which a
shepherd may have, and having full property

OF GOVERNMENT. 43

as an owner. So that, had it been his own
case, Sir Robert, I believe, would have thought
here was an alteration, nay, an enlarging of
property ; and that Noah and his children had
by this grant, not only property given them,
but such a property given them in the crea-
tures, as Adam had not : for however, in re-
spect of one another, men may be allowed
to have propriety in their distinct portions of
the creatures ; yet in respect of God the maker
of heaven and earth, who is sole lord and pro-
prietor of the whole world, man's propriety
in the creatures is nothing but that liberty to
use them, which God has permitted ; and so
man's property may be altered and enlarged,
as we see it was here, after the flood, when
other uses of them are allowed, which before
were not. From all which 1 suppose it is
clear, that neither Adam, nor Noah, had any
private dominion, any property in the crea-
tures, exclusive of his posterity, as they should
successively grow up into need of them, and
come to be able to make use of them.

§. 40. Thus we have examined our author's
argument for Adams monarchy, founded on
the blessing pronounced, Gen. i. 28. wherein I
think it is impossible for any sober reader, to
find any other but the setting of mankind
above the other kinds of creatures, in this
habitable earth of ours. It is nothing but the
giving lo man, the whole species of man, as
the chief inhabitant, who is the image of hi^

44 OF GOVERNMENT.

maker, the dominion over the other creatures.
This lies so obvious in the plain words, that
any one, but our author, would have thought it
necessary to have shewn, how these words,
that seemed to say quite the contrary, gave
Adam monarchial absolute power over other men,
or the sole property in all the creatures ; and
methinks in a business of this moment, and
that whereon he builds all that follows, he
should have done something* more than barely
cite words, which apparently make against
him ; for I confess, I cannot see any thing in
them, tending to Adams monarchy, or private
dominion, but quite the contrary. And I the
less deplore the dulness of my apprehension
herein, since I find the apostle seems to have
as little notion of any such private dominion of
Adam as 1, when he says, God gives ns all things
richly to enjoy, which he could not do, if it were
all given away already, to monarch Adam, and
the monarchs his heirs and successors. To
conclude, this text is so far from proving Adam
sole proprietor, that, on the contrary, it is a
confirmation of the original community of all
things amongst the sons of men, which appear-
ing from this donation of God, as well as other
places of scripture, the sovereignty of Adam,
built upon his private dominion, must fall, not
having any foundation to support it.

§.41. But yet, if after all, any one will
needs have it so, that by this donation of God,
Adam was made sole proprietor of the whole

OF GOVERNMENT. 45

earth, what will this be to his sovereignty? and
how will it appear, that propriety in land gives
a man power over the life of another? or how
will the possession even of the whole earth,
give any one a sovereign arbitrary authority
over the persons of men? The most specious
thing to be said, is, that he that is proprietor
of the whole world, may deny all the rest of
mankind food, and so at his pleasure starve
them, if they will not acknowledge his so-
vereignty, and obey his will. If this were
true, it would be a good argument to prove,
that there never was any such property, that
God never gave any such private dominion ;
since it is more reasonable to think, that God,
who bid mankind increase and multiply, should
rather himself give them all a right to make
use of the food and raiment, and other conve-
niences of life, the materials whereof he had
so plentifully provided for them ; than to make
them depend upon the will of a man for their
subsistence, who should have power to destroy
them all when he pleased, and who, being no
better than other men, was in succession like-
lier, by want and the dependence of a scanty
fortune, to tie them to hard service, than by
liberal allowance of the conveniences of life to
promote the great design of God, increase and
multiply : he that doubts this, let him look into
the absolute monarchies of the world, and see
what becomes of the conveniences of life, and
the multitudes of people.

4G OF GOVERNMENT.

§. 42. But we know God hath not left one
man so to the mercy of another, that he may
starve him if he please : God the Lord and
Father of all, has given no one of his children
such a property in his peculiar portion of the
things of this world, but that he has given his
needy brother a right to the surplusage of his
goods; so that it cannot justly be denied him,
when his pressing wants call for it : and there-
fore no man could ever have a just power over
the life of another by right of property in land
or possessions ; since it would always be a sin,
in any man of estate, to let his brother perish
for want of affording him relief out of his
plenty. As justice gives every man a title to
the product of his honest industry, and the
fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to
him ; so charity gives every man a title to so
much out of another's plenty, as will keep him
from extreme want, where he has no means
to subsist otherwise : and a man can no more
justly make use of another's necessity, to force
him to become his vassal, by with-holding that
relief, God requires him to afford to the wants
of his brother, than he that has more strength
can seize upon a weaker, master him to his
obedience, and with a dagger at his throat offer
him death or slavery.

§. 43. Should any one make so perverse an
use of God's blessings poured on him with a
liberal hand ; should any one be cruel and un-
charitable to that extremity, yet all this would

OF GOVERNMENT. 47

not prove that propriety in land, even in this
case, gave any authority over the persons of
men, but only that compact might ; since the
authority of the rich proprietor, and the sub-
jection of the needy beggar, began not from
the possession of the lord, but the consent of
the poor man, who preferred being his subject
to starving. And the man he thus submits to,
can pretend to no more power over him, than
he has consented to, upon compact. Upon
this ground a man's having his stores filled in
a time of scarcity, having money in his pocket,
being in a vessel at sea, being able to swim, fyc.
may as well be the foundation of rule and
dominion, as being possessor of all the land
in the world ; any of these being sufficient to
enable me to save a man's life, who would
perish if such assistance were denied him ;
and any thing, by this rule, that may be an
occasion of working upon another's necessity,
to save his life, or any thing dear to him, at the
rate of his freedom, may be made a foundation
of sovereignty, as well as property. From all
which it is clear, that though God should have
given Adam private dominion, yet that private
dominion could give him no sovereignty ; but
we have already sufficiently proved, that God
gave him no private dominion.

48 OF GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER V.

Of Adam's Title to sovereignty by the subjec-
tion o/"Eve.

§. 44. The next place of scripture we find
our author builds his monarchy of Adam on,
is, Gen. iii. 26. And thy desire shall be to thy
husband, and he shall rule over thee. Here ice
have (says he) the original grant of government ,
from whence he concludes, in the following
part of the page, Observations, 244. That the
supreme poiver is settled in the fatherhood, and
limited to one kind of government, that is, to
monarchy. For let his premises be what they
will, this is always the conclusion ; let rule, in
any text, be but once named, and presently
absolute monarchy is by divine right established.
If any one will but carefully read our author's
own reasoning from these words, Observations,
244. and consider, among other things, the
line and posterity of Adam, as he there brings
them in, he will find some difficulty to make
sense of what he says ; but we will allow this
at present to his peculiar May of writing, and
consider the force of the text in hand. The
words are the curse of God upon the woman
for having been the first and forwardest in the
disobedience ; and if we will consider the
occasion of what God says here to our first
parents, that he was denouncing judgement,

OF GOVERN MENT. 49

and declaring lii.s wrath against them both,
for their disobedience, we cannot suppose that
this was the time, wherein God was granting
Adam prerogatives and privileges, investing
him with dignity and authority, elevating him
to dominion and monarchy : for though, as
a helper in the temptation, Eve was laid below
him, and so he had accidentally a superiority
over her, for her greater punishment; yet he
too had his share in the fall, as well as the sin,
and was laid lower, as may be seen in the
following verses ; and it would be hard to
imagine, that God, in the same breath, should
make him universal monarch over all mankind,
and a day-labourer for his life ; turn him out
of paradise to till the ground, ver. 23. and at
the same time advance him to a throne, and
all the privileges and ease of absolute power.
§. 45. This was not a time, when Adam
could expect any favours, any grant of privi-
leges from his offended Maker. If this be
the original grant of government, as our author
tells us, and Adam was now made monarch,
whatever Sir Robert would have him, it is
plain, God made him but a very poor monarch,
such an one, as our author himself would have
counted it no great privilege to be. God sets
him to work for his living, and seems rather to
give him a spade into his hand, to subdue the
earth, than a sceptre to rule over its inhabi-
tants. In the sweat of thy face thou shall eat
thy bread, says God to him, ver. 19. This was

E

50 OF GOVERNMENT.

unavoidable, may it perhaps be answered,
because he was yet without subjects, and had
nobody to work for him ; but afterwards, living
as he did above 900 years, he might have
people enough, whom he might command to
work for him ; no, says God, not only whilst
thou art without other help, save thy wife, but
as long thou livest, shalt thou live by thy
labour, In the sweat of thy face, shalt thou eat
thy bread, till thou return unto the ground, for
out of it wast thou taken, for dust thou art, and
unto dust shalt thou return, v. 19. It will
perhaps be answered again in favour of our
author, that these words are not spoken person-
ally to Adam, but in him, as their representa-
tive, to all mankind, this being a curse upon
mankind, because of the fall.

§. 46. God, I believe, speaks differently
from men, because he speaks with more truth,
more certainty : but when he vouchsafes to
speak to men, I do not think he speaks
differently from them, in crossing the rules of
language in use amongst them : this would not
be to condescend to their capacities, when he
humbles himself to speak to them, but to lose
his design in speaking what, thus spoken,
they could not understand. And yet thus
must we think of God, if the interpretations
of scripture, necessary to maintain our author's
doctrine, must be received for good : for by
the ordinary rules of language, it will be very
hard to understand what God says, if what he

OF GOVERNMENT. r > 1

speaks here, in the singular number, to Adam,
must be understood to be spoken to all man-
kind, and what he says in the plural number,
Gen. i. 26, and 28. must be understood of
Adam alone, exclusive of all others, and what
he says to Noah and his sons jointly, must
be understood to be meant to Noah alone,
Gen. ix.

§. 47. Farther it is to be noted, that these
words here of Gen. iii. 10. which our author
calls the original grant of government, were not
spoken to Adam, neither indeed was there any
grant in them made to Adam, but a punishment
laid upon Eve: and if we will take them as
they were directed in particular to her, or in
her, as their representative to all other women,
they will at most concern the female sex only,
and import no more, but that subjection they
should ordinarily be in to their husband : but
there is here no more law to oblige a woman
to such subjection, if the circumstances either
of her condition, or contract with her husbands,
should exempt her from it, than there is, that
she should bring forth her children in sorrow
and pain, if there could be found a remedy for
it, which is also a part of the same curse upon
her : for the whole verse runs thus, Unto the
woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy
sorrow and thy conception ; in sorrow thou shalt
bring forth children, and thy desire shall be to
thy husband, and he shall rule over thee. It
would, I think, have been a hard matter for

e 2

52 OF GOVERNMENT.

any body, but our author, to have found out a
grant of monarchical government to Adam in
these words, which were neither spoke to, nor
of him : neither will any one, I suppose, by
these words, think the weaker sex, as by a
law, so subjected to the curse contained in
them, that it is their duty not to endeavour to
avoid it. And will any one say, that Ere, or
any other woman, sinned, if she were brought
to bed without those multiplied pains God
threatens her here with ? or that either of our
queens, Mary or Elisabeth, had they married
any of their subjects, had been by this text,
put into a political subjection to him ? or that
he thereby should have had monarchical rule
over her? God, in this text, gives not, that I
see, any authority to Adam over Eve, or to
men over their wives, but only foretels what
should be the woman's lot, how by his provi-
dence he would order it so, that she should
be subject to her husband, as we see that
generally the laws of mankind and customs of
nations have ordered it so; and there is, I
grant, a foundation in nature for it.

§. 48. Thus when God says of Jacob and
Esau, that the elder should serve the younger,
Gen. xxv. 23. no body supposes that God
hereby made Jacob Esaus sovereign, but fore-
told what should de facto come to pass.

But if these words here spoke to Eve must
needs be understood as a law to bind her and
all other women to subjection, it can be no

OF GOVERNMENT. i>3

other subjection than what every wife owes her
husband : and then if this be the original grant
of government and the foundation of monar-
chical power, there will be as many inonarchs
as there are husbands : if therefore these words
give any power to Adam, it can be only a con-
jugal power, not political ; the power that every
husband hath to order the things of private con-
cernment in his family, as proprietor of the goods
and land there, and to have his will take place be-
fore that of his wife in all things of their common
concernment; but not a political power of life
and death over her, much less over any body else.
§. 49. This I am sure : if our author will
have this text to be a grant, lite original grant
of government, political government, he ought
to have proved it by some better arguments
than by barely saying, that thy desire shall be
unto thy husband, was a law whereby Eve, and
all that should come of her, were subjected to
the absolute monarchical power of Adam and
his keirs. Thy desire shall be to thy husband,
is too doubtful an expression, of whose signi-
fication interpreters are not agreed, to build so
confidently on, and in a matter of such moment,
and so great and general concernment: but
our author, according to his way of writing,
having once named the text, concludes pre-
sently without any more ado, that the meaning
is as he would have it. Let the words rule
and subject be but found in the text or margent,
and it immediately signifies the duty of a sub-

54 OF GOVERNMENT.

ject to' his prince; the relation is changed,
and though God says husband, Sir Robert will
have it king; Adam has presently absolute
monarchial power over Eve, and not only over
Eve, but all that should come of her, though
the scripture says not a word of it, nor our
author a word to prove it. But Adam must
for all that be an absolute monarch, and so
down to the end of the chapter. And here I
leave my reader to consider, whether my bare
saying, without offering any reasons to evince
it, that this text gave not Adam that absolute
monarchial power, our author supposes, be not
sufficient to destroy that power, as his bare
assertion is to establish it, since the text men-
tions neither prince nor people, speaks nothing
of absolute or monarchial power, but the sub-
jection of Eve to Adam, a wife to her husband.
And he that would trace our author so all
through, would make a short and sufficient
answer to the greatest part of the grounds he
proceeds on, and abundantly confute them by
barely denying ; it being a sufficient answer to
assertions without proof, to deny them without
giving a reason. And therefore should I have
said nothing but barely denied, that by this
text the supreme power was settled and founded
by God himself, in the fatherhood, limited to
monarchy, and that to Adam's person and heirs,
all which our author notably concludes from
these words, as may be seen in the same page,
Observations, 244. it had been a sufficient an-

OF GOVERNMENT. 55

swer: should I have desired any sober man
only to have read the text, and considered to
whom, and on what occasion it was spoken,
he would no doubt have wondered how our
author found out monarchial absolute power in
it, had he not had an exceeding good faculty
to find it himself, where he could not shew it
others. And thus we have examined the two
places of scripture, all that I remember our
author brings to prove Adams sovereignty, that
supremacy, which he says, it was Gods ordi-
nance should be unlimited in Adam, and as
large as all the acts of his will, Observations,
254. viz. Gen. i. 28. and Gen. hi. 16. one where-
of signifies only the subjection of the inferior
ranks of creatures to mankind, and the other
the subjection that is due from a wife to her
husband, both far enough from that which
subjects owe the governors of political societies.

CHAPTER VI.

Of Adam's Title to Sovereignty by Fatherhood.

§. 50. There is one thing more, and then I
think I have given you all that our author
brings for proof of Adam's sovereignty, and
that is a supposition of a natural right of domi-
nion over his children, by being their father :
and this title of fatherhood he is so pleased
with, that you will find it brought in almost
in every page; particularly he says, not only

56 OF GOVERNMENT.

Adam, but the succeeding patriarchs had by
right of fatherhood royal authority over their
children, p. 12. And in the same page, this
subjection of children being the fountain of all
regal authority, &c. This being, as one would
think by his so frequent mentioning it, the
main basis of all his frame, we may well ex-
pect clear and evident reason for it, since he
lays it down as a position necessary to his
purpose, that every man that is born is so far
from being free, that by his very birth he becomes
a subject of him that begets him, Observations,
156. so that Adam being the only man created,
and all ever since being begotten, no body has
been born free. If we ask how Adam comes
by this power over his children, he tells us
here it is by begetting them : and so again, Ob-
servations, 223. this natural dominion of Adam,
says he, may be proved out of Grotius, himself,
who teacheth, that generatione jus acquiritur
parentibus in liberos. And indeed the act of
begetting being that which makes a man a
father, his right of a father over his children
can naturally arise from nothing else.

§. 51. Grotius tells us not here how far this
jus in liberos, this power of parents over their
children extends; but our author, always very
clear in the point, assures us, it is supreme powet\
and like that of absolute monarchs over their
slaves, absolute power of life and death. He
that should demand of him, how, or for what
reason it is, that begetting a child gives the

OF GOVERNMENT. 57

father such an absolute power over him, will
find him answer nothing : we are to take his
word for this, as well as several other things;
and by that the laws of nature and the consti-
tutions of government must stand or fall. Had
he been an absolute monarch, this way of talk-
ing might have suited well enough ; pro ratione
voluntas might have been of force in his mouth ;
but in the way of proof or argument is very
unbecoming, and will little advantage his plea
for absolute monarchy. Sir Robert has too
much lessened a subject's authority to leave
himself the hopes of establishing any thing by
bis bare saying it; one slave's opinion without
proof is not of weight enough to dispose of
the liberty and fortunes of all mankind. If all
men are not, as I think they are, naturally
equal, I am sure all slaves are; and then I
may without presumption oppose my single
opinion to his ; and be confident that my say-
ing, that begetting of children makes them not
slaves to their fathers, as certainly sets all man-
kind free, as his affirming the contrary makes
them all slaves. But that this position, which
is the foundation of all their doctrine, who
would have monarchy to be jure divino, may
have all fair play, let us hear what reasons
others give for it, since our author offers none.

§. 52. The argument, I have heard others
make use of, to prove that fathers, by begetting
them, come by an absolute power over their
children, is this; that fathers have a power over

58 OF GOVERNMENT.

the lives of their children, because they give
them life and being; which is the only proof it
is capable of: since there can be no reason,
why naturally one man should have any claim
or pretence of right over that in another, which
was never his, which he bestowed not, but was
received from the bounty of another. 1. I an-
swer, that every one who gives another any
thing, has not always thereby a right to take it
away again. But, 2. They who say the father
gives life to his children, are so dazzled with
the thoughts of monarchy, that they do not,
as they ought, remember God, who is the au-
thor and giver of life : it is in him alone ive
lire, more, and hare our being. How can he
be thought to give life to another, that knows
not wherein his own life consists? Philoso-
phers are at a loss about it after their most
diligent enquiries ; and anatomists, after their
whole lives and studies spent in dissections,
and diligent examining the bodies of men, con-
fess their ignorance in the structure and use
of many parts of man's body, and in that
operation wherein life consists in the whole.
And doth the rude plough-man, or the more
ignorant voluptuary, frame or fashion such an
admirable engine as this is, and then put life
and sense into it? Can any man say, he formed
the parts that are necessary to the life of his
child ? or can he suppose himself to give the
life, and yet not know what subject is fit to
receive it, nor what actions or organs are
necessary for its reception or preservation ?

OF GOVERNMENT. ijQ

§; o3. To give life to that Which has yet no
being, is to frame and make a living- creature,
fashion the parts, and mould and suit them to
their uses, and having proportioned and titted
them together, to put into them a living soul.
He that could do this, might indeed have
some pretence to destroy his own workman-
ship. But is there any one so bold, that dares
thus far arrogate to himself, the incomprehen-
sible works of the Almighty? Who alone did
at first, and continues still to make a living
soul, he alone can breathe in the breath of life.
If any one thinks himself an artist at this, let
him number up the parts of his child's body
which he hath made, tell me their uses and
operations, and when the living and rational
soul began to inhabit this curious structure,
when sense began, and how this engine, which
he has framed, thinks and reasons: if he made
it, let him, when it is out of order, mend it, at
least tell wherein the defects lie. Shall he that
made the eye not see ? says the Psalmist, Psalm
xciv. 9. See these men's vanities : the struc-
ture of that one part is sufficient to convince
us of an all-wise contriver, and he has so visi-
ble a claim to us as his workmanship, that
one of the ordinary appellations of God in
scripture is, God our Maker, and the Lord our
Maker. And therefore though our author, for
the magnifying his fatherhood, be pleased to
say, Observations, 159. That even the power
which God himself exercisclh over mankind is

GO OF GOVERNMENT.

by right of fatherhood, yet this fatherhood is
such an one as utterly excludes all pretence of
title in earthly parents ; for he is king, because
he is indeed maker of us all, which no parents
can pretend to be of their children.

§. 54. But had men skill and power to make
their children, it is not so slight a piece of
workmanship, that it can be imagined, they
could make them without designing it. What
father of a thousand, when he begets a child,
thinks farther than the satisfying his present
appetite! God in his infinite wisdom has put
strong desires of copulation into the consti-
tution of men, thereby to continue the race of
mankind, which he doth most commonly with-
out the intention, and often against the consent
and will of the begetter. And indeed those
who desire and design children, are but the
occasions of their being, and when they design
and wish to beget them, do little more towards
their making, than Deucalion and his wife in
the fable did towards the making of mankind,
by throwing pebbles over their heads.

§. 55. But grant that the parents made their
children, gave them life and being, and that
hence there followed an absolute power. This
would give the father but a joint dominion
with the mother over them : for nobody can
deny but that the woman hath an equal share,
if not the greater, as nourishing the child a
long time in her own body out of her own
substance ; there it is fashioned, and from her

OF GOVERNMENT. <M

it receives the materials and principles of its
constitution : and it is so hard to imagine the
rational soul should presently inhabit the yet
unformed embrio, as soon as the father has
done his part in the act of generation, that if
it must be supposed to derive any thing from
the parents, it must certainly owe most to the
mother. But be that as it will, the mother
cannot be denied an equal share in begetting
of the child, and so the absolute authority of
of the father will not arise from hence. Our
author indeed is of another mind ; for he says,
We know that God at the creation gave the
sovereignty to the man over the woman, as being
the nobler and principal agent in generation,
Observations, 172. I remember not this in
my Bible; and when the place is brought
where God at the creation gave the sovereignty
to man over the woman, and that for this
reason, because he is the nobler and principal
agent in generation, it will be time enough to
consider, and answer it. But it is no new
thing for our author to tell us his own fancies
for certain and divine truths, though there be
often a great deal of difference between his
and divine revelations ; for God in scripture
says, his father and his mother that begot him.
§. 56. They who alledge the practice of
mankind, for exposing or selling their children,
as a proof of their power over them, are with
Sir Robert happy arguers ; and cannot but
recommend their opinion, by founding it on

62 OF GOVERNMENT.

Ihe most shameful action, and most unnatural
murder, human nature is capable of. The
dens of lions and nurseries of wolves know no
such cruelty as this : these savage inhabitants
of the desalt obey God and nature in being-
tender and careful of their offspring: they will
hunt, watch, fight, and almost starve for the
preservation of their young ; never part with
them; never forsake them, till they are able
to shift for themselves. And is it the privilege
of man alone to act more contrary to nature
than the wild and most untamed part of the
creation? Doth God forbid us under the se-
verest penalty, that of death, to take away the
life of any man, a stranger, and upon provoca-
tion ? and does he permit us to destroy those,
he has given us the charge of; and by the
dictates of nature and reason, as well as his
revealed command, requires us to preserve?
He has in all the parts of the creation taken a
peculiar care to propagate and continue the
several species of creatures, and make the in-
dividuals act so strongly to this end, that they
sometimes neglect their own private good for
it, and seem to forget that general rule, which
nature teaches all things, of self-preservation;
and the preservation of their young, as the
strongest principle in them, over-rules the con-
stitution of their particular natures. Thus we
see, when their young stand in need of it, the
timorous become valiant, the fierce and savage
kind, and the ravenous tender and liberal.

OF GOVERNMENT. 03

&. .57. But if the example of what bath been
done, be the rule of what ought to be, history
would have furnished our author with instances
of this absolute fatherly power in its height and
perfection, and he might have shewed us in
Peru, people that begot children on purpose
to fatten and eat them. The story is so
remarkable that I cannot but set it down in the
author's words. " In some provinces, says he,
" they were so liquorish after man's flesh, that
" they would not have the patience to stay
" till the breath was out of the body, but
" would suck the blood as it ran from the
" wounds of the dying man ; they had public
" shambles of man's flesh, and their madness
" herein was to that degree, that they spared
" not their own children, which they had begot
" on strangers taken in war: for they made
" their captives their mistresses, and choicely
" nourished the children they had by them, till
" about thirteen years old they butchered and
" eat them; and they served the mothers after
" the same fashion, when they grew past child-
" bearing, and ceased to bring them any more
" roasters." Garci lasso de la vega Hist, ties
Yucas de Peru, 1. i. c. 12.

§. 58. Thus far can the busy mind of man
carry him to a brutality below the level of
beasts, when he quits his reason, which places
him almost equal to angels. Nor can it be
otherwise in a creature, whose thoughts are
more than the sands, and wider than the ocean,

Gi OF GOVERNMENT.

-where fancy and passion must needs run him
into strange courses, if reason, which is his
only star and compass be not that he steers
by. The imagination is always restless, and
suggests variety of thoughts, and the will,
reason being laid aside, is ready for every extra-
vagant project ; and in this state, he that goes
farthest out of the way, is thought fittest to
lead, and is sure of most followers: and when
fashion hath once established what folly or
craft began, custom makes it sacred, and if
will be thought impudence, or madness, to con-
tradict or question it. He that will imparti-
ally survey the nations of the world, will find
so much of their religions, governments and
manners, brought in and continued amongst
them by these means, that he will have but
little reverence for the practices which are in
use and credit amongst men ; and will have
reason to think, that the woods and forests,
where the irrational untaught inhabitants keep
right by following nature, are fitter to give us
rules, than cities and palaces, where those that
call themselves civil and rational, go out of
their way, by the authority of example. If
precedents are sufficient to establish a rule in
this case, our author might have found in holy
writ children sacrificed by their parents, and
this amongst the people of God themselves:
the Psalmist tells us, Psal. cvi. 38. They shed
innocent blood, even the blood of their sons and
of their daughters, whom they sacrificed unto

OF GOVERNMENT, G-3

the idols of Canaan. But God judged not of
this by our author's rule, nor allowed of the
authority of practice against his righteous law ;
but as it follows there, the land teas polluted
with blood; therefore teas the wrath of the
Lord kindled against his people, insomuch that
he abhorred his own inheritance. The killing
of their children, though it were fashionable,
was charged on them as innocent blood, and
so had in the account of God the guilt of
murder, as the offering them to idols had the
guilt of idolatry.

§. 59. Be it then, as Sir Robert says, that
anciently it was usual for men to sell and cas-
trate their children, Observations, 155. Let it
be, that they exposed them ; add to it, if you
please, for this is still greater power, that they
begat them for their tables, to fat and eat
them : if this proves a right to do so, we may,
by the same argument, justify adultery, incest
and sodomy, for there are examples of these
too, both ancient and modern ; sins, which I
suppose have their principal aggravation from
this, that they cross the main intention of
nature, which willeth the increase of mankind,
and the continuation of the species in the high-
est perfection, and the distinction of families,
with the security of the marriage-bed, as
necessary thereunto.

§. 60. In confirmation of this natural autho-
rity of the father, our author brings a lame
proof from the positive command of God in

66 OF GOVERNMENT.

scripture: his words are, To confirm the natural
right of regal power, ice find in the Decalogue,
that the law which enjoins obedience to kings, is
delivered in the terms, Honour thy father, p.
23. Whereas many confess, that government
only in the abstract, is the ordinance of God,
they are not able to prove any such ordinance in
the scripture, but only in the fatherly power;
and therefore we find the commandment, thai
enjoins obedience to superiors, given in the terms,
Honour thy father; so that not only the power
and right of government, but the form of the
power governing, and the person having the
power, are all the ordinances of God. The
first father had not only simply power, but
power monarchical, as he was father immediately
from God, Observations, 254. To the same
purpose, the same law is cited by our author
in several other places, and just after the same
fashion; that is, and mother, as apochrvphal
words, are always left out ; a great argument
of our authors ingenuity, and the goodness of
his cause, which required in its defender zeal
to a degree of warmth, able to warp the sacred
rule of the word of God, to make it comply
with his present occasion ; a way of proceeding
not unusual to those, who embrace not truths,
because reason and revelation offer them, but
espouse tenets and parties for ends different
from truth, and then resolve at any rate to
defend them ; and so do with the words and
sense of authors, they would fit to their purpose,

OF GOVERNMENT. 07

just as Procrustes did with his guests, lop or
stretch them, as may best fit them to the
size of their notions : and they always prove
like those so served, deformed, lame, and
useless.

§. 61. For had our author set down this com-
mand without garbling, as God gave it, and
joined mother to father, every reader would
have seen, that it had made directly against
him ; and that it was so far from establishing
the monarchical power of the father, that it set
up the mother equal with him, and enjoined
nothing but what was due in common, to both
father and mother : for that is the constant tenor '
of the scripture, Honour thy father and thy
mother, Exod. xx. He that smiteth his father
or mother, shall surely he put to death, xxi. 15.
He that curs el h his father or mother, shall
surely be put to death, ver. 17. Repeated, Lev.
xx. 9. and by our Saviour, Matth. xv. 4. Ye
shall fear every man his mother and his father,
Lev. xix. 3. If a man have a rebellious son,
which will not obey the voice of his father, or the
voice of his mother ; then shall his father and
his mother lay hold on him, and say, This our
son is stubborn and rebellious, he ivill not obey
our voice, Deut. xxi. 18, 19, 20, 21. Cursed be
he that setteth light by his father or his mother,
xxviii. 16*. My son, hear the instructions of
thy father, and forsake not the law of thy
mother, are the words of Solomon, a king who
was not ignorant of what belonged to him as

f2

6*8 OF GOVERNMENT.

a father or a king; and yet he joins father and
mother together, in all the instruction he gives
children quite through his book of Proverbs.
Woe unto him, that sayeth unto his father.
What beget test thou? or to the woman, What
hast thou brought forth? Isa. xi. ver. 10. In
thee hare they set light by father or mother,
Ezek. xxviii. *2. And it shall come to jrnss, that
when any shall yet prophesy, then his father
and his mother that begat him, shall say unto
him, thou shall not live ; and his father and
his mother that begat him, shall thrust him
through when he prophesieth, Zech. xiii. 3.
Here not the father only, but the father and
mother jointly, had power in this case of life
and death. Thus ran the law of the Old Tes-
tament, and in the New they are likewise joined,
in the obedience of their children, Eph. vi. J.
The rule is, Children, obey your parents ; and I do
not remember, that I any where read, Children,
obey your father, and no more : the scripture
joins mother too in that homage, which is due
from children ; and had there been any text,
where the honour or obedience of children had
been directed to the father alone, it is not
likely that our author, who pretends to build
all upon scripture, would have omitted it :
nay, the scripture makes the authority of father
and mother, in respect of those they have
begot, so equal, that in some places it neglects
even the priority of order, which is thought
due to the father, and the mother is put first,

OF GOVERNMENT. 09

as Lev. xix. 3. from which so constantly
joining father and mother together, as is found
quite through the scripture, we may conclude
that the honour they have a title to from their
children, is one common right belonging so
equally to them both, that neither can claim it
wholly, neither can be excluded.

§. 62. One would wonder then how our au-
thor infers from the fifth commandment, that
all power ivas originally in the father ; how he
finds monarchical power of government settled
and fixed by the commandment, Honour thy
father and thy mother. If all the honour due
by the commandment, be it what it will, be
the only right of the father because he, as our
author says, has the sovereignty over the woman,
as being the nobler and principaler agent in
generation, why did God afterwards all along
join the mother with him, to share in his honour?
can the father, by this sovereignty of his, dis-
charge the child from paying this honour to
his mother ? The scripture gave no such licence
to the Jews, and yet there were often breaches
wide enough betwixt husband and wife, even to
divorce and separation : and, I think, nobody
will say a child may with-hold honour from
his mother, or, as the scripture terms it, set
light by her, though his father should com-
mand him to do so; no more than the mother
could dispense with him for neglecting to
honour his father: whereby it is plain, that
this command of God gives the father no sove-
reignty, no supremacy.

70 OF GOVERNMENT.

§. 63. 1 agree with our author that the title
to this honour is vested in the parents by na-
ture, and is a right which accrues to them by
their having begotten their children, and God
by many positive declarations has confirmed
it to them : I also allow our authors rule,
that in grants and gifts, that have their original
from God and nature, as the power of the
father, (let me add and mother, for whom God
hath joined together, let no man put asunder)
no inferior power of men can limit, nor make
any law of prescription against them, Obser-
vations, 158. So that the mother having, by
this law of God, a right to honour from her
children, which is not subject to the will of
her husband, we see this absolute monarchical
power of the father can neither be founded on
it, nor consist with it; and he has a power
very far from monarchical, very far from that
absoluteness our author contends ; when ano-
ther has over his subjects the same power he
hath, and by the same title : and therefore he
cannot forbear saying himself that he cannot
see how any mans children can be free from
subjection to their parents, p. 12. which, in
common speech, I think, signifies mother as
well as father; or if parents here signifies only
father, it is the first time I ever yet knew it
to do so, and by such an use of words one may
say any thing.

§. 64. By our author's doctrine, the father,
having absolute jurisdiction over his children,

OF GOVERNMENT. 71

has also Hie same over their issue; and the
consequence is good, were it true, that the
father had such a power : and yet I ask our
author whether the grandfather, by his sove-
reignty, could discharge the grandchild from
paying to his father the honour due to him
by the fifth commandment. If the grandfather
hath, by right of fatherhood, sole sovereign
power in him, and that obedience which is due
to the supreme magistrate, be commanded in
these words, Honour thy father, it is certain
the grandfather might dispense with the grand-
son's honouring his father, which since it is
evident in common sense he cannot, it follows
from hence, that Honour thy father and mother,
cannot mean an absolute subjection to a sove-
reign power, but something else. The right
therefore which parents have by nature, and
which is confirmed to them by the fifth com-
mandment, cannot be that political dominion
which our author would derive from it: for
that being in every civil society supreme some-
where, can discharge any subject from any
political obedience to any one of his fellow-
subjects. But what law of the magistrate can
i^ive a child liberty, not to honour his father
and mother? It is an eternal law, annexed
purely to the ralation of parents and children,
and so contains nothing of the magistrate's
power in it, nor is subjected to it.

§. 05. Our author says, God hath given, to a
father a right or liberty to alien his power over

72 OF GOVERNMENT.

his children to any other, Observations, 155.
1 doubt whether he can alien wholly the right
of honour that is due from them: but be that
as it will, this 1 am sure, lie cannot alien, and
retain the same power. If therefore the ma-
gistrate's sovereignty be, as our author would
have it, nothing but the authority of a su-
preme father, p. 23. it is unavoidable, that if
the magistrate hath all this paternal right, as
he must have if fatherhood be the fountain of
all authority ; then the subjects, though fathers,
can have no power over their children, no right
to honour from them : for it cannot be all in
another's hands, and a part remain with the
parents. So that, according to our author's
own doctrine, Honour thy father and mother
cannot possibly be understood of political
subjection and obedience ; since the laws both
in the Old and New Testament, that com-
manded children to honour and obey their
parents, were given to such, whose fathers
were under civil government, and fellow-sub-
jects with them in political societies ; and to
have bid them honour and obey their parents,
in our authors sense, had been to bid them be
subjects to those who had no title to it ; the
right to obedience from subjects, being all
vested in another ; and instead of teaching-
obedience, this had been to foment sedition,
by setting up powers that were not. If there-
fore this command, Honour thy father and
mother, concern political dominion, it directly

OF GOVERNMENT. 73

overthrows our author's monarchy ; since it
being- to be paid by every child to his father,
even in society, every father must necessarily
have political dominion, and there will be as
many sovereigns as there are fathers : besides
that the mother too hath her title, which de-
stroys the sovereignty of one supreme monarch.
But if Honour thy father and mother mean
something distinct from political power, as
necessarily it must, it is besides our author's
business, and serves nothing to his purpose.

§. 66. Hie law that enjoins obedience to kings
is delivered, says our author, in the terms,
Honour thy father, as if all power were ori-
ginally in the father, Observations, 254. and
that law is also delivered, say I, in the terms,
Honour thy mother, as if all power were ori-
ginally in the mother. I appeal whether the
argument be not as good on one side as the
other, father and mother being joined all along
in the Old and New Testament wherever ho-
nour or obedience is enjoined children. Again
our author tells us, Observations, 254. that this
command, Honour thy father gives the right, to
govern, and makes the form of government mo-
narchical. ■ To which I answer, that if by
Honour thy father be meant obedience to the
political power of the magistrate, it concerns
not any duty we owe to our natural fathers,
who are subjects ; because they, by our author's
doctrine, are divested of all that power, it
being placed wholly in the prince, and so being

74 OF GOVERNMENT.

equally subjects and slaves with their children,
can have no right, by that title, to any such
honour or obedience, as contains in it political
subjection : if Honour thy father and mother
signifies the duty we owe our natural parents,
as by our Saviour's interpretation, Matlli. xv.
4. and all the other mentioned places, it is
plain it does, then it cannot concern political
obedience, but a duty that is owing to persons,
who have no title to sovereignty, nor any
political authority as magistrates over subjects.
For the person of a private father, and a title
to obedience, due to the supreme magistrate,
are things inconsistent ; and therefore this
command, which must necessarily comprehend
the persons of our natural fathers, must mean a
duty we owe them distinct from our obedience
to the magistrate, and from which the most
absolute power of princes cannot absolve us.
What this duty is, we shall in its due place
examine.

§. 67. And thus we have at last got through
all, that in our author looks like an argument for
that absolute unlimited sovereignty described,
Sect. 8. which he supposes in Adam; so that
mankind ever since have been all born slaves,
without any title to freedom. But if creation,
which gave nothing but a being, made not
Adam prince of his posterity : if Adam, Gen. i.
28. was not constituted lord of mankind, nor
had a private dominion given him exclusive of
his children, but only a right and power over

OF GOVERNMENT. 75

the earth, and inferior creatures in common
with the children of men ; if also Gen. iii. 16.
God gave not any political power to Adam
over his wife and children, but only subjected
Eve to Adam, as a punishment, or foretold the
subjection of the weaker sex, in the ordering
the common concernments of their families,
but gave not thereby to Adam, as to the hus-
band, power of life and death, which necessarily
belongs to the magistrate: if fathers by be-
getting their children acquire no such power
over them ; and if the command, Honour thy
father and mother, give it not, but only enjoins
a duty owing to parents equally, whether
subjects or not, and to the mother as well as
the father; if all this be so, as I think, by what
has been said, is very evident; then man has a
natural freedom, notwithstanding all our author
confidently says to the contrary ; since all that
share in the same common nature, faculties
and powers, are in nature equal, and ought to
partake in the same common rights and privi-
leges, till the manifest appointment of God,
who is Lord over all, blessed for ever, can be
produced to shew any particular person's
supremacy ; or a man's own consent subjects
him to a superior. This is so plain, that our
author confesses, that Sir John Hayivard,
Blackwood and Barclay, the great vindicators
of the right of kings, could not deny it, but
admit ivith one consent the natural liberty and
equality of mankind, for a truth unquestionable.

7G OF GOVERNMENT.

And our author hath been so far from produ-
cing any tiling*, that may make good his great
position that Adam was absolute monarch, and
so men are not naturally free, that even his own
proofs make against him ; so that to use his
own way of arguing, the Jirst erroneous prin-
ciple failing, the whole fabric of this vast engine
of absolute power and tyranny drops down of
itself and there needs no more to be said in
answer to all that he builds upon so false and
frail a foundation.

§. 68. But to save others the pains, were
there any need, he is not sparing himself to
shew, by his own contradictions, the weak-
ness of his own doctrine. Adams absolute
and sole dominion is that, which he is every
where full of, and all along builds on, and yet
he tells us, p. 12. that as Adam was lord of
his children, so his children under him had a
command and power over their own children.
The unlimited and undivided sovereignty of
Adams fatherhood, by our author's computa-
tion, stood but a little while, only during the
first generation, but as soon as he had grand-
children, Sir Robert could give but a very ill
account of it. Adam, asjather of his children,
saith he, hath an absolute, unlimited royal
power over them, and by virtue thereof over
those that they begot, and so to all generations ;
and yet his children, viz. Cain and Seth, have
a paternal power over their children at the
same lime; so that Ihey are at the same time

OF GOVERNMENT. 77

absolute lords, and yet vassals and slares;
Adam has all the authority, as grandfather of
the people, and they have a part of it as fathers
of a part of them : lie is absolute over them
and their posterity, by having- begotten them,
and yet they are absolute over their own chil-
dren by the same title. No, says our author,
Adams children under him had power over their
own children, but still with subordination to the
first parent. A good distinction that sounds
well, and it is pity it signifies nothing, nor can
be reconciled with our author's words. I
readily grant, that supposing Adams absolute
power over his posterity, any of his children
might have from him a delegated, and so a
subordinate power over a part, or all the rest :
but that cannot be the power our author speaks
of here; it is not a power by grant and com-
mission, but the natural paternal power he
supposes a father to have over his children.
For 1. he says, As Adam ivas lord of his chil-
dren, so his children under him had a power over
their own children: they were then lords over
their own children after the same manner, and
by the same title, that Adam was, i. e. by right
of generation, by right of fatherhood. 2. It is
plain he means the natural power of fathers,
because he limits it to be only over their own
children ; a delegated power has no such limi-
tation, as only over their own children, it might
be over others, as well as their own children.
3. If it were a delegated power, it must ap-

78 OF GOVERNMENT.

pear in scripture; but there is no ground in
scripture to affirm, that Adams children had
any other power over theirs, than what they
naturally had as fathers.

§. 69. But that he means here paternal power
and no other, is past doubt, from the inference
he makes in these words immediately following,
I see not then hoiv the children of Adam, or of
any man else, can be free from subjection to their
'parents. Whereby it appears that the power on
one side, and the subjection on the other, our
author here speaks of, is that natural power \
and subjection between parents and children:
for that which every man's children owed,
could be no other; and that our author always
affirms to be absolute and unlimited. This
natural power of parents over their children,
Adam had over his posterity, says our author;
and thispower of parents over their children, his
children had over theirs in his life-time, says
our author also; so that Adam, by a natural
right of father, had an absolute unlimited
power over all his posterity, and at the same
time his children had by the same right abso-
lute unlimited power over theirs. Here then
are two absolute unlimited powers existing to-
gether, which I would have any body reconcile
one to another, or to common sense. For the
salvo he has put in of subordination, makes it
more absurd : To have one absolute, unlimited,
nay, unit mil able power, in subordination to
another, is so manifest a contradiction, that

OF GOVERNMENT. 79

nothing can be more. Adam is absolute prince
ivith the unlimited authority of fatherhood over
all his posterity; all his posterity are then
absolutely his subjects; and, as our author
says, his slaves, children, and grandchildren,
are equally in this state of subjection and
slavery ; and yet, says our anthor, the chil-
dren of Adam have paternal, i. c. absolute un-
limited power over their own children : which
in plain English is, they are slaves and abso-
lute princes at the same time, and in the same
government ; and one part of the subjects have
an absolute unlimited power over the other by
the natural right of parentage.

<§. 70. If any one will suppose, in favour of
our author, that he here meant, that parents,
who are in subjection themselves to the abso-
lute authority of their father, have yet some
power over their children; I confess he is
something nearer the truth : but he will not at
all hereby help our author: for he no where
speaking of the paternal power, but as an
absolute unlimited authority, cannot be sup-
posed to understand any thing else here, unless
he himself had limited it, and shewed how
far it reached. And that he means here pater-
nal authority in that large extent, is plain from
the immediately following words ; This sub-
jection of children being, says he, the founda-
tion of all regal authority, p. J 2. the subjection
then that in the former line, he says, every man is
in to his parents, and consequently what Adam's

80 OF GOVERNMENT.

grand-children were in to their parents, was
that which was the fountain of all regal au-
thority, i. e. according to our author, absolute
unlimited authority. And thus Adams chil-
dren had regal authority over their children,
whilst they themselves were subjects to their
father, and fellow-subjects with their children.
But let him mean as he pleases, it is plain he
allows Adam 's children to have paternal power y
p. 12. as also all other fathers to have paternal
power over their children, Observations, 156.
From whence one of these two things will
necessarily follow, that either Adam's children,
even in his life-time, had, and so all fathers
have, as he phrases it, p. 12. by right of father-
hood, royal authority over their children, or
else, that Adam, by right of fatherhood, had
not royal authority. For it cannot be but that
paternal power does, or does not, give royal
authority to them that have it : if it does not,
then Adam could not be sovereign by this title,
nor any body else ; and then there is an end
of all our author's politics at once : if it does
give royal authority, then every one that has pa-
ternal power, has royal authority ; and then by
our authors patriarchal government, there will
be as many kings as there are fathers.

§.71. And thus what a monarchy he hath
set up, let him and his disciples consider.
Princes certainly will have great reason to
thank him for these new politics, which set up
as many absolute kings in every country as

OF GOVERNMENT. 01

there are fathers of children. And yet who
can blame our author for it, it lying unavoid-
ably in the way of one discoursing upon our
author's principles ? For having placed an ab-
solute power in fathers by right of begetting,
he could not easily resolve how much of this
power belonged to a son over the children he
had begotten ; and so it fell out to be a hard
matter to give all the power, as he does, to
Adam, and yet allow a part in his life-time
to his children, when they were parents, and
which he knew not well how to deny them.
This makes him so doubtful in his expressions,
and so uncertain where to place this absolute
natural power, which he calls fatherhood.
Sometimes Adam alone has it all, as p. 13.
Observations, 244, 245. 6f Pre/.

Sometimes parents have it, which word scarce
signifies the father alone, p. 12, 19.

Sometimes children during their fathers life-
time, as p. 12.

Sometimes fathers of families, as p. 78, &79.

Sometimes fathers indefinitely, Observations,
155.

Sometimes the heir to Adam, Observations,
253.

Sometimes the posterity o/*Adam, 244, 246.

Sometimes prime fathers, all sons or grand-
children o/'Noah, Observations, 244.

Sometimes the eldest parents, p. 12,

Sometimes all kings, p. 19.

G

82 OF GOVERNMENT.

Sometimes all that have supreme power, Ob-
servations, 245.

Sometimes heirs to those first progenitors,
who were at first the natural parents of the
whole people, p. 19.

Sometimes an elective king, p. 23.

Sometimes those, whether a few or a multi-
titude, that govern the commonwealth, p. 23.

Sometimes he that can catch it, an usurper,
p. 23. Observations, 155.

§. 72. Thus this neiv nothing, that is to carry
with it all power, authority, and government;
this fatherhood, which is to design the person,
and establish the throne of monarch's, whom
the people are to obey, may, according to Sir
Robert, come into any hands, any how, and so
by his politics give to democracy royal autho-
rity, and make an usurper a lawful prince.
And if it will do all these fine feats, much
good do our author and all his followers with
their omnipotent fatherhood, which can serve
for nothing but to unsettle and destroy all the
lawful governments in the world, and to es-
tablish in their room disorder, tyranny, and
usurpation.

OF GOVERNMENT. 83

CHAPTER VIT.

Of Fatherhood and Property considered
together as Fountains of Sovereignty.

§. 73. In the foregoing chapters we have
seen what Adam's monarchy was, in our au-
thor's opinion, and upon what titles he founded
it. The foundations which he lays the chief
stress on, as those from which he thinks he
may derive monarchical power to future princes,
are two, viz. Fatherhood and property: and
therefore the way he proposes to remove the ab-
surdities and inconveniencies of the doctrine of
natural freedom^ is, to maintain the natural and
private dominion of Adam, Observations, 222.
Conformable hereunto, he tells us, the grounds
and jjrinciplcs of government necessarily depend
upon the original of property. Observations,
108. The subjection of children to their pa-
rents is the fountain of all regal authority, p. 12.
And all power on earth is either derived or
usurped from the fatherly poiver, their being no
other original to be found of any power what-
soever, Observations, 158. I will not stand
here to examine how it can be said without a
contradiction, that the first grounds and princi-
ples of government necessarily depend upon the
original of property, and yet, that there is no other
original of any power whatsoever, but that of
the father ; it being hard to understand how

g 2

84 OF GOVERNMENT.

there can be no other original but fatherhood,
and yet that the grounds and principles of go-
vernment depend upon the original of property ;
property and fatherhood being- as far different
as lord of a manor and father of children.
Nor do I see how they will either of them
agree with what our author says, Observations*
244. of God's sentence against Eve, Gen. iii. 16.
That it is the original grant of government :
so that if that were the original, government
had not its original, by our authors own con-
fession, cither from property or fatherhood :
and this text, which he brings as a proof of
Adam's power over Eve, necessarily contradicts
what he says of the fatherhood, that it is the
sole fountain of all poiuer : for if Adam had
any such regal power over Eve, as our author
contends for, it must be by some other title
than that of begetting.

§. 74. But I leave him to reconcile these
contradictions, as well as many others, which
may plentifully be found in him by any one,
who will but read him with a little attention ;
and shall come now to consider, how these
two originals of government, Adams natural
and private dominion, will consist, and serve
to make out and establish the titles of suc-
ceeding monarchs, who, as our author obliges
them, must all derive their power from these
fountains. Let us then suppose Adam made,
by God's donation, lord and sole proprietor of
the whole earth, in as large and ample a manner

OF GOVERNMENT. 85

as Sir ^Robert could wish; let us suppose him
also, by right of fatherhood, absolute ruler over
his children with au unlimited supremacy; I
ask then, upon Adams death what becomes
of both his natural and private dominion? and
I doubt not it will be answered, that they
descended to his next heir, as our author tells
us in several places. But this way, it is plain,
cannot possibly convey both his natural and
private dominion to the same person : for should
we allow, that all the property, all the estate
of the father, ought to descend to the eldest
son, (which will need some proof to establish
it) and so he has by that title all the private do-
minion of the father, yet the father's natural
dominion, the paternal power cannot descend
to him by inheritance : for it being a right that
accrues to a man ouly by begetting, no man
can have this natural dominion over any one
he does not beget; unless it can be supposed,
that a man can have a right to any thing, with-
out doing that upon which that right is solely
founded : for if a father by begetting, and no
other title, has natural dominion over his chil-
dren, he that does not beget them cannot have
this natural dominion over them ; and therefore
be it true or false, that our author says, Obser-
vations, 1 5t>. That every man that is born, by
his very birth becomes subject to him that begets
him, this necessarily follows, viz. That a man
by his birth cannot become a subject to his
brother, who did not beget him ; unless it can

86 OF GOVERNMENT.

be supposed that a man by the very same title
can come to be under the natural and absolute
dominion of two different men at once ; or it
be sense to say, that a man by birth is under
the natural dominion of his father, only be-
cause he begat him, and a man by birth also
is under the natural dominion of his eldest
brother, though he did not beget him.

§. 75. If then the private dominion of Adam,
i. e. his property in the creatures, descended
at his death all entirely to his eldest son, his
heir ; (for, if it did not, there is presently an
end of all Sir Robert's monarchy) and his
natural dominion, the dominion a father has
over his children by begetting them, belonged
immediately, upon Adams decease, equally to
all his sons who had children, by the same
title their father had it, the sovereignty founded
upon property, and the sovereignty founded
upon fatherhood, come to be divided ; since
Cain, as heir, had that or property alone;
Seth, and the other sons, that of fatherhood
equally with him. This is the best that can
be made of our authors doctrine, and of the
two titles of sovereignty he sets up in Adam :
one of them Will either signify nothing ; or,
if (hey both must stand, they can serve only
to confound the rights of princes, and disorder
government in his posterity : for by building
upon two titles to dominion, which cannot
descend together, and which he allows may
be separated, (for he yields that Adam's chil-

OF GOVERNMENT. 87

dren had their distinct territories by right of
private dominion, Observations, 210, p. 40.)
he makes it perpetually a doubt upon his prin-
ciples where the sovereignty is, or to whom
we owe our obedience, since fatherhood and
property are distinct titles, and began presently
upon Adams death to be in distinct persons.
And which then was to give way to the other?
§. 76. Let us take the account of it, as he
himself gives it us. He tells us out of Grotius,
That Adams children by donation, assignation,
or some kind of cession before he was dead, had
their distinct territories by right of private
dominion; Abel had his flocks and pastures for
them : Cain had his fields for corn, and the
land of Nod, where he built him a city, Obser-
vations, 210. Here it is obvious to demand,
which of these two after Adams death was
sovereign? Cain, says our author, p. 19. By
what title ? As heir ; for heirs to progenitors,
ivho ivere natural parents of their people, are
not only lords of their own children, but also of
their brethren, says our author, p. 19. What
was Cain heir to? Not the entire possessions,
not all that which Adam had private dominion
in ; for our author allows that Abel by a title
derived from his father, had his distinct terri-
tory for pasture by right of private dominion.
What then Abel had by private dominion, was
exempt from Cain's dominion : for he could
not have private dominion over that which was
under the private dominion of another; and

88 OF GOVERNMENT.

therefore his sovereignty over his brother is
gone with this private dominion, and so there are
presently two sovereigns, and his imaginary
title of fatherhood is out of doors, and Cain
is no prince over his brother : or else, if Cain
retain his sovereignty over Abel, notwithstand-
ing his private dominion, it will follow, that
the first grounds and principles of government
have nothing to do with property, whatever our
author says to the contrary. Jt is true, Abel
did not outlive his father Adam; but that
makes nothing to the argument, which will
hold good against Sir Robert in Abels issue,
or in Seth, or any of the posterity of Adam %
not descended from Cain.

\. 77. The same inconvenience he runs into
about the three sons of Noah, who, as he says,
p. 13. had the whole world divided amongst
them by their father. I ask then, in which of
the three shall we find the establishment of
regal poiver after Noah's death? If in all three,
as our author there seems to say ; then it will
follow, that regal power is founded in property
of land, and follows private dominion, and not
in paternal power, or natural dominion; and so
there is an end of paternal power as the
fountain of regal authority, and the so-much-
magnified fatherhood quite vanishes. If the
regal power descended to Shem as eldest, and
heir to his father, then NoaJts division of the
world by lot, to his sons or his ten years sailing
about the Mediterranean to appoint each son

OF GOVERNMENT. Hi)

his part, which our author tells of, p. 15. was
labour lost; his division of the world to them,
was to ill, or to no purpose: for his grant to
Cham and Japhel was little worth, if Shem,
notwithstanding this grant, as soon as Noah
was dead, was to be lord over them. Or, if
this grant of private dominion to them, over
their assigned territories, were good, here were
set up two distinct sorts of power, not subor-
dinate one to the other, with all those incon-
veniencies which he musters up against the
potter of the people, Observations, 158. which I
shall set down in his own words, only changing
property for people. All power on earth is either
derived or usurped from the fatherly power, there
being no other original to be found of any power
whatsoever : for if there should be granted two
sorts of power, without any subordination of one
to the other, they ivould be in perpetual strife
which should be supreme, for two supremes can-
not agree: if the fatherly power be supreme, then
the power grounded on private dominion must be
subordinate, and depend on it; and if the power
grounded on property besupreme, then the father-
ly power must submit to it, and cannot be exercised
without the licence of the proprietors, ivhich must
quite destroy the frame and course of nature.
This is his own arguing against two distinct inde-
pendent powers, which I have set down in his
own words, only putting power rising from pro-
perty, for power of I he people ; and when he has
answered what he himself has urged here against

90 OF GOVERNMENT.

two distinct powers, we shall be better able to
see how, with any tolerable sense, he can
derive all regal authority from the natural and
private dominion of Adam, from fatherhood and
pr&perty together, which are distinct titles, that
do not always meet in the same person; and
it is plain, by his own confession, presently
separated as soon both as Adams and Noatis
death made way for succession : though our
author frequently in his writings jumbles them
together, and omits not to make use of either,
where he thinks it will sound best to his
purpose. But the absurdities of this will more
fully appear in the next chapter, where we
shall examine the ways of conveyance of the
sovereignty of Adam, to princes that were to
reiiiu after him.

■&•

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Conveyance of Adams Sovereign
Monarchical Power.

§. 78. Sir Robert, not having been very
happy in any proof he brings for the sovereign-
ty of Adam, is not much more fortunate in
conveying it to future princes, who, if his
politics be true, must all derive their titles
from that first monarch. The ways he has
assigned, as they lie scattered up and down in
his writings, I will set down in his own words :
in his preface he tells us, That Adam being

OF GOVERNMENT. 91

monarch of the ivhole world, none of his poste-
rity had any right to j^ossess any thing, but by
his grant or permission, or by succession from
him. Here he makes two ways of conveyance
of any thing Adam stood possessed of; and
those are grants or succession. Again he says,
All kings either are, or are to be reputed, the
next heirs to those first progenitors, ivho were
at first the natural parents of the ivhole people,
p. 19. There cannot be any multitude of men
whatsoever, but that in it, considered by itself
there is one man amongst them, that in nature
hath a right to be the king of all the rest, as
being the next heir to Adam, Observations, 253.
Here in these places inheritance is the only
way he allows of conveying- monarchical power
to princes. In other places he tells ns, Obser-
vations, 155. All power on earth is either
derived or usurped from the fatherly power,
Observations, 158. All kings that now are,
or ever were, are or were either fathers of their
people, or heirs of such fathers, or usurpers of the
right of such fathers, Observations, 253. And
here he makes inheritance or usurpation the
only ways whereby kings come by this original
power: but yet he tells us, This fatherly empire,
as it ivas of itself hereditary, so it was alienable
by patent and seizable by an usurper, Observa-
tions, 190. So then here inheritance, grant,
or usurpation, will convey it. And last of all,
which is most admirable, he tells us, p. 100.
It skills not which way kings come by their

02 OF GOVERNMENT.

poiver, whether by election, donation, succession,
or by any other means ; for it is still the manner
of the government by supreme power, that makes
them properly kings, and not the means oj
obtaining their crowns. Which I think is a full
answer to all his whole hypothesis and discourse
about Adams royal authority, as the fountain
from which all princes are to derive theirs:
and he might have spared the trouble of speak-
ing- so much as he does, up and down, of heirs
and inheritance, if to make one properly a king,
needs no more but governing by supreme
poiver, and it matters jwt by what means he
came by it.

§. 79. By this notable way, our author may
make Oliver as properly king, as any one else
he could think of: and had he had the happi-
ness to live under Massanetta's government, he
could not by this his own rule have forborn
to have done homage to him, with O king live
for ever, since the manner of his government
by supreme power, made him properly king,
who was but the day before properly a fisher-
man. And if Don Quixote had taught his
squire to govern with supreme authority, our
author no doubt could have made a most loyal
subject in Sancho Pancluis island; and he
must needs have deserved some preferment in
such governments, since I think he is the first
politician, who, pretending to settle government
upon its true basis, and to establish the thrones
of lawful princes., ever told the world. Thai he

OF GOVERNMENT. 93

was properly a king, whose manner of govern-
ment was by supreme power, by what means soever
he obtained it : which in plain English is to say,
that regal and supreme power is properly and
truly his, who can by any means seize upon it;
and if this be to be properly a king, 1 wonder
how he came to think of, or where lie will find,
an usurper.

§. 80. This is so strange a doctrine, that the
surprise of it hath made me pass by, without
their due reflection, the contradictions he runs
into, by making sometimes inheritance alone,
sometimes only grant or inheritance, sometimes
only inheritance or usurpation, sometimes all
these three, and at last election, or any other
means, added to them, whereby Adams royal
authority, that is, his right to supreme rule,
could be conveyed down to future kings and
governors, so as to give them a title to the
obedience and subjection of the people. But
these contradictions lie so open, that the very
reading of our author's own words will dis-
cover them to any ordinary understanding;
and though what I have quoted out of him
(with abundance more of the same strain and
coherence which might be found in him) might
well excuse me from any farther trouble in this
argument, yet having proposed to myself, to
examine the main parts of his doctrine, I shall
a little more particularly consider how inheri-
tance, grant, usurpation, or election, can any
way make out government in the world upon

94 OF GOVERNMENT.

his principles ; or derive to any one a right of
empire from this regal authority of Adam, had
it been never so well proved, that he had been
absolute monarch, and lord of the whole
world.

CHAPTER IX.

Of Monarchy by Inheritance from Adam.

§.81. Though it be never so plain, that
there ought to be government in the world,
nay, should all men be of our author's mind,
that divine appointment had ordained it to be
monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any
thing, that cannot command ; and ideas of
government in the fancy, though never so per-
fect, though never so right, cannot give laws,
nor prescribe rules to the actions of men ; it
would be of no behoof for the settling of order,
and establishing of government in its exercise
and use amongst men, unless there were a way
also taught how to know r the person, to whom
it belonged to have this power, and exercise
this dominion over others. It is in vain then
to talk of subjection and obedience without
telling us whom we are to obey : for were I
never so fully persuaded that there ought to
be magistracy and rule in the world ; yet I am
nevertheless at liberty still, till it appears who
is the person that hath right to my obedience ;
since, if there be no marks to know him bv,

OF GOVERNMENT. 95

and distinguish him that hath right to rule
from other men, it may be myself, as well as
any other. And therefore, though submission
to government be every one's duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction
and laws of such men as have authority to com-
mand, it is not enough to make a man a subject,
to convince him that there is a regal power hi the
world ; but there must be ways of designing,
and knowing the person to whom this regal
power of right belongs : and a man can never
be obliged in conscience to submit to any
power, unless he can be satisfied who is the
person who has a right to exercise that power
over him. If this were not so, there would
be no distinction between pirates and lawful
princes ; he that has force is without any more
ado to be obeyed, and crowns and sceptres
would become the inheritance only of violence
and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do
their physicians, if the person cannot be known
who has a right to direct me, and whose
prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle
therefore men's consciences, under an obliga-
tion to obedience, it is necessary that they
know not only, that there is a power somewhere
in the world, but the person who by right is
vested with this power over them.

§. 82. How successful our author has been
in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute
potter in Adam, the reader may judge by what

96 OF GOVERNMENT.

has been already said ; but were that absolute
monarchy as clear as our author would desire
it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could
be of no use to the government of mankind now
in the world, unless he also make out these
two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to
end with him, but was upon his decease con-
veyed intire to some other person, and so on
to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now
on earth are possessed of this power of Adam,
by a right way of conveyance derived to them.

§. 83. If the first of these fail, the power of
Adam, were it never so great, never so certain,
will signify nothing to the present government
and societies in the world ; but we must seek
out some other original of power for the govern-
ment of politys than this of Adam, or else
there will be none at all in the world. If the
latter fail, it will destroy the authority of the
present governors, and absolve the people from
subjection to them, since they, having no better
a claim than others to that power, which is
alone the fountain of all authority, can have no
title to rule over them.

§. 84. Our author, having fancied an abso-
lute sovereignty in Adam, mentions several
ways of its conveyance to princes, that were to
be his successors ; but that which lie chiefly
insists on, is that of inheritance, which occurs
so often in his several discourses ; and I having

OF GOVERNMENT. 97

in the foregoing chapter quoted several of
these passages, I shall not need here again to
repeat them. This sovereignty he erects, as
has been said, upon a double foundation, viz.
that of property, and that of fat her hood. One
was the right he was supposed to have in all
creatures, a right to possess the earth with the
beasts, and other inferior ranks of things in it,
for his private use, exclusive of all other men.
The other was the right he was supposed to
have, to rule and govern men, all the rest of
mankind.

§. 85. In both these rights, there being sup-
posed an exclusion of all other men, it must be
upon some reason peculiar to Adam, that they
must both be founded.

That of his property our author supposes to
arise from Gods immediate donation, Gen. i.
28. and that of fatherhood from the act of
begetting: now in all inheritance, if the heir
succeed not to the reason upon which his
father's right was founded, he cannot succeed
to the right which followeth from it. For ex-
ample, Adam had a right of property in the
creatures upon the donation and grant of God
almighty, who was lord and proprietor of them
all : let this be so as our author tells us, yet
upon his death his heir can have no title to
them, no such right of property in them, unless
the same reason, viz. God's donation, vested a
right in the heir too : for if Adam could have
had no property in, nor use of the creatures,

H

98 OF GOVERNMENT.

without this positive donation from God, and
this donation were only personally to Adam,
his heir could have no right by it ; but upon
his death it must revert to God, the lord and
owner again ; for positive grants give no title
farther than the express words convey it, and
by which only it is held. And thus, as if our
author himself contends, that donation, Gen. i.
28. were made only to Adam personally, his
heir could not succeed to his property in the
creatures ; and if it were a donation to any
but Adam, let it be shewn, that it was to his
heir in our author's sense, i. e. to one of his
children, exclusive of all the rest.

§. 86. But not to follow our author too far
out of the way, the plain of the case is this.
God having made man, and planted in him,
as in all other animals, a strong desire of self-
preservation ; and furnished the world with
things fit for food and raiment, and other
necessaries of life, subservient to his design,
that man should live and abide for some time
upon the face of the earth, and not that so
curious and wonderful a piece of workmanship,
by his own negligence, or want of necessaries,
should perish again, presently after a few
moments continuance ; God, I say, having
made man and the world thus, spoke to him,
(that is) directed him by his senses and reason,
as he did the inferior animals by their sense
and instinct, which were serviceable for his
subsistence, and given him as the means of his

OF GOVERNMENT. 90

preservation. And therefore I doubt not, but
before these words were pronounced, Gen. i.
28, 29. (if they must be understood literally
to have been spoken) and without any such
verbal donation, man had a right to an use of
the creatures, by the will and grant of God :
for the desire, strong desire of preserving his
life and being, having been planted in him as
a principle of action by God himself, reason,
which ivas the voice of God in him, could not
but teach him and assure him, that pursuing
that natural inclination he had to preserve his
being, he followed the will of his Maker, and
therefore had a right to make use of those
creatures, which by his reason or senses he
could discover would be serviceable thereunto.
And thus man's property in the creatures was
founded upon the right he had to make use
of those things that were necessary or useful
to his being.

§. 87. This being the reason and foundation
of Adams property, gave the same title, on the
same ground, to all his children, not only after
his death, but in his life-time : so that here was
no privilege of his heir above his other chil-
dren, which could exclude them from an equal
right to the use of the inferior creatures, for
the comfortable preservation of their beings,
which is all the property man hath in them ;
and so Adams sovereignty built on property,
or, as our author calls it, private dominion,
comes to nothing. Every man had a right to

h 2

100 OF GOVERNMENT.

the creatures, by the same title Adam had, viz.
by the right every one had to take care of, and
provide for their subsistence: and thus men
had a right in common, Adam's children in
common with him. But if any one had began,
and made himself a property in any particular
thing, (which how he, or any one else, could
do, shall be shewn in another place) that thing,
that possession, if he disposed not otherwise
of it by his positive grant, descended naturally
to his children, and they had a right to succeed
to it, and possess it.

§. 88. It might reasonably be asked here,
how come children by this right of possessing,
before any other, the properties of their parents
upon their decease ? for it being personally the
parents, when they die, without actually trans-
ferring their right to another, why does it not
return again to the common stock of mankind ?
It will perhaps be answered, that common
consent hath disposed of it to their children.
Common practice, we see indeed, does so dis-
pose of it; but we cannot say, that it is the
common consent of mankind ; for that hath
never been asked, nor actually given; and if
common tacit consent hath established it, it
would make but a positive, and not a natural
right of children to inherit the goods of their
parents: but where the practice is universal,
it is reasonable to think the cause is natural.
The ground then I think to be this. The first
and strongest desire God planted in men, and

OF GOVERNMENT. 101

wrought into the very principles of their nature,
being that of self-preservation, that is the
foundation of a right to the creatures for the
particular support and use of each individual
person himself. But, next to this, God planted
in men a strong desire also of propagating their
kind, and continuing themselves in their pos-
terity ; and this gives children a title to share
in the property of their parents, and a right to
inherit their possessions. Men are not proprie-
tors of what they have, merely for themselves;
their children have a title to part of it, and
have their kind of right joined with their
parents, in the possession which comes to be
wholly theirs, when death, having put an end
to their parents use of it, hath taken them from
their possessions ; and this we call inheritance :
men being by a like obligation bound to pre-
serve what they have begotten, as to preserve
themselves, their issue come to have a right in
the goods they are possessed of. That chil-
dren have such a right, is plain from the laws
of God ; and that men are convinced that
children have such a right, is evident from the
law of the land ; both which laws require
parents to provide for their children.

§. 89. For children being by the course of
nature, born weak, and unable to provide for
themselves, they have by the appointment of
God himself, who hath thus ordered the course
of nature, a right to be nourished and main-
tained by their parents ; nay, a right not only

102 OF GOVERNMENT.

to a bare subsistence, but to the conveniencies
and comforts of life, as far as the conditions
of their parents can afford it. Hence it comes,
that when their parents leave the world, and
so the care due to their children ceases, the
effects of it are to extend as far as possibly
they can, and the provisions they have made in
their life-time, are understood to be intended,
as nature requires they should, for their chil-
dren, whom, after themselves, they are bound
to provide for : though the dying parents, by
express words, declare nothing about them,
nature appoints the descent of their property
to their children, who thus come to have a
title, and natural right of inheritance to their
fathers goods, which the rest of mankind
cannot pretend to.

§. 90. Were it not for this right of being
nourished and maintained by their parents,
which God and nature has given to children,
and obliged parents to as a duty, it would be
reasonable, that the father should inherit the
estate of his son, and be preferred in the inhe-
ritance before his grandchild : for to the grand-
father there is due a long score of care and
expences laid out upon the breeding and
education of his son, which one would think
in justice ought to be paid. But that having
been done in obedience to the same law,
whereby he received nourishment and educa-
tion from his own parents : this score of
education, received from a man's father, is paid

OF GOVERNMENT. 103

by taking care, and providing for his own
children ; is paid, I say, as much as is required
of payment by alteration of property, unless
present necessity of the parents require a return
of goods for their necessary support and sub-
sistence : for we are not now speaking of that
reverence, acknowledgment, respect and ho-
nour, that is always due from children to their
parents ; but of possessions and commodities
of life valuable by money. But though it be
incumbent on parents to bring up and provide
for their children, yet this debt to their children
does not quite cancel the score due to their
parents ; but only is made by nature preferable
to it: for the debt a man owes his father,
takes place, and gives the father a right to in-
herit the son's goods, where, for want of issue,
the right of children doth not exclude that
title. And therefore a man having a right to
be maintained by his children, where he needs
it; and to enjoy also the comforts of life from
them, when the necessary provision due to
them and their children will afford it; if his
son die without issue, the father has a right
in nature to possess his goods, and inherit his
estate, (whatever the municipal laws of some
countries may absurdly direct otherwise ;) and
so again his children and their issue from him ;
or, for want of such, his father and his issue.
But where no such are to be found, i. e. no
kindred, there we see the possessions of a
private man revert to the community, and so

104 OF GOVERNMENT.

in politic societies come into the hands of the
public magistrate ; but in the state of nature
become again perfectly common, nobody
having a right to inherit them : nor can any one
have a property in them, otherwise than in
other things common by nature ; of which 1
shall speak in its due place.

§. 9J. I have been the larger, in shewing
upon what ground children have a right to
succeed to the possession of their fathers pro-
perties, not only because by it, it will appear,
that if Adam had a property (a titular, insigni-
ficant, useless property; for it could be no
better, for he was bound to nourish and main-
tain his children and posterity out of it) in the
whole earth and its product, yet all his children
coming to have, by the law of nature, and
right of inheritance, a joint title, and right of
property in it after his death, it could convey
no right of sovereignty to any one of his pos-
terity over the rest : since every one having a
right of inheritance to his portion, they might
enjoy their inheritance, or any part of it in
common, or share it, or some parts of it, by
division, as it best liked them. But no one
could pretend to the whole inheritance, or any
sovereignty supposed to accompany it; since
a right of inheritance gave every one of the
rest, as well as any one, a title to share in the
goods of his father. Not only upon this
account, 1 say, have I been so particular in
examining tht reason of children's inheriting

OF GOVERNMENT. 105

the property of their fathers, but also because
it will give us farther light in the inheritance of
rule and power, which in countries where their
particular municipal laws give the whole pos-
session of land entirely to the first-born, and
descent of power has gone so to men by this
custom, some have been apt to be deceived
into an opinion, that there was a natural or
divine right of primogeniture, to both estate
and power; and that the inheritance of both
rule over men, and property in tilings, sprang
from the same original, and were to descend
by the same rules.

§. 92. Property, whose original is from the
right a man has to use any of the inferior
creatures, for the subsistence and comfort of
his life, is for the benefit and sole advantage of
the proprietor, so that he may even destroy the
thing, that he has property in by his use of it,
where need requires: but government being
for the preservation of every man's right and
property, by preserving him from the violence
or injury of others, is for the good of the govern-
ed : for the magistrate's sword being for a
terror to evil doers, and by that terror to in-
force men to observe the positive laws of the
society, made conformable to the laws of na-
ture, for the public good, i. e. the good of
every particular member of that society, as far
as by common rules it can be provided for;
the sword is not given the magistrate for his
own good alone.

106 OF GOVERNMENT.

§. 93. Children therefore, as has been shew-
ed, by the depend ance they have on their
parents for subsistence, have a right of inheri-
tance to their fathers property, as that which
belongs to them for their proper good and
behoof, and therefore are fitly termed goods,
wherein the first-born has not a sole or pecu-
liar right by any law of God and nature, the
younger children having an equal title with
him, founded on that right they all have to
maintenance, support, and comfort from their
parents, and on nothing else. But government
being for the benefit of the governed, and not
the sole advantage of the governors, (but only
for theirs with the rest, as they make a part of
that politic body, each of whose parts and
members are taken care of, and directed in its
peculiar functions for the good of the whole,
by the laws of society) cannot be inherited by
the same title, that children have to the goods
of their father. The right a son has to be
maintained and provided with the necessaries
and conveniencies of life out of his father's
stock, gives him a right to succeed to his
father's property for his own good ; but this
can give him no right to succeed also to the
rule, which his father had over other men.
All that a child has right to claim from his
father is nourishment and education, and the
things nature furnishes for the support of life :
but he has no right to demand rule or dominion
from him : he can subsist and receive from him

OF GOVERNMENT. 107

(lie portion of good tilings, and advantages of
education naturally due to him, without empire
and dominion. That (if his father hath any)
was vested in him, for the good and behoof of
others : and therefore the son cannot claim or
inherit it by a title, which is founded wholly
on his own private good and advantage.

§. 94. We must know how the first ruler,
from whom any one claims, came by his au-
thority, upon what ground any one has empire,
what his title is to it, before we can know who
has a right to succeed him in it, and inherit it
from him : if the agreement and consent of
men first gave a sceptre into any one's hand,
or put a crown on his head, that also must
direct its descent and conveyance ; for the
same authority, that made the first a lawful
ruler, must make the second too, and so give
right of succession: in this case inheritance,
or primogeniture, can in itself have no pretence
to it, any farther than that consent, which
established the form of the government, »hath
so settled the succession. And thus we see,
the succession of crowns, in several countries,
places it on different heads, and he comes by
right of succession to be a prince in one place,
who would be a subject in another.

§. 95. If God, by his positive grant and re-
vealed declaration, first gave rule and dominion
to any man, he that will claim by that title,
must have the same positive grant of God for
his succession: for if that has not directed the

108 OF GOVERNMENT.

course of its descent and conveyance down to
others, nobody can succeed to this title of the
first ruler. Children have no right of inheri-
tance in this ; and primogeniture can lay no
claim to it, unless God, the author of this
constitution, hath so ordained it. Thus we
see, the pretensions of Saul's family, who re-
ceived his crown from the immediate appoint-
ment of God, ended with his reign; and David,
by the same title that Saul reigned, viz. God's
appointment, succeeded in his throne, to the
exclusion of Jonathan, and all pretensions of
paternal inheritance : and if Solomon had a
right to succeed his father, it must be by some
other title, than that of primogeniture. A cadet,
or sister's son, must have the preference in
succession, if he has the same title the first law-
ful prince had : and in dominion that had its
foundation only in the positive appointment of
God himself, Benjamin, the youngest, must
have the inheritance of the crown, if God so
direct, as well as one of that tribe had the first
possession.

§. 96. If paternal right, the act of begetting,
give a man rule and dominion inheritance or
primogeniture can give no title : for he that
cannot succeed to his father's title, which was
begetting, cannot succeed to that power over
his brethren, which his father had by paternal
right over them. But of this I shall have oc-
casion to say more in another place. This is
plain in the mean time, that any government,

OF GOVERNMENT. I Of)

whether supposed to be at first founded in
paternal rigid, consent of the people, or the
positive appointment of God himself, which ran
supersede either of the other, and so begin a
new government upon a new foundation ; I say,
any government began upon either of these,
can by right of succession come to those only,
who have the title of him they succeed to :
power founded on contract can descend only
to him, who has right by that contract : power
founded on begetting, he only can have that
begets; and power founded on the positive
grant or donation of God, he only can have by
right of succession, to whom that grant directs
it.

§. 97. From what I have said, I think this is
clear, that a right to the use of the creatures,
being founded originally in the right a man has
to subsist and enjoy the conveniencies of life ;
and the natural right children have to inherit
the goods of their parents, being founded in the
right they have to the same subsistence and
commodities of life, out of the stock of their
parents, who are therefore taught by natural
love and tenderness to provide for them, as a
part of themselves ; and all this being only for
the good of the proprietor, or heir; it can be
no reason for children's inheriting of rule and
dominion, which has another original and a
different end. Nor can primogeniture have
any pretence to a right of solely inheriting
either property or power, as we shall, in its due

110 OF GOVERNMENT.

place, see more fully. It is enough to have
shewed here, that Adam's property, or private
dominion, could not convey any sovereignty or
rule to his heir, who not having a right to in-
herit all his fathers possessions, could not
thereby come to have any sovereignty over his
brethren : and therefore, if any sovereignty on
account of his property had been vested in
Adam, which in truth there was not, yet it
would have died with him.

§. 98. As Adams sovereignty, if, by virtue
of being proprietor of the world, he had any
authority over men, could not have been in-
herited by any of his children over the rest,
because they had the same title to divide the
inheritance, and every one had a right to a
portion of his father's possessions ; so neither
could Adams sovereignty by right of father-
hood, if any such he had, descend to any one
of his children : for it being, in our author's
account, a right acquired by begetting to rule
over those he had begotten, it was not a power
possible to be inherited, because the right being*
consequent to, and built on, an act perfectly
personal, made that power so too, and impos-
sible to be inherited : for paternal power, being
a natural right rising only from the relation of
father and son, is as impossible to be inherited
as the relation itself; and a man may pretend
as well to inherit the conjugal power the hus-
band, whose heir he is, had over his wife, as
he can to inherit the paternal power of a father

OF GOVERNMENT. Ill

over his children : for the power of the husband
being founded on contract, and the power of
the father on begetting, he may as well inherit
the power obtained by the conjugal contract,
which was only personal, as he may the power
obtained by begetting - , which could reach no
farther than the person of the begetter, unless
begetting can be a title to power in him that
does not beget.

§. 90. Which makes it a reasonable question
to ask, whether Adam, dying before Eve, his
heir, (suppose Cain or Seth) should have by
right of inheriting Adam s fatherhood, sovereign
power over Eve his mother : for Adams father-
hood being nothing but a right he had to govern
his children, because he begot them, he that
inherits Adams fatherhood, inherits nothing,
even in our author's sense, but the right Adam
had to govern his children, because he begot
them : so that the monarchy of the heir would
not have taken in Eve; or if it did, it being
nothing but the fatherhood of Adam descended
by inheritance, the heir must have right to
govern Eve, because Adam begot her; for
fatherhood is nothing else.

§. 100. Perhaps it will be said with our
author, that a man can alien his power over
his child; and what may be transferred by
compact, may be possessed by inheritance. I
answer, a father cannot alien the power he has
over his child : he may perhaps to some degrees
forfeit it, but cannot transfer it; and if any

112 OF GOVERNMENT.

other man acquire it, it is not by the fathers
grant, but by some act of his own. For ex-
ample, a father, naturally careless of his child,
sells or gives him to another man ; and he
again exposes him ; a third man finding him,
breeds up, cherishes, and provides for him as
his own : I think in this case, nobody will
doubt, but that the greatest part of filial duty
and subjection was here owing, and to be paid
to this foster-father ; and if any thing could
be demanded from the child by either of the
other, it could only be due to his natural father,
who perhaps might have forfeited his right to
much of that duty comprehended in the com-
mand, Honour your parents, but could transfer
none of it to another. He that purchased, and
neglected the child, got by his purchase and
grant of the father, no title to duty or honour
from the child ; but only he acquired it, who
by his own authority, performing the office and
care of a father, to the forlorn and perishing
infant, made himself, by paternal care, a title
to proportionable degrees of paternal power.
This will be more easily admitted upon consi-
deration of the nature of paternal power, for
which I refer my reader to the second book.

§. 101. To return to the argument in hand ;
this is evident, That paternal power arising
only from begetting, for in that our author
places it alone, can neither be transferred nor
inherited : and he that does not beget, can no
more have paternal power, which arises from

OF GOVERNMENT. 113

thence, than he can have a right to any thing,
who performs not the condition, to which only
it is annexed. If one should ask, by what law
has a father power over his children? it will
be answered, no doubt, by the law of nature,
which gives such a power over them, to him
that begets them. If one should ask likewise,
by what law does our author's heir come by a
right to inherit? I think it would be answered,
by the law of nature too : for I find not that
our author brings one word of scripture to
prove the right of such an heir he speaks of.
Why then the law of nature gives fathers
paternal power over their children, because
they did beget them ; and the same law of
nature gives the same paternal power to the
heir over his brethren, who did not beget them :
whence it follows, that either the father has not
his paternal power by begetting, or else that
the heir has it not at all ; for it is hard to
understand how the law of nature, which is the
law of reason, can give the paternal power
to the father over his children, for the only
reason of begetting ; and to the first-born over
his brethren without this only reason, i. c. for
no reason at all : and if the eldest, by the law
of nature, can. inherit this paternal power,
without the only reason that gives a title to it,
s<> may the youngest as well as he, and a
stranger as well as either; for where there is
no reason for any our, as then- is not, but for
him that begets, all have an equal title. I am

i

1 14 OF GOVERNMENT.

sure our author offers no reason ; and when
any body does, we shall see whether it Avill
hold or no.

§. 102. In the mean time it is as good sense
to say, that by the law of nature a man has
right to inherit the property of another, because
he is of kin to him, and is known to be of his
blood ; and therefore, by the same law of
nature, an utter stranger to his blood has right
to inherit his estate ; as to say that, by the law
of nature, he that begets them has paternal
power over his children, and therefore, by the
law of nature, the heir that begets them not,
has this paternal power over them ; or suppo-
sing the law of the land gave absolute power
over their children, to such only who nursed
them, and fed their children themselves, could
any body pretend, that this law gave any one,
who did no such thing, absolute power over
those, who were not his children ?

<§. 103. When therefore it can be shewed,
that conjugal power can belong to him that is
not an husband, it will also I believe be proved,
that our author's paternal power, acquired by
begetting, may be inherited by a son ; and that
a brother, as heir to his father's power, may
have paternal power, over his brethren, and by
the same rule conjugal power too: but till
then, I think we may rest satisfied, that the
paternal power of Adam, this sovereign autho-
rity of fatherhood, were there any such, could
not descend to, nor be inherited by, his next

OF GOVERNMENT. ] 15

heir. Fatherly power, I easily grant our author,
if it will do him any good, can never be lost,
because it will be as long in the world as there
are fathers : but none of them will have Adams
paternal power, or derive their's from him;
but every one will have his own, by the same
title Adam had his, viz. by begetting', but not
by inheritance, or succession, no more than
husbands have their conjugal power by inheri-
tance from Adam. And thus we see, as Adam
had no such property, no such paternal poiver,
as gave him sovereign jurisdiction over man-
kind ; so likewise his sovereignty built upon
either of these titles, [if he had any such, could
not have descended to his heir, but must have
ended with him. Adam therefore, as lias been
proved, being neither monarch, nor his imagi-
nary monarchy hereditable, the power which
is now in the world, is not that which was
Adam's, since all that Adam could have upon
our author's grounds, either of property or
fatherhood, necessarily died with him, and
could not be conveyed to posterity by inheri-
tance. In the next place we will consider,
whether Adam had any such heir, to inherit
his power, as our author talks of.

i 2

116 OF GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER X.

Of the Heir to Adam's Monarchical Power.

§. 104. Our author tells us, Observations,
253. That it is a truth undeniable, that there
cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever,
either great or small, though gathered together
from the several corners and remotest regions of
the world, but that in the same multitude, con-
sidered by itself, there is one man amongst them,
that in nature hath a right to be king of all the
rest, as being the next heir to Adam, and all the
other subjects to him : every man by nature is a
king or a subject. And again, p. 20. If
Adam himself ivere still living, and now ready
to die, it is certain that there is one man, and
but one in the world, ivho is next heir. Let this
multitude of men be, if our author pleases, all
the princes upon the earth, there will then be,
by our authors rule, one amongst them, that in
nature hath a right to be king of all the rest,
as being the right heir to Adam ; an excellent
way to establish the thrones of princes, and
settle the obedience of their subjects, by setting-
up an hundred, or perhaps a thousand titles
(if there be so many princes in the world)
against any king now reigning, each as good,
upon our author's grounds, as his who wears the
crown. If this right of heir carry any weight
with it, if it be the ordinance of God, as our

OF GOVERNMENT. 1 17

tuthor seems to tell us, Observations, 241. must
not all be subject to it, from the highest to the
lowest? Can those who wear the name of
princes, without having the right of being heirs
to Adam, demand obedience from their subjects
by this title, and not be bound to pay it by the
s;une law ? Either governments in the world
are not to be claimed, and held by this title of
Adam's heir ; and then the starting of it is to.
no purpose, the being or not being Adam's heir,
signifies nothing as to the title of dominion : or
if it really be, as our author says, the true title
to government or sovereignty, the first thing to
be done, is to find out this true heir of Adam,
scat him in his throne, and then all the kings
and princes of the world ought to come and
resign up their crowns and sceptres to him, as
things that belong no more to them, than to any
of their subjects.

§. 105. For either this right in nature, of
Adams heir, to be king over all the race of
men, (for all together they make one multitude)
is a right not necessary to the making of a
lawful king, and so there may be lawful kings
without it, and then kings titles and power
depend not on it ; or else all the kings in the
world but one are not lawful kings, and so
have no right to obedience : either this title of
heir to Adam is that whereby kings hold their
crowns, and have a right to subjection from
their subjects, and then one only can have it,
ind the rest being subjects can require no

118 OF GOVERNMENT.

obedience from other men, who are but their
fellow-subjects; or else it is not the title
whereby kings rule, and have a right to obe-
dience from their subjects, and then kings are
kings without it, and this dream of the natural
sovereignty of Adams heir is of no use to
obedience and government : for if kings have a
right to dominion, and the obedience of their
subjects, who are not, nor can possibly be,
heirs to Adam, what use is there of such a
title, when we are obliged to obey without it?
If kings, who are not heirs to Adam, have no
right to sovereignty, we are all free, till our
author, or any body for him, will shew us
Adam's right heir. If there be but one heir of
Adam, there can be but one lawful king in the
world, and nobody in conscience can be obliged
to obedience till it be resolved who that is ; for
it may be any one, who is not known to be of
a younger house, and all others have equal
titles. If there be more than one heir of Adam,
every one is his heir, and so every one has
regal power: for if two sons can be heirs
together, then all the sons are equally heirs,
and so all arc heirs, being all sons, or sons
sons of Adam. Betwixt these two the right of
heir cannot stand ; for by it either but one only
man, or all men are kings. Take which you
please, it dissolves the bonds of government
and obedience; since, if all men are heirs,
they can owe obedience to nobody; if only
• mi be obliged to pay ol>< di< m -

him, till he be known, and his t it 1« made out

OF GOVERNMENT 119

CHAPTER XI.
Who HEIR?

§. 106. The great question which in all
ages has disturbed mankind, and brought on
them the greatest part of those mischiefs which
have ruined cities, depopulated countries, and
disordered the peace of the world, has been,
not whether there be power in the world, nor
whence it came, but who should have it. The
settling of this point being of no smaller mo-
ment than the security of princes, and the
peace and welfare of their estates and king-
doms, a reformer of politics, one would think,
should lay this sure, and be very clear in it :
for if this remain disputable, all the rest will be
to very little purpose; and the skill used in
dressing up power with all the splendour and
temptation absoluteness can add to it, without
shewing who has a right to have it, will serve
only to give a greater edge to man's natural
ambition, which of itself is but too keen. What
can this do but set men on the more eagerly to
scramble, and so lay a sure and lasting foun-
dation of endless contention and disorder,
instead of that peace and tranquillity, which
is the business of government, and the end of
human society ?

§. 107. This designation of the person our
author is more than ordinary obliged to take

120 OF GOVERNMENT.

care of, because he, affirming that the assign-
ment of civil poiver is by divine institution, hath
made the conveyance as well as the power
itself sacred : so that no consideration, no act
or art of man, can divert it from that person,
to whom, by this divine right, it is assigned ;
no necessity or contrivance can substitute
another person in his room : for if the assign-
ment of civil power be by divine institution, and
Adams heir be he to whom it is thus assigned,
as in the foregoing chapter our author tells us,
it would be as much sacrilege for any one to
be king, who was not Adams heir, as it would
have been amongst the Jews, for any one to
have been priest, who had not been of Aaron s
posterity : for not only the priesthood in general
being by divine institution, but the assignment
of it to the sole line and posterity of Aaron,
made it impossible to be enjoyed or exercised
by any one, but those persons who were the
offspring of Aaron : whose succession therefore
was carefully observed, and by that the persons
who had a right to the priesthood certainly
known.

§. 108. Let us see then what care our author
has taken, to make us know who is this heir,
who by divine institution has a right to be king
over all men. The first account of him we
meet with is, p. 12. in these words: This sub-
jection of children, being the fountain of all
regal authority, by the ordination of God him-
wff> it follows, that civil power, not only in

OF GOVERNMENT. 121

general, is by divine institution, bat even the,
assignment of it, specifically to Ike eldest parents.
Matters of such consequence as this is, should
be in plain words, as little liable, as might be,
to doubt or equivocation; and I think, if
language be capable of expressing any thing
distinctly and clearly, that of kindred, and the
several degrees of nearness of blood, is one.
It were therefore to be wished, that our author
had used a little more intelligible expressions
here, that we might have better known, who it
is, to whom the assignment of civil power is
made by divine institution ; or at least would
have told us what he meant by eldest parents :
for I believe, if land had been assigned or
granted to him, and the eldest parents of his
family, he would have thought it had needed
an interpreter ; and it would scarce have been
known to whom it next belonged.

^. 109. In propriety of speech, (and certainly
propriety of speech is necessary in a discourse
of this nature) eldest parents signifies either the
eldest men and women that have had children,
or those who have longest had issue ; and then
our author's assertion will be, that those fathers
and mothers, who have been longest in the
world, or longest fruitful, have by divine insti-
tution a right to civil potter. If there be any
absurdity in this, our author must answer for
it: and if his meaning be different from my
explication, he is to be blamed, that he would
not speak it plainly. This I am sure, parents

122 OF GOVERNMENT.

cannot signify heirs male, nor eldest parents an
infant child : who yet may sometimes be the
true heir, if there can be but one. And we are
hereby still as much at a loss, who civil power
belongs to, notwithstanding this assignment by
divine institution, as if there had been no such
assignment at all, or our author had said no-
thing of it. This of eldest parents leaving us
more in the dark, who by divine institution has
a right to civil power, than those who never
heard any thing at all of heir, or descent, of
which our author is so full. And though the
chief matter of his writing be to teach obedience
to those, who have a right to it, which he tells
us is conveyed by descent, yet who those are,
to whom this right by descent belongs, he
leaves, like the philosophers stone in politics,
out of the reach of any one to discover from
his writings.

§. 110. This obscurity cannot be imputed to
want of language in so great a master of style
as Sir Robert is, when he is resolved with
himself what he would say: and therefore, I
fear, finding how hard it would be to settle
rules of descent by institution, and how little
it would be to his purpose, or conduce to the
clearing and establishing the titles of princes,
if such rules of descent were settled, he chose
rather to content himself with doubtful and
general terms, which might make no ill sound
in nuns ears, who were willing to be pleased
with them, rather than offer any clear rules of

OF GOVERNMENT. 123

descent of this fatherhood of Adam, by which
men's consciences might be satisfied to whom
it descended, and know the persons who had
a right to regal power, and with it to their
obedience.

§. 111. How else is it possible, that laying
so much stress, as he does, upon descent, and
Adam's heir, next, heir, true heir, he should
never tell us what heir means, nor the way to
know who the next or true heir is ? This, I do
not remember, he does any where expressly
handle ; but, where it comes in his way, very
warily and doubtfully touches ; though it be
so necessary, that without it all discourses of
government and obedience upon his principles
would be to no purpose, and fatherly poiver,
never so well made out, will be of no use to
any body. Hence he tells us, Observations,
244. That not only the constitution of power
in general, but the limitation of it to one kind,
(i. e.) monarchy, and the determination of it to
the individual person and line of Adam, are all
I /tree ordinances of God; neither Eve nor her
children could either limit Adam's poiver, or
join others with him ; and what ivas given unto
Adam ivas given in his person to his posterity.
Here again our author informs us, that the
divine ordinance hath limited the descent of
Adam's monarchical power. To whom? To
Adam's lint and posterity, says our author. A

(table limitation, a limitation to all mankind:
if our author can find any one amongst

124 OF GOVERNMENT.

mankind, that is not of the li?ie and posterity
of Adam, he may perhaps tell him, who this
next heir of Adam is : but for us, I despair
how this limitation of Adam's empire to his
tine and posterity will help us to find out one
heir. This limitation indeed of our author
will save those the labour, who would look for
him amongst the race of brutes, if any such
there were ; but will very little contribute to
the discovery of one next heir amongst men,
though it make a short and easy determination
of the question about the descent of Adam's
regal power, by telling us, that the line and
posterity of Adam is to have it, that is, in plain
English, any one may have it, since there is
no person living that hath not the title of being
of the line and posterity of Adam; and while
it keeps there, it keeps within our author's
limitation by God's ordinance. Indeed, p. 19.
he tells us, that such heirs are not only lords
of their own children, but of their brethren;
whereby, and by the words following, which
we shall consider anon, he seems to insinuate,
that the eldest son is heir ; but he no where,
that I know, says it in direct words, but by the
instances of Cain and Jacob, that there follow,
we may allow this to be so far his opinion
concerning heirs, that where there are divers
children, the eldest son has the right to be heir.
That primogeniture cannot give any title to
paternal power, we have already shewed.
That a father may have a natural right to

OF GOVERNMENT. 125

some kind of power over his children, is easily
granted ; hut that an elder brother has so over
his brethren, remains to be proved : God or
nature has not any where, that I know, placed
such jurisdiction in the first-born; nor can
reason find any such natural superiority amongst
brethren. The law of Moses gave a double
portion of the goods and possessions to the
eldest; but we find not any where that na-
turally, or by God's institution, superiority or
dominion belonged to him, and the instances
there brought by our author are but slender
proofs of a right to civil power and dominion
in the first-born, and do rather shew the
contrary.

§. 1 12. His words are in the forecited place:
And therefore ivefind God told Cain of his bro-
ther Abel : his desire shall be subject unto thee,
and thou shall rule over him. To which 1
answer,

1. These words of God to Cain, are by many
interpreters, with great reason, understood in
a quite different sense than what our author
uses them in.

2. Whatever was meant by them, it could
not be, that Cain, as elder, had a natural do-
mion over Abel; for the words are conditional,
If thou dost well: and so personal to Cain:
and whatever was signified by them, did de-
pend on his carriage, and not follow his birth-
right ; and therefore could by no means be
an establishment of dominion in the first-born

120 OF GOVERNMENT.

in general : for before this Abel had his distinct
territories by right of private dominion, as our
author himself confesses, Observations, 210,
which he could not have had to the prejudice
of the heirs title, if by divine institution, Cain
as heir were to inherit all his father's dominion.

3. If this were intended by God as the char-
ter of primogeniture, and the grant of dominion
to elder brothers in general as such, by right
of inheritance, we might expect it should have
included all his brethren : for we may well
suppose, Adam, from whom the world was to
be peopled, had by this time, that these were
grown up to be men, more sons than these
two : whereas Abel himself is not so much as.
named ; and the words in the original can
scarce, with any good construction, be applied
to him.

4. It is too much to build a doctrine of so
mighty consequence upon so doubtful and
obscure a place of scripture, which may be
well, nay better, understood in a quite dif-
ferent sense, and so can be but an ill proof,
being as doubtful as the thing to be proved by
it; especially when there is nothing else in
scripture or reason to be found, that favours
or supports it.

§. 113. It follows, p. 19. Accordingly when
Jacob bought his brothers birth-right, Isaac
blessed him thus; Be lord over thy brethren,
(uid let the sons of thy mother bow before thee.
Another instance, I take it, brought by our

OF GOVERNMENT. \'l.

author to evince dominion tine to birth-right,
aud an admirable one it is : for it must he no
ordinary way of reasoning in a man, that is
pleading for the natural power of kings, and
against all compact, to bring for proof of it,
an example, where his own account of it founds
all the right upon compact, and settles empire
in the younger brother, unless buying and selling-
be no compact; for he tells us, tvhen Jacob
bought his brother s birth-right. But passing
by that, let us consider the history itself, what
use our author makes of it, and we shall find
these following mistakes about it.

1 . That our author reports this, as if Isaac
had given Jacob this blessing, immediately up-
on his purchasing the birth-right ; for he says,
when Jacob bought, Isaac blessed him; which
is plainly otherwise in the scripture : for it
appears, there was a distance of time between,
and if we will take the story in the order it
lies, it must be no small distance ; all Isaac's
sojourning in Gerar, and transactions with
Abimelech, Gen. xxvi. coming between ; Re-
becca being then beautiful, and consequently
young ; but Isaac, when he blessed Jacob, was
old and decrepit; and Esau also complains
of Jacob, Gen. xxvii. 36. that two times he had
supplanted him ; He took aivay my birth-right,
says he, and behold now he hath taken away
my blessing; words, that I think signify dis-
tance of time and difference of action.

2. Another mistake of our author's is, that

128 OF GOVERNMENT.

he supposes Isaac gave Jacob the blessing, and
bid him be lord over his brethren, because he
had the birth-right ; for our author brings this
example to prove, that he that has the birth-
right, has thereby a right to be lord over his
brethren. But it is also manifest by the text,
that Isaac had no consideration of Jacob's
having bought the birth-right; for when he
blessed him, he considered him not as Jacob,
but took him for Esau. Nor did Esau under-
stand any such connection between birth-right
and the blessing; for he says, He hath sup-
planted me these two times, he took away my
birth-right, and behold now he hath taken away
my blessing : whereas had the blessing, which
was to be lord over his brethren, belonged to
the birth-right, Esau could not have com-
plained of this second, as a cheat, Jacob having
got nothing but what Esau had sold him, when
he sold him his birth-ri<rht ; so that it is plain,
dominion, if these words signify it, was not
understood to belong to the birth-ri<>'ht.

\. 114. And that in those days of the pa-
triarchs, dominion was not understood to be
the right of the heir, but only a greater portion
of goods, is plain from Gen. xxi. 10. for Sarah,
taking Isaac to be heir, says, Cast out this
bondwoman and her son, for the son of this
bondwoman shall not be heir with my son:
whereby could be meant nothing, but that he
should not have a pretence to an equal share
of his father's estate after his death, but should

OF GOVERNMENT. 129

have his portion presently, and begone. Ac-
cordingly we read, Gen. xxv. 5, 6. That
Abraham gave all he had unto Isaac, but unto
the sons of the concubines which Abraham had,
Abraham gave gifts, and sent them away from
Isaac Ms son, ivhile he yet lived. That is, Abra-
ham having- given portions to all his other sons,
and sent them away, that which he had re-
served, being the greatest part of his substance,
Isaac as heir possessed after his , death : but
by being heir, he had no right to be lord over
his brethren; for if he had, why should Sarah
endeavour to rob him of one of his subjects,
or lessen the number of his slaves, by desiring
to have Ishmael sent away ?

§. 115. Thus, as under the law, the privi-
lege of birth-right was nothing but a double
portion : so we see that before Moses, in the
patriarchs time, from whence our author pre-
tends to take his model, there was no know-
ledge, no thought, that birth-right gave rule
or empire, paternal or kingly authority, to any
one over his brethren. If this be not plain
enough in the story of Isaac and Ishmael, he
that will look into 1 Chron. v. 12. may read
these words ; Reuben ivas the first-born ; but
forasmuch as he defiled his father's bed, his
birth-right, ivas given unto the sons of Joseph,
the son of Israel : and the genealogy is not to
be reckoned after the birth-right; for Judah
prevailed above his brethren, and of him came
the chief rider ; but the birth-right was Joseph's.

K

J .30 OF GOVERNMENT.

What this births-right was, Jacob blessing* Jo-
seph, Gen. xlviii. 22. telleth us in these words,
Moreover I have given thee one "portion above thy
brethren, which I took out of the hand of the
Amorite, with my sword and with my bow.
AVhereby it is not only plain, that the birth-
right was nothing but a double portion; but
the text in Chronicles is express against our
author's doctrine, and shews that dominion
was no part of the birth-right ; for it tells us,
that Joseph had the birth-right, but Judah the
dominion. One would think our author were
very fond of the very name of birth-right,
when he brings this instance of Jacob and
Esau, to prove that dominion belongs to the
heir over his brethren.

§.116. 1. Because it will be but an ill ex-
ample to prove, that dominion by God's ordi-
nation belonged to the eldest son, because Ja-
cob the youngest here had it, let him come by
it how he would : for if it prove any thing, it
can only prove, against our author, that tin 1
assignment of dominion to the eldest is not by
divine institution, which would then be unalter-
able : for if by the law of God, or nature,
absolute power and empire belongs to the
eldest son and his heirs, so that they are su-
preme monarchs, and all the rest of their
brethren slaves, our author gives us reason to
doubt whether the eldest son has a power to
part with it, to the prejudice of his posterity,
since he tells us, Observations, 158. That in

OF GOVERNMENT. 131

grants and gifts that have their original from
God or nature, no inferior power of man can
limit or make any law of prescription against
them.

<§. 117. 2. Because this place, Gen. xxvii.
29. brought by our author, concerns not at all
the dominion of one brother over the other, nor
the subjection of Esau to Jacob : for it is plain
in the history, that Esau was never subject to
Jacob, but lived apart in mount Seir, where he
founded a distinct people and government,
and was himself prince over them, as much as
Jacob was in his own family. This text, if
considered, can never be understood of Esau
himself, or the personal dominion of Jacob over
him : for the words brethren and sons of thy
mother, could not be used literally by Isaac,
who knew Jacob had only one brother; and
these words are so far from being true in a
literal sense, or establishing any dominion in
Jacob over Esau, that in the story we find the
quite contrary, for Gen. xxxii. Jacob several
times calls Esaulord, and himself his servant;
and Gen. xxxiii. he bowed himself seven times
to the ground to Esau. Whether Esau then
were a subject and vassal (nay, as our author
tells us, all subjects are slaves) to Jacob, and
Jacob his sovereign prince by birth -right, I
leave the reader to judge; and to believe if he
ran, that these words of Isaac, Ee lord over
thy brethren, and let thy mother s sons bow down
to thee, confirmed Jacob in a sovereignty over

K 2

132 OF GOVERNMENT.

Esau, upon the account of the birth-right he
had got from him.

§. 118. He that reads the story of Jacob and
Esau, will find there was never any jurisdiction
or authority, that either of them had over the
other after their father's death: they lived with
the friendship and equality of brethren, neither
lord, neither slave to his brother ; but indepen-
dent each of other, were both heads of their
distinct families, where they received no laws
from one another, but lived separately, and
were the roots out of which sprang two distinct
people under two distinct governments. This
blessing then of Isaac, whereon our author
would build the dominion of the elder brother,
signifies no more, but what Rebecca had been
told from God, Gen. xxv. 23. Two nations are
in thy ivomb, and tico manner of people shall be
separated from thy bowels, and the one people
shall be stronger than the other people, and the
elder shall serve the younger; and so Jacob
blessed Judah, Gen, xlix. and gave him the
sceptre and dominion, from whence our author
might have argued as well, that jurisdiction
and dominion belongs to the third son over his
brethren, as well as from this blessing of Isaac,
that it belonged to Jacob: both these places
contain only predictions of what should long
after happen to their posterities, and not any
declaration of the right of inheritance to do-
minion in either. And thus we have our an-

OF GOVERNMENT. 133

thDr's two great and only arguments to prove,
that heirs are lords over their brethren.

1. Because God tells Cain, Gen. iv. that
however sin might set upon him, he ought or
might be master of it : for the most learned in-
terpreters understood the words of sin, and not
of Abel, and give so strong reasons for it, that
nothing can convincingly be inferred from so
doubtful a text, to our author's purpose.

2. Because in this of Gen. xxvii. Isaac fore-
tels that the Israelites, the posterity of Jacob,
should have dominion over the Edomites, the
posterity of Esau ; therefore says our author,
heirs are lords of their brethren: I leave any
one to judge of the conclusion.

§. 119. And now we see how our author
has provided for the descending, and convey-
ance down of Adams monarchical power, or
paternal dominion to posterity, by the inhe-
ritance of his heir, succeeding to all his father's
authority, and becoming upon his death as
much lord as his father was, not only over his
own children, but over his brethren, and all
descended from his father, and so in infinitum.
But yet who this heir is, he does not once tell
us ; and all the light we have from him in this
so fundamental a point, is only, that in his in-
stance of Jacob, by using the word birth-right,
as that which passed from Esau to Jacob, he
haves us to guess, that by heir, he means the
eldest son; though I do not remember he any
where mentions expressly the title of the first-

134 OF GOVERNMENT.

born, but all along keeps himself under the
shelter of the indefinite term heir. But taking
it to be his meaning, that the eldest son is heir,
(for if the eldest be not, there will be no pre-
tence why the sons should not be all heirs
alike) and so by right of primogeniture has
dominion over his brethren ; this is but one
step towards the settlement of succession, and
the difficulties remain still as much as ever, till
he can shew us who is meant by right heir, in
all those cases which may happen where the
present possessor hath no son. This he silently
passes over, and perhaps wisely too : for what
can be wiser, after one has affirmed, that the
person having that power, as icell as the power
and form of government, is the ordinance of
God, and by divine institution, vid. Observations,
254. p. 12. than to be careful, not to start any
question concerning the person, the resolution
whereof will certainly lead him into a confes-
sion, that God and nature hath determined
nothing about him? And if our author cannot
shew who by right of nature, or a clear positive
law of God, has the next right to inherit the
dominion of this natural monarch he has been
at such pains about, when he died without a
son, he might have spared his pains in all the
rest, it being more necessary for the settling
men's consciences, and determining their sub-
jection and allegiance, to shew them who by
original right, superior and antecedent to the
will, or any act of men, hath a title to this

OF GOVERNMENT. 13-5

paternal jurisdiction, than it is to shew that by
nature there was such a jurisdiction; it being
to no purpose for me to know there is such a
paternal power, which I ought, and am dis-
posed to obey, unless, where there are many
pretenders, I also know the person that is
rightfully invested and endowed with it.

<§. 120. For the main matter in question
being concerning the duty of my obedience,
and the obligation of conscience I am under to
pay it to him that is of right my lord and ruler,
1 must know the person that this right of pater-
nal power resides in, and so impowers him to
claim obedience from me: for let it be true
what he says, p. 12. That civil poiver not only
in general is by divine institution, but even the
assignment of it specially to the eldest parents ;
and Observations, 254. That not only the
power, or right of government, but the form of
the power of governing, and the person having
that power, are all the ordinance of God ; yet
unless he shew us in all cases, who is this
person ordained by God, who is this eldest
parent; all his abstract notions of monarchical
power will signify just nothing, when they are
to be reduced to practice, and men are con-
scientiously to pay their obedience : for paternal
jurisdiction being not the thing to be obeyed,
because it cannot command, but is only that
which gives one man a right which another
hath not, and if it come by inheritance, another
man cannot have, to command and be obeyed ;

136 OF GOVERNMENT.

it is ridiculous to say, I pay obedience to the
paternal powe?', when I obey him, to whom
paternal power gives uo right to my obedience :
for he can have no divine right to my obedience,
who cannot shew his divine right to the power
of ruling over me, as well as that by divine
right there is such a power in the world.

<§. 121. And hence not being able to make
out any princes title to government, as heir to
Adam, which therefore is of no use, and had
been better let alone, he is fain to resolve all
into present possession, and make civil obe-
dience as due to an usurper, as to a lawful
king ; and thereby the usurper s title as good.
His words are, Observations, 253. and they
deserve to be remembered : If an usurper dis-
possess the true heir, the subjects obedience to
the fatherly power must go along, and wait
upon God's providence. But I shall leave his
title of usurpers to be examined in its due
place, and desire my sober reader to consider
what thanks princes owe such politics as this,
which can suppose paternal poiver (i. e.) a right
to government in the hands of a Cade, or a
Cromwell ; and so all obedience being due to
paternal power, the obedience of subjects will
be due to them, by the same right, and upon
as good grounds, as it is to lawful princes ;
and yet this, as dangerous a doctrine as it is,
must necessarily follow from making all politi-
cal power to be nothing else, but Adam's pa-
ternal power by right and divine institution,

OF GOVERNMENT. 137

descending from him without being able to
shew to whom it descended, or who is heir to it.

§. 12*2. To settle government in the world,
and to lay obligations to obedience on any
man's conscience, it is necessary (supposing
with our author that all power be nothing but
the being possessed of Adams j at her hood) to
satisfy him, who has a right to this power, this
fatherhood, when the possessor dies without
sons to succeed immediately to it, as it was to
tell him, that upon the death of the father, the
eldest son had a right to it: for it is still to be
remembered, that the great question is, (and
that which our author would be thought to
contend for, if he did not sometimes forget it)
what persons have a right to be obeyed, and
not whether there be a power in the world,
which is to be called paternal, without knowing
in whom it resides : for so it be a power, i. e.
right to govern, it matters not, whether it be
termed paternal or regal, natural or acquired;
whether you call it supreme fatherhood, or su-
preme brotherhood, will be all one, provided we
know who has it.

§. 123. I go on then to ask, whether in the
inheriting of this paternal power, this supreme
fatherhood, the grandson by a daughter hath a
right before a nephew by a brother ? Whether
the grandson by the eldest son, being an infant,
before the younger son, a man and able?
\\ hether the daughter before (he uncle ? or any
other man, descended by a male line? Whether

J38 OF GOVERNMENT.

a grandson by a young daughter, before a
grand-daughter by an elder daughter? Whether
the elder son by a concubine, before a younger
son by a wife? From whence also will arise
many questions of legitimation, and what in
nature is the difference betwixt a wife and a
concubine? for as to the municipal or positive
laws of men, they can signify nothing here.
It may farther be asked, Whether the eldest
son, being a fool, shall inherit this paternal
■power, before the younger, a wise man ? and
what degree of folly it must be that shall ex-
clude him? and who shall be judge of it?
Whether the son of a fool, excluded for his
folly, before the son of his wise brother who
reigned? Who has the paternal power whilst
the widow-queen is with child by the deceased
king, and nobody knows whether it will be a
son or a daughter? Which shall be heir of the
two male-twins, who by the dissection of the
mother were laid open to the world ? Whether
a sister by the half blood, before a brother's
daughter by the whole blood ?

§. 124. These, and many more such doubts,
might be proposed about the titles of succes-
sion, and the right of inheritance ; and that not
as idle speculations, but such as in history we
shall find have concerned the inheritance of
crowns and kingdoms; and if ours want them,
we need not go farther for famous examples of
it, than the other kingdom in this very island,
which having been fully related by the ingenious

OF GOVERNMENT. 130

and learned author of Patriarcha non Monar-
ches, I need say no more of. Till our author
hath resolved all the doubts that may arise
about the next heir, and shewed that they are
plainly determined by the law of nature, or the
revealed law of God, all his suppositions of a
monarchical, absolute, supreme, paternal power
in Adam, and the descent of that power to his
heirs, would not be of the least use to establish
the authority, or make out the title, of any one
prince now on earth ; but would rather unsettle
and bring all into question : for let our author
tell us as long as he pleases, and let all men
believe it too, that Adam had a paternal, and
thereby a monarchical power; that this (the
on\y power in the world) descended to his heirs;
and that there is no other power in the world
but this : let this be all as clear demonstration,
as it is manifest error, yet if it be not past
doubt, to whom this paternal power descends,
and whose now it is, nobody can be under any
obligation of obedience, unless any one will say,
that I am bound to pay obedience to paternal
poiver in a man who has no more paternal power
than 1 myself; which is all one as to say, I
obey a man, because he has a right to govern ;
and if I be asked, how I know he has a right to
govern, I should answer, it cannot be known,
that he has any at all : for that cannot be the
reason of my obedience, which I know not to be
so ; much less can that be a reason of my obe-
dience, which nobody at all can know to be so.

140 OF GOVERNMENT.

§. 125. And therefore all this ado about
Adam's fatherhood, the greatness of its power,
and the necessity of its supposal, helps nothing
to establish the power of those that govern, or
to determine the obedience of subjects who
are to obey, if they cannot tell whom they are
to obey, or it cannot be known who are to
govern, and who to obey. In the state the
world is now, it is irrecoverably ignorant, who
is Adams heir. This fatherhood, this monar-
chical power of Adam, descending to his heirs,
would be of no more use to the government of
mankind, than it would be to the quieting of
men's consciences, or securing their healths, if
our author had assured them, that Adam had
a power to forgive sins, or cure diseases, which
by divine institution descended to his heir,
whilst this heir is impossible to be known.
And should not he do as rationally, who upon
this assurance of our author went and confes-
sed his sins, and expected a good absolution ;
or took physic with expectation of health, from
any one who had taken on himself the name
of priest or physician, or thrust himself into
those employments, saying, I acquiesce in the
absolving power descending from Adam, or I
shall be cured by the medicinal power descend-
ing from Adam ; as he who says, I submit to
and obey the paternal power descending from
Adam, when it is confessed all these powers
descend only to his single heir, and that heir
is unknown.

OF GOVERNMENT. 141

§. 120. It is true, the civil lawyers have
pretended to determine some of these cases
concerning the succession of princes ; but by
our authors principles, they have meddled in
a matter that belongs not to them : for if all
political power be derived only from Adam,
and be to descend only to his successive heirs,
by the ordinance of God and divine institution,
this is a right antecedent and paramount to all
government; and therefore the positive laws of
men cannot determine that which is itself the
foundation of all law and government, and is
to receive its rule only from the law of God
and nature. And that being silent in the case,
I am apt to think there is no such right to be
conveyed this way : I am sure it would be to
no purpose if there were, and men would be
more at a loss concerning government, and
obedience to governors, than if there were no
such right ; since by positive laws and compact,
which divine institution (if there be any) shuts
out, all these endless inextricable doubts can
be safely provided against : but it can never be
understood, how a divine natural right, and
that of such moment as is all order and peace
in the world, should be conveyed down to
posterity, without any plain natural or divine
rule concerning it. And there would be an
end of all civil government, if the assignment
of civil power were by divine institution to the
heir, and yet by that divine institution the per-
son of the heir could not be known. This

142 OF GOVERNMENT.

paternal regal power being by divine right only
his, it leaves no room for human prudence, or
consent, to place it any where else ; for if only
one man hath a divine right to the obedience of
mankind, nobody can claim that obedience,
but he that can shew that right ; nor can men's
consciences by any other pretence be obliged
to it. And thus this doctrine cuts up all
government by the roots.

§. 127. Thus we see how our author, laying
it for a sure foundation, that the very person
that is to rule, is the ordinance of God, and by
divine institution, tells us at large, only that
this person is the heir, but who this heir is, he
leaves us to guess ; and so this divine institu-
tion, which assigns it to a person whom we
have no rule to know, is just as good as an
assignment to nobody at all. But, whatever
our author does, divine institution makes no
such ridiculous assignments : nor can God be
supposed to make it a sacred law, that one
certain person should have a right to some-
thing, and yet not give rules to mark out, and
know that person by, or give an heir a divine
right to power, and yet not point out who that
heir is. It is rather to be thought, that an heir
had no such right by divine institution, than
that God should give such a right to the heir,
but yet leave it doubtful and undeterminable
Avho such heir is.

§. 128. If God had given the land of Canaan
to Abraham, and in general terms to some-

OP GOVERNMENT. 143

body after him, without naming his seed,
whereby it might be known who that some-
body was, it would have been as good and
useful an assignment, to determine the right
to the land of Canaan, as it would be the de-
termining the right of crowns, to give empire
to Adam and his successive heirs after him,
without telling who his heir is: for the word
heir, without a rule to know who it is, signifies
no more than somebody, I know not whom.
God making it a divine institution, that men
should not marry those who were near of kin,
thinks it not enough to say, None of you shall
approach to any that is near of kin to him, to
uncover their nakedness ; but moreover, gives
rules to know who are those near of kin, for-
bidden by divine institution; or else that law
would have been of no use, it being to no
purpose to lay restraint, or give privileges to
men, in such general terms, as the particular
person concerned cannot be known by. But
God not having any where said, the next heir
shall inherit all his father's estate or dominion,
we are not to wonder, that he hath no where
appointed who that heir should be ; for never
having intended any such thing, never designed
any heir in that sense, we cannot expect he
should any where nominate, or appoint any
person to it, as we might, had it been otherwise.
And therefore in scripture, though the word
heir occur, vet there is no such tiling- as heir
in our author's sense, one that was by right of

144 OF GOVERNMENT.

nature to inherit all that his father had, exclu-
sive of his brethren. Hence Sarah supposes,
that if Ishmael staid in the house, to share in
Abrahams estate after his death, this son of
a bond-woman might be heir with Isaac ; and
therefore, says she, cast out this bond-icoman
and her son, for the son of this bond-woman shall
iwl be heir with my son : but this cannot excuse
our author, who telling us there is, in every
number of men, one who is right and next heir
to Adam, ought to have told us what the laws
of descent are ; but he having been so sparing
to instruct us by rules, how to know who is
heir, let us see in the next, place, what his
history out of scripture, on which he pretends
wholly to build his government, give us in this
necessary and fundamental point.

§. 129. Our author, to make good the title
of his book, p. 13. begins his history of the
descent of Adam's regal power, p. 13. in these
words : This lordship which Adam by com-
ma/id had over the whole world, and by right
descending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy,
was a large, &c. How does he prove that the
patriarchs by descent did enjoy it ? for dominion
of life and death, says he, we find Judah the
father pronounced sentence of death against
Thamar his daughter-in-law for playing the
harlot, p. 13. How does this prove that Judah
had absolute and sovereign authority? he pro-
nounced sentence of death. The pronouncing
of sentence of death is not a certain mark of

OP GOVERNMENT. 145

sovereignty, but usually the office of inferior
magistrates. The power of making laws of
life and death is indeed a mark of sovereignty,
but pronouncing the sentence according to
those laws may be done by others, and there-
fore this will but ill prove that he had sovereign
authority : as if one should say, Judge Jefferies
pronounced sentence of death in the late times,
therefore Judge Jefferies had sovereign autho-
rity. But it will be said, Judah did it not by
commission from another, and therefore did
it in his own right. Who knows whether he
had any right at all? Heat of passion might
carry him to do that which he had no authority
to do. Judah had dominion of life and death :
how does that appear? He exercised it, he
pronounced sentence of death against Thamar :
our author thinks it is very good proof, that
because he did it, therefore he had a right to
do it : he lay with her also : by the same way
of proof, he had a right to do that too. If the
consequence be good from doing to a right
of doing, Absalom too may be reckoned
amongst our author's sovereigns, for he pro-
nounced such a sentence of death against his
brother Amnon, and much upon a like occasion,
and had it executed too, if that be sufficient to
prove a dominion of life and death.

But allowing this all to be clear demonstra-
tion of sovereign power, who was it that had
this lordship by right descending to him from
Adam, as large and ample as the absolutcst

L

146' OF GOVERNMENT.

dominion of any monarch? Judah, says ouv
author, Judah, a younger son of Jacob, his
father and elder brethren living ; so that if our
author's own proof be to be taken, a younger
brother may, in the life of his father and elder
brothers, by right of descent, enjoy Adam's
monarchical power; and if one so qualified
may be monarch by descent, why may not
every man? If Judah, his father and elder
brother living, were one of Adams heirs, I
know not who can be excluded from this
inheritance; all men by inheritance may be
monarchs as well as Judah.

§. 130. 'Touching war, we see that Abraham
commanded an army of three hundred and
eighteen soldiers of his own family, and Esau
met his brother Jacob with four hundred men
at arms: for matter of peace, Abraham made
a league with Abimelech, Src. p. 13. Is it not
possible for a man to have three hundred and
eighteen men in his family, without being heir
to Adam? A planter in the West Indies has
more, and might, if he pleased, (who doubts?)
muster them up and lead them out against the
Indians, to seek reparation upon any injury
received from them ; and all this without the
absolute dominion of a monarch, descending to
him from Adam. Would it not be an ad-
mirable argument to prove, that all power by
God's institution descended from Adam by
inheritance, and that the very person and
power of this planter were the ordinance of God,

OF GOVERNMENT I 17

because he had power in his family over ser-
vants, horn in his house, and bought with his
money? For this was just Abraham's case;
Ihose who were rich in the patriarch's days,
as in the West Indies now, bought men and
maid servants, and by their increase, as well
as purchasing- of new, came to have large and
numerous families, which though they made
use of in war or peace, can it be thought the
power they had over them was an inheritance
descended from Adam, when it was the pur-
chase of their money? A man's riding in an
expedition against an enemy, his horse bought
in a fair would be as good a proof that the
owner enjoyed the lordship which Adam by
command had over the whole world, by right
of descending to him, as Abrahams leading out
the servants of his family is, that the patriarchs
enjoyed this lordship by descent from Adam :
since the title to the power, the master had
in both cases, whether over slaves or horses,
was only from his purchase ; and the getting
a dominion over any thing by bargain and
money, is a new way of proving one had it by
descent and inheritance.

§. 131. 13 Hi making tear and peace are marks
of sovereignty. Let it be so in politic socie-
ties: may not therefore a man in the West
Indies, who hath with him sons of his own,
friends, or companions, soldiers under pay, or
slaves bought with money, or perhaps a band
made up all of these, make war and peace, if

l 2

148 OF GOVERNMENT.

there should be occasion, and ratify the articles
too with an oath, without being a sovereign, an
absolute king over those who went with him ?
He that says he cannot, must then allow many
masters of ships, many private planters, to be
absolute monarchs, for as much as this they
have done. War and peace cannot be made
for politic societies, but by the supreme power
of such societies ; because war and peace,
giving a different motion to the force of such a
politic body, none can make war or peace, but
that which has the direction of the force of the
whole body, and that in politic societies is only
the supreme power. In voluntary societies for
the time, he that has such a power by consent,
may make war and peace, and so may a single
man for himself, the state of war not consisting
in the number of jJartisans, but the enmity of
the parties, where they have no superior to
appeal to.

§. 132. The actual making of war or peace,
is no proof of any other power, but only of
disposing those to exercise or cease acts of
enmity for whom he makes it ; and this power
in many cases any one may have without any
politic supremacy : and therefore the making
of war or peace will not prove that every one
that does so is a politic ruler, much less a king ;
for then commonwealths must be kings too,
for they do as certainly make war and peace
as monarchical government.

§. 133. But granting this a mark of sove-

OP GOVERNMENT. 149

reignty in Abraham, it is a proof of the descent
to him of Adam's sovereignty over the whole
world? If it be, it will surely be as good a
proof of the descent of Adam's lordship to
other's too. And then commonwealths, as
well as Abraham, will be heirs of Adam, for
they make ivar and peace, as well as he. If
you say, that the lordship of Adam doth not by
right descend to commonwealths, though they
make war and peace, the same say I of Abra-
ham, and then there is an end of your argu-
ment : if you stand to your argument, and say
those that do make war and peace, as com-
monwealths do without doubt, do inherit
Adam's lordship, there is an end of your mo-
narchy, unless you will say, that common-
wealths by descent enjoying Adam's lordship
are monarchies ; and that indeed would be a
new way of making all the governments in the
world monarchical.

<§. 134. To give our author the honour of
this new invention, for I confess it is not I have
first found it out by tracing his principles, and
so charged it on him, it is fit my readers know
that (as absurd as it may seem) he teaches it
himself, p. 23. where he ingenuously says, In
all kingdoms and commonwealths in the world,
whether the prince be the supreme father of the
people, or but the true heir to such a father, or
come to the crown by usurpation or election, or
whether some few or a multitude govern the

J 50 OF GOVERNMENT.

commonwealth; yet still the authority that is in
any one, or in many, or in all these, is the only
right, and natural authority of a supreme father ;
which right of fatherhood, he often tells us, is
regal and royal authority; as particularly, p.
12. the page immediately preceding this instance
of Abraham. This regal authority, he says,
those that govern commonwealths have; and
if it be true, that regal and royal authority be
in those that govern commonwealths, it is as
true that commonwealths are governed by
kings ; for if regal authority be in him that go-
verns, he that governs must needs be a king,
and so all commonwealths are nothing but
downright monarchies ; and then what need
any more ado about the matter ? The govern-
ments of the world are as they should be, there
is nothing but monarchy in it. This, without
doubt, was the surest way our author could
have found, to turn all other governments, but
monarchical, out of the world.

^. 13-5. But all this scarce proves Abraham
to have been a king as heir to Adam. If by
inheritance he had been king, Lot, who was
of the same family, must needs have been his
subject, by that title, before the servants in his
family ; but we see they lived as friends and
equals, and when their herdsmen could not
agree, there was no pretence of jurisdiction or
superiority between them, but they parted by
consent, Gen. xiii. hence he is called both by

OF GOVERNMENT. 151

Abraham, and by the text, Abrahams brother,
the name of friendship and equality, and not
of jurisdiction and authority, though he were
really but his nephew. And if our author
knows that Abraham was Adams heir, and a
king-, it was more, it seems, than Abraham
himself knew, or his servant whom he sent a
wooing for his son ; for when he sets out the
advantages of the match, Gen. xxiv. 35. there-
by to prevail with the young woman and her
friends, he says, / am Abraham's servant, and
the Lord hath blessed my master greatly, and he
is become great; and he hath given him flocks
and herds, and silver and gold, and men-ser-
vants and maid-servants, and camels and asses :
and Sarah, my master s wife, bare a son to my
master when she teas old, and unto him hath he
given all he hath. Can one think that a dis-
creet servant that was thus particular to set out
his master's greatness, would have omitted the
crown Isaac was to have, if he had known of
any such? Can it be imagined he should have
neglected to have told them on such an occa-
sion as this, that Abraham was a king, a name
well known at that time, for he had nine of
them his neighbours, if he or his master had
thought any such thing, the likeliest matter of
all the rest, to make his errand successful ?

§. 136. But this discovery it seems was re-
served for our author to make two or three
thousand years after, and let him enjoy the
credit of it; only he should have taken care

152 OF GOVERNMENT.

that some of Adam's land should have de-
scended to this bis heir, as well as all Adam's
lordship : for though this lordship which Abra-
ham, (if we may believe our author) as well as
the other patriarchs, by right descending to him
did enjoy, ivas as large and ample as the abso-
lutest dominion of any monarch which hath been
since the creation ; yet his estate, his territories,
his dominions were very narrow and scanty, for
he had not the possession of a foot of land, till
he bought a field and a cave of the sons of
Heth to bury Sarah in.

§. 137. The instance of Esau joined with
this of Abraham, to prove that the lordship
which Adam had over the whole icorld, by right
descending from him, the patriarchs did enjoy,
is yet more pleasant than the former. Esau
met his brother Jacob with four hundred men at
arms : he therefore was a king by right of heir
to Adam. Four hundred armed men then,
however got together, are enough to prove him
that leads them, to be a king and Adams heir.
There have been tories in Ireland, (whatever
there are in other countries) who would have
thanked our author for so honourable an opi-
nion of them, especially if there had been no-
body near with a better title of five hundred
armed men, to question their royal authority of
four hundred. It is a shame for men to trifle
so, to say no worse of it, in so serious an argu-
ment. Here Esau is brought as a proof that
Adams lordship, Adams absolute dominion, as

OF GOVERNMENT. 153

huge as that of any monarch, descended by right
to the patriarchs, and in this very chap. p. 19.
Jacob is brought as an instance of one, that by
birth-right ivas lord over his brethren. So we
have here two brothers absolute monarchs by
the same title, and at the same time heirs to
Adam, the eldest, heir to Adam, because he
met his brother with four hundred men ; and
the youngest, heir to Adam by birth-right.
Esau enjoyed the lordship ivhich Adam had
over the ivhole world by right descending to him
in as large and ample manner, as the absolutest
dominion of any monarch ; and at the same
time, Jacob lord over him, by the right heirs
have to be lords over their brethren. JRismn
tcneatis ? I never, I confess, met with any man
of parts so dexterous as Sir Robert at this way
of arguing: but it was his misfortune to light
upon an hypothesis, that could not be accom-
modated to the nature of things, and humau
affairs ; his principles could not be made to
agree with that constitution and order, which
God had settled in the world, and therefore
must needs often clash with common sense and
experience.

§. 138. In the next section, he tells us This
patriarchal power continued not only till the
flood, but after it, as the name patriarch doth
in part prove. The word patriarch doth more
than in part prove, that patriarchal power
continued in the world as long as there were
patriarchs, for it is necessary that patriarchal

154 OF GOVERNMENT.

power should be whilst there are patriarchs ;
as it is necessary there should be paternal or
conjugal power whilst there are fathers or
husbands ; but this is but playing with names.
That which he would fallaciously insinuate is
the thing in question to be proved, viz. that the
lordship which Adam had over the ivorld, the
supposed absolute universal dominion of Adam
by right descending Jrom him, the patriarchs
did enjoy. If he affirms such an absolute
monarchy continued to the flood, in the world,
I would be glad to know what records he has
it from ; for I confess I cannot find a word
of it in my Bible: if by patriarchal potter he
means any thing else; it is nothing to the
matter in hand. And how the name patriarch
in some part proves, that those, who are
called by that name, had absolute monarchical
power, I confess, I do not see, and therefore I
think needs no answer till the argument from
it be made out a little clearer.

§. 139. The three sons of Noah had the
world, says our author, divided amongst them
by their father, for of them ivas the whole
world overspread, p. 14. The world might be
overspread by the offspring of Noah's sons,
though he never divided the world amongst
them ; for the earth might be replenished
without being divided : so that all our author's
argument here proves no such division. How-
ever, 1 allow it to him, and then ask, the
world being divided amongst them, which of

OF GOVERNMENT. 155

the three was Adams heir \ If Adams lordship,
Adam's monarchy, by right descended only to
the eldest, then the other two could be but his
subjects, his slaves : if by right it descended to
all three brothers, by the same right, it will
descend to all mankind ; and then it will be
impossible what he says, p. 19. that heirs are
lords of their brethren, should be true ; but
all brothers, and consequently all men, will
be equal and independent, all heirs to Adam's
monarchy, and consequently all monarchs too,
one as much as another. But it will be said,
Noah their father divided the world amongst
them ; so that our author will allow more to
Noah, than he will to God Almighty, for
Observations, 211. he thought it hard, that
God himself should give the world to Noah
and his sons, to the prejudice of Noah's birth-
right: his words are, Noah was left sole heir
to the world: ivhy should it be thought that
God would disinherit him of his birth-right,
and make him, of all men in the world, the only
tenant in common with his children? and yet
here he thinks it fit that Noah should disin-
herit Shem of his birth-right, and divide the
world betwixt him and his brethren ; so that
this birth-right, when our author pleases, must,
and when he pleases must not, be sacred and
inviolable.

§. 140. If Noah did divide the world be-
tween his sons, and his assignment of do-
minions to them were good, there is an end of

156 OF GOVERNMENT.

divine institution; all our author's discourse
of Adam's heir, with whatsoever he builds on
it, is quite out of doors ; the natural power of
kings falls to the ground ; and then the form
of the power governing, and the person having
that power, will not be (as he says they are,
Observations, 254) the ordinance of God, but
they will be ordinances of man : for if the right
of the heir be the ordinance of God, a divine
right, no man, father or not father, can alter it :
if it be not a divine right, it is only human,
depending on the will of man : and so where
human institution gives it not, the first-born
has no right at all above his brethren ; and
men may put government into what hands, and
under what form, they please.

§. 141. He goes on, Most of the civilest na-
tions of the earth labour to fetch their original
from some of the sons, or nephews of Noah,
p. 14. How many do most of the civilest
nations amount to? and who are they? I fear
the Chineses, a very great and civil people,
as well as several other people of the East,
West, North and South, trouble not themselves
much about this matter. All that believe the
Bible, which I believe are our author's most
of the civilest nations, must necessarily derive
themselves from Noah : but for the rest of the
world, they think little of his sons or nephews.
But if the heralds and antiquaries of all na-
tions, for it is these men generally that labour to
find out the originals of nations, or all the

OF GOVERNMENT. 1-57

nations themselves, should labour to fetch their
original from some of the sons or nephews of
Noah, what would this be to prove, that the
lordship which Adam had over the whole world,
by right descended to the patriarchs ? Whoever,
nations, or races of men, labour to fetch their
original from, maybe concluded to be thought
by them, men of renown, famous to posterity,
for the greatness of their virtues and actions ;
but beyond these they look not, nor consider
who they were heirs to, but look on them as
such as raised themselves, by their own virtue,
to a degree that would give a lustre to those
who in future ages could pretend to derive
themselves from them. But if it were Ogyges,
Hercules, JBrama, Tamerlane, Pharamond; nay,
if Jupiter and Saturn were the names from
whence divers races of men, both ancient and
modern, have laboured to derive their original ;
will that prove, that those men enjoyed the lord-
ship of Adam, by right descending to them?
If not, this is but a flourish of our author's
to mislead his reader, that in itself signifies
nothing.

§. 142. To as much purpose is what he tells
us, p. 15. concerning this division of the world,
That some say it was by Lot, and others that
Noah sailed round the Mediterranean in ten
yearSy and divided the world into Asia, Afric and
Europe, portions for his three sons. America
then, it seems, was left to be his that could catch
it. Why our author takes such pains to prove the

158 OF GOVERNMENT.

division of the world by Noah to his sons, and
will not leave out an imagination, though no
better than a dream, that he can find any where
to favour it, is hard to guess, since such a
division, if it prove any thing, must necessarily
take away the title of Adam's heir; unless
three brothers can all together be heirs of
Adam ; and therefore the following words,
Howsoever the manner of this division be un-
certain, yet it is most certain the division itself
was by families from Noah and his children,
over which the parents were heads and princes,
p. 1-5. if allowed him to be true, and of any
force to prove, that all the power in the world
is nothing but the lordship of Adam's descend-
ing by right, they will only prove, that the fa-
thers of the children are all heirs to this lord-
ship of Adam: for if in those days Cham and
Japhet, and other parents, besides the eldest
son, were heads and princes over their fami-
milies, and had a right to divide the earth by
families, what hinders younger brothers, being
fathers of families, from having the same right?
If Cham and Japhet were princes by right
descending to them, notwithstanding any title
of heir in their eldest brother, younger brothers
by the same right descending to them are
princes now; and so all our author's natural
power of kings will reach no farther than their
own children, and no kingdom, by this natural
right, can be bigger than a family : for either this
lordship of Adam over the whole world, by right

OF GOVERNMENT. !•">!»

descends only to the eldest son, and then there
can be but one heir, as our author says, p. 19.
or else, it by right descends to all the sons
equally, and then every father of a family will
have it, as well as the three sons of Noah :
take which you will, it destroys the present
governments and kingdoms, that are now in
the world, since whoever has this natural
power of a king, by right descending to him,
must have it, either as our author tells us Cain
had it, and be lord over his brethren, and so
be alone king of the whole world ; or else, as
he tells us here, S/iem, Cham and Japhet had it,
three brothers, and so be only prince of his
own family, and alt families independent one
of another: all the world must be only one
empire by the right of the next heir, or else
every family be a distinct government of itself,
by the lordship of Adam's descending to pa-
rents of families. And to this only tend all
the proofs he here gives us of the descent of
Adams lordship : for continuing his story of
this descent, he says,

§. 143. In the dispersion of Babel, ice must
certainly find the establishment of royal power,
throughout the kingdoms of the world, p. 14.
If you must find it, pray do, and you will help
us to a new piece of history: but you must
shew it us before we shall be bound to believe,
that regal power was established in the world
upon your principles : for, that regal power was
established in the kingdoms of the world, I

1G0 OP GOVERNMENT.

think nobody will dispute ; but that there
should be kingdoms in the world, whose se-
veral kings enjoyed their crowns, by right de-
scending to them from Adam, that we think not
only Apocryphal, but also utterly impossible.
If our author has no better foundation for his
monarchy than a supposition of what was done
at the dispersion of Babel, the monarchy he
erects thereon, whose top is to reach to heaven
to unite mankind, will serve only to divide and
scatter them as that tower did ; and, instead of
establishing civil government and order in the
world, will produce nothing but confusion.

§. 144. For he tells us, the nations they were
divided into, were distinct families, which had
fathers for rulers over them ; whereby it appears,
that even in the confusion , God was careful to
preserve the fatherly authority, by distributing
the diversity of languages according to the
diversity of families, p. 14. It would have
been a hard matter for any one but our author
to have found out so plainly, in the text he here
brings, that all the nations in that dispersion
were governed by father s, and that God was
careful to preserve the fatherly authority. The
words of the text are ; These are the sons of
Shem after their families, ajter their tongues
in their lands, ajter their nations; and the
same thing is said of Cham and Japhet, after
an enumeration of their posterities ; in all
which there is not one word said of their go-
vernors, or forms of government; of fathers,

OF GOVERNMENT 161

or fatherly authority. But our author, who is
very quick sighted to spy out fatherhood,
where nobody else could see any the least
glimpses of it, tells us positively their riders
were fathers, and God was careful to preserve
the fatherly authority; and why? Because
those of the same family spoke the same lan-
guage, and so of necessity in the division kept
together. Just as if one should argue thus
Hannibal in his army, consisting of divers
nations, kept those of the same language to-
gether ; therefore fathers were captains of each
band, and Hannibal was careful of the fatherly
authority: or in peopling of Carolina, the En-
glish, French, Scotch and Welch that are there,
plant themselves together, and by them the
country is divided in their lands ajter their
tongues, after their families, after their nations;
therefore care was taken of the fatherly autho-
rity : or because, in many parts of America,
every little tribe was a distinct people, with a
different language, one should infer, that there-
fore God was careful to preserve the fatherly
authority, or that therefore their rulers enjoyed
Adam's lordship by right descending to them,
though we know not who were their governors,
nor what their form of government, but only
that they were divided into little independent
societies, speaking different languages.

<§. 145. The scripture says not a word of
their rulers or forms of government, but only
gives an account, how mankind came to be

M

162 OF GOVERNMENT.

divided into distinct languages and nations, and
therefore it is not to argue from the authority
of scripture, to tell us positively, fathers were
their rulers, when the scripture says no such
thing ; but to set up fancies of one's own brain,
when we confidently aver matter of fact,
where records are utterly silent. Upon a like
ground, i. e. none at all, he says, That they
were not confused multitudes without heads and
governors, and at liberty to choose what gover-
nors or governments they pleased.

§. 14(3. For I demand, when mankind were
all yet of one language, all congregated in the
plain of Shinar, were they then all under one
monarch, who enjoyed the lordship of Adam by
right descending to him? If they were not,
there were then no thoughts, it is plain, of
Adam's heir, no right of government known
then upon that title ; no care taken, by God
or man, of Adam's fatherly authority. If
when mankind were but one people, dwelt all
together, and were of one language, and were
upon building a city together; and when it
was plain, they could not but know the right
heir, for Shem lived till Isaac s time, a long
while after the division at Babel; if then, I
say, they were not under the monarchical go-
vernment of Adams fatherhood, by right de-
scending to the heir, it is plain there was no
regard had to the fatherhood, no monarchy
acknowledged due to Adam's heir, no empire
of Shems in Asia, and consequently no such

OF GOVERNMENT. 163

division of the world by Noah, as our author
has talked of. As far as we can conclude any
thing from scripture in this matter, it seems
from this place, that if they had any govern-
ment, it was rather a commonwealth than an
absolute monarchy : for the scripture tells us,
Gen. xi. They said: it was not a prince com-
manded the building of this city and tower, it
was not by the command of one monarch, but
by the consultation of many, a free people ; let
us build us a city : they built it for themselves
as free-men, not as slaves for their lord and
master : that ive be not scattered abroad ; having
a city once built, and fixed habitations to
settle our abodes and families. This was the
consultation and design of a people, that were
at liberty to part asunder, but desired to keep
in one body, and could not have been either
necessary or likely in men tied together under
the government of one monarch, who if they
had been, as our author tells us, all slaves
under the absolute dominion of a monarch,
needed not have taken such care to hinder
themselves from wandering out of the reach of
his dominion. I demand whether this be not
plainer in scripture than any thing of Adams
heir or fatherly authority ?

§. 147. But if being, as God says, Gen. xi. 6.
one people, they had one ruler, one king by
natural right, absolute and supreme over them,
what care had God to preserve the paternal
authority of the supreme fatherhood, if on a

M 2

lf)4 OF GOVERNMENT.

sudden lie suffer seventy-two (for so many our
author talks of) distinct nations to be erected
out of it, under distinct governors, and at once
to withdraw themselves from the obedience of
their sovereign? This is to intitle God's carehow,
and to what we please. Can it be sense to say,
that God was careful to preserve the fatherly
authority in those who had it not? for if these
were subjects under a supreme prince, what
authority had they ? Was it an instance of
God's care to preserve the fatherly authority,
when he took away the true supreme father-
hood of the natural monarch ? Can it be reason
to say, that God, for the preservation of father-
ly authority, lets several new governments with
their governors start up, w ho could not all have
fatherly authority? And is it not as much
reason to say, that God is careful to destroy
fatherly authority, when he suffers one, who is
in possession of it, to have his government torn
in pieces, and shared by several of his subjects?
Would it not be an argument just like this, for
monarchical government to say, when any mo-
narchy was shattered to pieces, and divided
amongst revolted subjects, that God was care-
ful to preserve monarchical power, by rending
a settled empire into a multitude of little go-
vernments? If any one will say, that what hap-
pens in providence to be preserved, God is
careful to preserve as a thing therefore to be
esteemed by men as necessary or useful, it is
a peculiar propriety of speech, which every

OF GOVERNMENT. \()0

one a\ ill not think fit to imitate: but this 1 am
sdre is impossible to be cither proper, or true
speaking, that Shem, for example, (for he was
then alive,) should have fatherly authority, or
sovereignty by right of fatherhood, over that,
one people at Babel, and that the next moment,
Shem yet living, seventy-two others should
have fatherly authority, or sovereignty by right
of fatherhood, over the same people, divided
into so many distinct governments: either these
seventy-two fathers actually were rulers, just
before the confusion, and then they were not
one people, but that God himself says they
Were-; or else they were a commonwealth, and
then* where was monarchy ? or else these
seventy-two fathers had fatherly authority, but
knew it not. Strange! that fatherly authority
should be the only original of government
amongst men, and yet all mankind not know
it; and stranger yet, that the confusion of ton-
gues should reveal it to them all of a sudden,
that in an instant these seventy-two should
know that they had jalherhj power, and all
others know that they were to obey it in them,
and every one know that particular fatherly
authority to which he was a subject. He that
can think this arguing from scripture, may from
thence make out what model of an Utopia will
best suit with his fancy or interest; and this
fatherhood, thus disposed of, will justify both
a prince who claims an universal monarchy^
and his subjects, who. being fathers of families,

J 66 OF GOVERNMENT.

shall quit all subjection to him, and canton his
empire into less governments for themselves ;
for it will always remain a doubt in which of
these the fatherly authority resided, till our
author resolves us, wheher Shem, who was then
alive, or these seventy-two new princes, begin-
ning so many new empires in his dominions,
and over his subjects, had right to govern,
since our author tells us, that both one and the
other had fatherly \ t which is supreme authority,
and are brought in by him as instances of
those who did enjoy the lordships of Adam by
right descending to them, which was as large
and ample as the absolulest dominion of any
monarch. This at least is unavoidable,' that
if God ivas careful to preserve the fatherly au-
thority, in the seventy-two new-erected nations,
it necessarily follows, that he was as careful
to destroy all pretences of Adam's heir ; since
he took care, and therefore did preserve the
fatherly authority in so many, at least seventy-
one, that could not possibly be Adams heirs,
when the right heir (if God had ever ordained
any such inheritance) could not but be known,
Shem then living, and they being all one
people.

§. 148. Nimrod is his next instance of en-
joying this patriarchal power, p. 16. but I
know not for what reason our author seems a
little unkind to him, and says, that he against
right enlarged his empire, by seizing violently
on the rights of other lords of families. These

OF GOVERNMENT. 1G7

lords of families here were called fathers of
families, in his account of the dispersion at
Babel: but it matters not how they were
called, so we know who they are; for this
fatherly authority must be in them, either as
heirs to Adam, and so there could not be
seventy-two, nor above one at once ; or else
as natural parents over their children, and so
every father will ha? e paternal authority over
his children by the same right, and in as large
extent as those seventy-two had, and so be
independent princes over their own offspring.
Taking his lords of families in this latter sense,
(as it is hard to give those words any other
sense in this place) he gives us a very pretty
account of the original of monarchy, in these
following words, p. 16. And in this sense he
may be said to be the author and founder of
monarchy, viz. As against right seizing vio-
lently on the rights of fathers over their chil-
dren; which paternal authority, if it be in
them, by right of nature, (for else how could
tiiose seventy-two come by it ?) nobody can
take from them without their own consents;
and then 1 desire our author and his friends
to consider, how far this will concern other
princes, and whether it will not, according to
his conclusion of that paragraph, resolve all
regal power of those, whose dominions extend
beyond their families, either into tyranny and
usurpation, or election and consent of fathers

168 OF GOVERNMENT.

of families, which will differ very little from
consent of the people.

§. 149. All his instances, in the next section,
p. 17. of the twelve dukes of Edom, the nine
kings in a little corner of Asia in Abraham's
days, the thirty-one kings in Canaan destroyed
by Joshua, and the care he takes to prove that
these were all sovereign princes, and that
every town in those days had a king, are so
many direct proofs against him, that it was
not the lordship of Adam by right descending
to them, that made kings : for if they had held
their royalties by that title, either their must
have been but one sovereign over them all, or
else every father of a family had been as good
a prince, and had as good a claim to royalty,
as these : for if all the sons of Esau had each
of them, the younger as well as the eldest,
the right of father hood, and so were sovereign
princes after their father's death, the same right
had their sons after them, and so on to all
posterity; which will limit all the natural
power of fatherhood, only to be over the issue
of their own bodies, and their descendents ;
which power of fatherhood dies with the head
of each family, and makes way for the like
power of fatherhood to take place in each
of his sons over their respective posterities :
whereby the power of fatherhood will be pre-
served indeed, and is intelligible, but will not
be at all to our author's purpose. None of
flic instances he brings arc proofs of any power

OF GOVERNMENT. 1 09

they had, as heirs of Adam's paternal authority
by the title of his fatherhood descending to
them; no, nor of any power they had by virtue
of their own : for Adam's fatherhood being" over
all mankind, it could descend but to one at
once, and from him to his right heir only, and
so there could by that title be but one king in
the world at a time: and by right of father-
hood, not descending from Adam, it must be
only as they themselves were fathers, and so
could be over none but their own posterity.
So that if those twelve dukes of Edom; if
Abraham and the nine kings his neighbours;
if Jacob and Esau, and the thirty-one kings in
Canaan, the seventy-two kings mutilated by
Adonibcseck, the thirty-two kings that came to
J3enhadad, the seventy kings of Greece making
war at Troy, were, as our author contends, all
of them sovereign princes ; it is evident that
kings derived their power from some other
original than fatherhood, since some of these
had power over more than their own posterity;
and it is demonstration, they could not be all
heirs to Adam; for 1 challenge any man to
make any pretence to power by right of father-
hood, either intelligible or possible in any one,
otherwise than either as Adams heir, or as
progenitor over his own descendents, naturally
sprung from him. And if our author could
shew that any one of these princes, of which
he gives us here so large a catalogue, had his
authority by either of these titles, 1 think I

]70 OF GOVERNMENT.

might yield him the cause; though it is mani-
fest they are all impertinent, and directly
contrary to what be brings them to prove, viz.
That the lordship which Adam had over the
world by right descended to the patriarchs.

§. 150. Having told us, p. 16. That the
patriarchal government continued in Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob, until the Egyptian bondage,
p. 17. he tells us, J3y manifest footsteps we may
trace this paternal government unto the Israelites
coming* into Egypt, where the exercise of su-
preme patriarchal government was intermitted,
because they ivere in subjection to a stronger
prince. What these footsteps are of paternal
government, in our author's sense, i. e. of ab-
solute monarchical power descending from
Adam, and exercised by right of fatherhood,
we have seen, that is for 2290 years no foot-
steps at all ; since in all that time he cannot
produce any one example of any person who
claimed or exercised regal authority by right
of fatherhood ; or shew any one who being a
king was Adams heir: all that his proofs
amount to, is only this, that there were fathers,
patriarchs and kings, in that age of the world ;
but that the fathers and patriarchs had any
absolute arbitrary power, or by what titles
those kings had theirs, and of what extent it
was, the scripture is wholly silent; it is mani-
fest by right of fatherhood they neither did,
nor could claim any title to dominion and
empire.

OF GOVERNMENT. 171

§. 151. To say, that the exercise of supreme
•patriarchal government ivas intermitted, because
they were in subjection to a stronger prince,
proves nothing but what 1 before suspected,
viz. That patriarchal jurisdiction or govern-
ment is a fallacious expression, and does not
in our author signify (what he would yet in-
sinuate by it) paternal and regal power, such
an absolute sovereignty as he supposes was in
Adam.

§. 152. For how can he say that patriarchal
jurisdiction was intermitted in .Egypt, where
there was a king, under whose regal govern-
ment the Israelites were, if patriarchal were
absolute monarchical jurisdiction? And if it were
not, but something else, why does he make
such ado about a power not in question, and
nothing to the purpose ? The exercise of patri-
archal jurisdiction, if patriarchal be regal, was
not intermitted whilst the Israelites were in
Egypt. It is true, the exercise of regal power
was not then in the hands of any of the pro-
mised seed of Abraham, nor before neither that
I know ; but what is that to the intermission
of regal authority, as descending from Adam,
unless our author will have it, that this chosen
line of Abraham had the right of inheritance to
Adams lordship ? aud then to what purpose
are his instances of the seventy-two rulers, in
whom the fatherly authority was preserved in
the confusion at Babel ? Why does he bring
the twelve princes sons of Jshmael, and the

172 OF GOVERNMENT.

dukes of Edom, and join them with Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob, as examples of the exercise
of true patriarchal government, if the exercise
of patriarchal jurisdiction were intermitted in
the world, whenever the heirs of Jacob had not
supreme power? I fear, supreme patriarchal
jurisdiction was not only intermitted, but from
the time of the Egyptian bondage quite lost in
the world, since it will be hard to find, from
that time downwards, any one who exercised
it as an inheritance descending to him from
the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. 1
imagined monarchical government would have
served his turn in the hands of Pharaoh, or
any body. But one cannot easily discover in
all places what his discourse tends to, as par-
ticularly in this place it is not obvious to
guess what he drives at, when he says, the
exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction in
Egypt, or how this serves to make out the de-
scent of Adams lordship to the patriarchs, or
any body else.

§. 153. For I thought he had been giving us
out of scripture, proofs and examples of mo-
narchical government, founded on paternal au-
thority, descending from Adam; and not an
history of the Jcivs : amongst whom yet we
find no kings, till many years after they were
a people : and when kings were their rulers,
there is not the least mention or room for a
pretence that they were heirs to Adam, or
kings by paternal authority. I expected, talk-

OP GOVERNMENT. 173

ing so much as ho does of scripture, that he
would have produced thence a series of mo-
narch*, whose titles were clear to Adam's
fatherhood, and who, as heirs to him, owned
and exercised paternal jurisdietion over their
subjects, and that this was the true patriarchi-
cal government; whereas he neither proves,
that the patriarchs were kings ; nor that either
kings or patriarchs were heirs to Adam, or so
much is pretended to it: and one may as well
prove, that the patriarchs were all absolute
monarchs ; that the power both of patriarchs
and kings was only paternal ; and that this
power descended to them from Adam: I say
all these propositions may be as well proved
by a confused account of a multitude of little
kings in the West- Indies, out of Ferdinando
Soto, or any of our late histories of the Nor-
thern America, or by our author's seventy
kings of Greece, out of Homer, as by any thing
he brings out of scripture, in that multitude of
kings he has reekoned up.

§. 154. And methinks he should have let
Homer and his wars of Troy alone, since his
great zeal to truth or monarchy carried him to
such a pitch of transport against philosophers
and poets, that he tells us in his preface, that
there are too many in these days, who please
themselves in running after the opinions of phi-
losophers and poets, to find out such an original
of government, as might promise them some
title to liberty, to the great scandal of Christi-

174 OF GOVERNMENT.

unity, and bringing in of atheism. And yet
these heathens, philosopher Aristotle, and poet
Homer, are not rejected by our zealous Chris-
tian politician, whenever they offer any thing
that seems to serve his turn ; -whether to the
great scandal of Christianity and bringing in
of atheism, let him look. This I cannot but
observe, in authors who it is visible -write not
for truth, how ready zeal for interest and party
is to entitle Christianity to their designs, and
to charge atheism on those who will not with-
out examining submit to their doctrines, and
blindly swallow their nonsense.

But to return to his scripture history, our au-
thor farther tells us, p. 18. that ajter the return
of Me Israelites out of bondage, God, out of a
special care of them, chose Moses and Joshua
successively to govern as princes in the place and
stead of the supreme fathers. If it be true, that
they returned out of bondage', it must be into a
state of freedom, and must imply that both
before and after this bondage they were free,
unless our author will sav, that chanirina: of
masters is returning out of bondage; or that
a slave returns out of bondage, when he is
removed from one galley to another. If then
they returned out of bondage, it is plain that in
those days, whatever our author in his preface
says to the contrary, there were difference
between a son, a subject and a slave; and that
neither the patriarchs before, nor their rulers
after this Egyptian bondage, numbered their

OF GOVERNMENT. 175

softs or subjects amongst their possessions, and
disposed of them with as absolute a dominion,
as they did their other goods.

§. 155. This is evident in Jacob, to whom
Reuben offered his two sons as pledges ; and
Judah was at last surety for Benjamins safe
return out of Egypt: which all had been vain,
superfluous, and but a sort of mockery, if
Jacob had had the same power over every one
of his family as he had over his ox or his ass,
as an owner over his substance; and the offers
that Reuben or Judah made had been such a
security for returning of Benjamin, as if a man
should take two lambs out of his lord's flock,
and offer one as security, that he will safely re-
store the other.

§. 156. When they were out of this bondage,
what then ? God out of a special care of them,
the Israelites. It is well that once in his book,
he will allow God to have any care of the peo-
ple ; for in other places he speaks of mankind,
as if God had no care of any part of them, but
only of their monarchs, and that the rest of
the people, the societies of men, were made as
so many herds of cattle, only for the service,
use, and pleasure of their princes.

§. 157. Chose Moses and Joshua successively
to govern as princes; a shrewd argument our
author has found out to prove that God's care
of the fatherly authority, and Adams heirs,
that here, as an expression of his care of his
own people, he chooses those for princes over

176 OF GOVERNMENT.

them, that had not the least pretence to either.
The persons chosen were, Moses of the tribe of
Levi, and Joshua of the tribe of Ephraim,
neither of which had any title of fatherhood.
But says our author, they were in the place
and stead of the supreme fathers. If God had
any where as plainly declared his choice of
such fathers to be rulers, as he did of Moses
and Joshua, we might believe Moses and Joshua
were in their jrfacc and stead : but that being
the question in debate, till that be better proved,
Moses being chosen by God to be ruler of his
people, will no more prove that government be-
longed to Adams heir, or to the fatherhood,
than God's choosing Aaron of the tribe of Levi
to be priest, will prove that the priesthood be-
longed to Adams heir, or the prime fathers ;
since God would choose Aaron to be priest,
and 3Ioses ruler in Israel, though neither of
those offices were settled on Adams heir, or
the fatherhood.

§. 158. Our author goes on, and after them
likewise for a time he raised up judges, to de-
fend his people in time of peril, p. 18. This
proves fatherly authority to be the original of
government, and that it descended from Adam
to his heirs, just as well as what went before:
only here our author seems to confess, that
these judges, who were all the governors they
then had, were only men of valour, whom they
made their generals to defend them in time of
peril ; and cannot God raise up such men,
unless fatherhood have a title to government?

OF GOVERNMENT. 177

§. 159. But says our author, when God gave
the Israelites kings, he re-established the ancient
and prime right of lineal succession to paternal
government, p. 18.

§. 100. How did God re-establish it? by a
law, a positive command? We find no such
thing. Our author means then, that when God
gave them a king, in giving them a king, he
re-established the right, fyc. To re-establish
de facto the right of lineal succession to pater-
nal government, is to put a man in possession
of that government which his fathers did enjoy,
and he by lineal succession had a right to:
for, first, if it were another government than
what his ancestors had, it was not succeeding
to an ancient right, but beginning a new one :
for if a prince should give a man, besides his
ancient patrimony, which for some ages his
family had been disseized of, an additional
estate, never before in the possession of his
ancestors, he could not be said to re-establish
the right of lineal succession to any more than
what had been formerly enjoyed by his ancestors.
If therefore the power the kings of Israel had,
were any thing more than Isaac or Jacob had,
it was not the re-establishing in them the right
of succession to a power, but giving them a
new power, however you please to call it,
paternal or not : and whether Isaac and Jacob
had the same power that the kings of Israel
had, I desire any one, by what has been above
said, to consider; and I do not think they will

N

178 OF GOVERNMENT.

find, that either Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, had
any regal power at all.

§. 161. Next, there can be no re-establish-
ment of the prime and ancient right of lineal
succession to any thing, unless he, that is put
in possession of it, has the right to succeed,
and be the true and next heir to him he suc-
ceeds to. Can that be a re-establishment
which begins in a new family ? or that the re-
establishment of an ancient right of lineal suc-
cession, when a crown is given to one, who
has no right of succession to it, and who, if
the lineal succession had gone on, had been
out of all possibility of pretence to it? Saul,
the first king God gave the Israelites, was of
the tribe of Benjamin. Was the ancient and
prime right of lineal succession re-established
in him? The next was David, the youngest
son of Jesse, of the posterity of Judah, Jacob's
third son. Was the ancient and prime right of
lineal succession to paternal government re-esta-
blished in him ? or in Solomon, his younger son
and successor in the throne ? or in Jeroboam
over the ten tribes ? or in Athaliah, a woman
who reio-ned six vears an utter stranger to the
royal blood ? If the ancient and prime right of
lineal succession to paternal government were
re-established in any of these or their posterity,
the ancient and prime right of lineal succession
to paternal government belongs to younger
brothers as well as elder, and may be re-
established in any man living; for whatever

OF GOVERNMENT. 179

younger brothers, by ancient and prime rigid of
lineal succession, may have as well as the elder,
that every living man may have a right to, by
lineal succession, and Sir Robert as well as
any other. And so what a brave right of
lineal succession, to his paternal or regal go-
vernment, our author has re-established, for the
securing the rights and inheritance of crowns,
where every one may have it, let the world
consider.

§. 162. But says our author however, p. 19.
Whensoever God made choice of any special per-
son to be king, he intended that the issue also
should have benefit thereof, as being compre-
hended sufficiently in the person of the father,
although the father wets only named in the
grant. This yet will not help out succession ;
for if, as our author says, the benefit of the
grant be intended to the issue of the grantee,
this will not direct the succession ; since, if
God give any thing to a man and his issue in
general, the claim cannot be to any one of that
issue in particular ; every one that is of his
race will have an equal right. If it be said,
our author meant heir, I believe our author
was as willing as any body to have used that
word, if it would have served his turn : but
Solomon, who succeeded David in the throne,
being no more his heir than Jeroboam, who
succeeded him in the government of the ten
tribes, was his issue, our author had reason to
avoid saying. That God intended it to the

N 2

180 OF GOVERNMENT.

heirs, when that would not hold in a succes-
sion, which our author could not except
against; and so he has left his succession as
undetermined, as if he had said nothing about
it: for if the regal power be given by God to
a man and his issue, as the land of Canaan was
to Abraham and his seed, must they not all
have a title to it, all share in it ? And one may
as well say, that by God's grant to Abraham
and his seed, the land of Canaan was to be-
long only to one of his seed exclusive of all
others, as by God's grant of dominion to a
man and his issue, this dominion was to belong
in peculiar to one of his issue exclusive of all
others.

§. 163. But how will our author prove that
whensoever God made choice of any special
person to be a king, he intended that the (I
suppose he means his) issue also should have
benefit thereof? has he so soon forgot Moses
and Joshua, whom in this very section, he
says, God out of a special care chose to govern
as princes, and the judges that God raised up?
Had not these princes, having the authority of
the supreme fatherhood, the same power that
the kings had ; and being specially chosen by
God himself, should not their issue have the
benefit of that choice, as well as David's or
Solomons? If these had the paternal authority
put into their hands immediately by God, why
1 1 ad not their issue the benefit of this grant in
a succession to this power? or if they had it

OF GOVERNMENT. 181

as Adams heirs, why did not their heirs enjoy
it after them by right descending- to them ? for
they could not be heirs to one another. Was
the power the same, and from the same origi-
nal, in 3Ioses, Joshua and the Judges, as it was
in David and the Kings; and was it inheritable
in one, and not in the other? If it was not
paternal authority, then God's own people
were governed by those that had not paternal
authority, and those governors did well enough
without it: if it were paternal authority, and
God chose the persons that were to exercise
it, our author's ride fails, that whensoever God
makes choice of any perso?i to be supreme ruler
(for I suppose the name king has no spell in
it, it is not the title, but the power makes the
difference) he intends that the issue should have
the benefit of it, since from their coming out
of Egypt to David s time, four hundred years,
the issue was never so sufficiently comprehended
in the person of the father, as that any son,
after the death of his father, succeeded to the
government amongst all those judges that
judged Israel. If, to avoid this, it be said,
God always chose the person of the successor,
and so, transferring the fatherly authority to
him, excluded his issue from succeeding to it,
that is manifestly not so in the story of Jeph-
tha, where he articled with the people, and
they made him judge over them, as is plain,
Judges xi.
§. 104. It is in vain then to say, that when-

182 OF GOVERNMENT.

soever God chooses any special person to have
the exercise of paternal authority , (for if that be
not to be king, 1 desire to know the difference
between a king and one having the exercise
of paternal authority) he intends the issue also
should have the benefit of it, since we find the
authority, the judges had, ended with them,
and descended not to their issue; and if the
judges had not paternal authority, I fear it will
trouble our author, or any of the friends to his
principles, to tell who had then the paternal
authority, that is, the government and supreme
power amongst the Israelites ; and I suspect
they must confess that the chosen people of
God continued a people several hundreds of
years, without any knowledge or thought of
this paternal authority, or any appearance of
monarchical government at all.

§. 1G5. To be satisfied of this, he need but
read the story of the Levite, and the war there-
upon with the Benjamites, in the three last
chapters of Judges: and when he finds, that
the Levite appeals to the people for justice
that it was the tribes and the congregation,
that debated, resolved, and directed all that
was done on that occasion; he must conclude,
either that God was not careful to preserve the
fatherly authority amongst his own chosen
people; or else that the fatherly authority
may be preserved, where there is no monar-
chical government; if the latter, then it will
follow, that though fatherly authority be never

OF GOVERNMENT. Iii3

so well proved, yet it will not inter a necessity of
monarchical government; if the former, it will
seem very strange and improbable, that God
should ordain fatherly authority to be so sacred
amongst the sons of men, that there could be
no power, or government without it, and yet
that amongst his own people, even whilst he is
providing a government for them, and therein
prescribes rules to the several states and rela-
tions of men, this great and fundamental one,
this most material and necessary of all the
rest, should be concealed, and lie neglected
for four hundred years after.

§. 166. Before I leave this, I must ask how
our author knows that whensoever Clod makes
choice of any special person to be king, lie intends
that the issue shoutd have the benefit thereof '?
Does God by the law of nature or revelation
say so? By the same law also he must say,
which of his issue must enjoy the crown in
succession, and so point out the heir, or else
leave his issue to divide or scramble for the
government: both alike absurd, and such as
will destroy the benefit of such grant to the
issue. When any such declaration of Gods
intention is produced, it will be our duty to
believe God intends it so ; but till that be
done, our author must shew ns some better
warrant, before we shall be obliged to receive
him as the authentic revealer of God's in-
tentions.

§. 167. The issue, says our author, is cornpre-

184 OF GOVERNMENT.

hended sufficiently in the person of the father,
although the father only was named in the grant :
and yet God, when he gave the land of Canaan
to Abraham, Gen. xiii. 15. thought fit to put
his seed into the grant too : so the priesthood
was given to Aaron and his seed; and the
crown God gave not only to David, but his
seed also : and however our author assures us
that God intends, that the issue should have the
benefit of it, when he chooses any person to be
king, yet we see that the kingdom which he
gave to Saul, without mentioning his seed after
him, never came to any of his issue: and why,
when God chose a person to be king, he should
intend, that his issue should have the benefit of
it, more than when he chose one to be judge in
Israel, I would fain know a reason ; or why
does a grant of fatherly authority to a king
more comprehend the issue, than when a like
grant is made to a judge? Is paternal authority
by right to descend to the issue of one, and not
of the other? There will need some reason to
be shewn of this difference, more than the
name, when the thing given is the same fatherly
authority, and the manner of giving it, God's
choice of the person, the same too; for I
suppose our author, when he says, God raised
up judges, will by no means allow, they were
chosen by the people.

§. 168. But since our author has so confi-
dently assured us of the care of God to preserve
the fatherhood, and pretends to build all he

OF GOVERNMENT. 105

says upon the authority of the scripture, we
may well expect that that people, whose law,
constitution and history is chiefly contained in
the scripture, should furnish him with the
clearest instances of God's care of preserving
the fatherly authority, in that people who it is
agreed he had a most peculiar care of. Let
us see then what state this 'paternal authority
or government was in amongst the Jews, from
their beginning to be a people. It was omitted,
by our author's confession, from their -coming
into Egypt, till their return out of that bondage,
above two hundred years: from thence till God
gave the Israelites a king, about four hundred
years more, our author gives but a very slender
account of it; nor indeed all that time are there
the least footsteps of paternal or regal govern-
ment amongst them. But then says our author,
(rod re-established the ancient and prime right
of lineal succession to paternal government.

§. 1G9. What a lineal succession to paternal
government was then established, we have
already seen. I only now consider how long
this lasted, and that was to their captivity,
about five hundred years : from thence to their
destruction by the Romans, above six hundred
and fifty years after, the ancient and prime
right of lineal succession to paternal government
was again lost, and they continued a people
in the promised land without it. So that of
one thousand, seven hundred and fifty years
that they were Gods peculiar people, they had

186 OF GOVERNMENT.

hereditary kingly government amongst them
not one third of the time ; and of that time
there is not the least footstep of one moment of
paternal government, nor the re-establishment of
the ancient and prime right of lineal succession
to it, whether we suppose it to be derived, a>
from its fountain, from David, Saul, Abraham,
or, which upon our author's principles, is the
only true, from Adam.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

§. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing
discourse,

1. That Adam had not, either by natural
right of fatherhood, or by positive donation
from God, any such authority over his children,
or dominion over the world, as is pretended:

2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right
to it:

3. That if his heirs had, there being no law
of nature nor positive law of God that deter-
mines which is the right heir in all cases that
may arise, the right of succession, and conse-
quently of bearing rule, could not have been
certainly determined :

4. That if even that had been determined,
yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line
of Adams posterity, being so long since utterly
lost, that in the races of mankind and families
of the world, there remains not to one above
another, the least pretence to ha the eldest
house, and to have the right of inheritance :

188 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

All these premises having, as I think, been
clearly made out, it is impossible that the ru-
lers now on earth should make any benefit, or
derive any the least shadow of authority from
that, which is held to be the fountain of all
power, Adams private dominion and paternal
jurisdiction; -so that he that will not give just
occasion to think that all government in the
world is the product only of force and violence,
and that men live together by no other rules
but that of beasts, where the strongest carries
it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disor-
der and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion,
(tilings that the followers of that hypothesis so
loudly cry out against) must of necessity find
out another rise of government, another original
of political power, and another way of design-
ing and knowing the persons that have it, than
what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

§. 2. To this purpose, 1 think it may not be
amiss, to set down what I take to be political
power ; that the power of a magistrate over a
subject may be distinguished from that of a
father over his children, a master over his ser-
vant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over
his slave. All which distinct powers happen-
ing sometimes together in the same man, if he
be considered under these different relations,
it may help us to distinguish these powers
one from another, and shew the difference be-
twixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a
family, and a captain of a galley.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 189

§. 3. Political power, then, I take to be a
right of making laws with penalties of death,
and consequently all less penalties, for the re-
gulating' and preserving of property, and of
employing the force of the community, in the
execution of such laws, and in the defence
of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and
all this only for the public good.

CHAPTER II.

Of the State of Nature.

§. 4. To understand political power right,
and derive it from its original, we must consider,
what state all men are naturally in, and that is,
a state of pet fee I freedom to order their actions,
and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon
the will of any other man.

A state also of equality, wherein all the
power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than another; there being nothing
more evident, than that creatures of the same
species and rank, promiscuously born to all the
same advantages of nature, and the use of the
same faculties should also be equal one amongst
another without subordination or subjection,
unless the lord and master of them all should,
by any manifest declaration of his will, set one
above another, and confer on him, by an evident

190 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

and clear appointment, an undoubted right to
dominion and sovereignty.

§. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judi-
cious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself,
and beyond all question, that he makes it the
foundation of that obligation to mutual love
amongst men, on which he builds the duties
they owe one another, and from whence he
derives the great maxims of justice and charity.
His words are,

The like natural inducement hath brought
men to know that it is no less their duty, to love
others than themselves ; for seeing those things
which are equal, must needs all have one mea-
sure ; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even
as much at every man's hands, as any man can
wish unto his own soul, how should I look to
have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless
myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which
is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and
the same nature? To have any thing offered
them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all
respects grieve them as much as me ; so that if 1
do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no
reason that others should sheiv greater measure
of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto
them : my desire therefore to be loved of my
equals in nature, as much as possible may be,
imposcth upon me a natural duty of bearing to
them-ivard fully the like affection; from which
relation of equality between ourselves and them
that are as ourselves, what several rules and

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 191

canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction
<>/ life, no man is ignorant. Eccl. Pol. Lib. i.

§. 6. But though this be a state of liberty,
yet it is not a state of license: though man in
that state have an uncontroulable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has
not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as
any creature in his possession, but where some
nobler use than its bare preservation calls for
it. The state of nature has a law of nature to
govern it, which obliges every one : and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who
will but consult it, that being all equal and in-
dependent, no one ought to harm another in his
life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent,
and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of
one sovereign master, sent into the world by
his order, and about his business ; they are his
property, whose workmanship they are, made
to last during his, not one another's pleasure:
and being furnished with like faculties, sharing
all in one community of nature, there cannot
be supposed any such subordination among us,
that may authorize us to destroy one another,
as if we were made for one another's uses,
as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours.
Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself,
and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the
like reason, when his own preservation comes
not in competition, ought he, as much as he
can, to preserve the rest of mankind and may

192 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

not, unless it be to do justice on an offender,
take away, or impair the life, or what tends to
the preservation of the life, the liberty, health,
limb, or goods of another.

§. 7. And that all men may be restrained
from invading others rights, and from doing
hurt to one another, and the law of nature be ob-
served, which willeth the peace and preserva-
tion of all mankind, the execution of the law of
nature is, in that state, put into every man's
hands, whereby every one has a right to punish
the transgressors of that law to such a degree,
as may hinder its violation : for the law of
nature would, as all other laws that concern
men in this world, be in vain, if there were
nobody that in the state of nature had a power
to execute that law, and thereby preserve the
innocent and restrain offenders. And if any
one in the state of nature may punish another
for any evil he has done, every one may do
so : for in that state of jjerfect equality where
naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction 7
of one over another, what any may do in pro-
secution of that law, every one must needs
have a right to do.

§. 0. And thus, in the state of nature, one
man comes by a power over another ; but yet
no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a crimi-
nal, when he has got him in his hands, ac-
cording to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own will ; but only to re-
tribute to him, so far as calm reason and

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 193

conscience dictate, what is proportionate to
his transgression, which is so much as may
serve for reparation and restraint: for these
two are the only reasons, why one man may
lawfully do harm to another, which is that we
call punishment. In transgressing the law of
nature, the offender declares himself to live by
another rule than that of reason and common
equity, which is that measure God has set to
the actions of men, for their mutual security;
and so he becomes dangerous to mankind,
the tye, which is to secure them from injury
and violence, being slighted and broken by
him. Which being a trespass against the
whole species, and the peace and safety of it,
provided for by the law of nature, every man
upon this score, by the right he hath to pre-
serve mankind in general, may restrain, or
where it is necessary, destroy things noxious
to them, and so may bring such evil on any one,
"who hath transgressed that law, as may make
him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter
him, and by his example others, from doing the
like mischief. And in this case, and upon this
ground, every man hath a right to punish the
offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.
%. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a very
strange doctrine to some men : but before they
condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by
what right any prince or state can put to death,
or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in
in their country. It is certain their laws, by

o

J94 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

virtue of any sanction they receive from the
promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a
stranger : they speak not to him, nor, if they
did, is he bound to hearken to them. The
legislative authority, by which they are in force
over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath
no power over him. Those who have the
supreme power of making laws in England,
France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like
the rest of the world, men without authority :
and therefore, if by the law of nature every man
hath not a power to punish offences against it,
as he soberly judges the case to require, I see
not how the magistrates of auy community can
punish an alien of another country; since, in
reference to him, they can have no more power
than what every man naturally may have over
another.

§. 10. Besides the crime which consists in
violating the law, and varying from the right
rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the
principles of human nature, and to be a noxious
creature, there is commonly injury done to
some person or other, and some other man re-
ceives damage by his transgression ; in which
case he who hath received any damage, has,
besides the right of punishment common to him
with other men, a particular right to seek repa-
ration from him that has done it : and any other
person, who finds it just, may also join with
him that is injured, and assist him in recover-

OP CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 195

ing from the offender so much as may make
satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.

§. 11. From these two distinct rights, the
one of punishing the crime for restraint, and
preventing- the like offence, which right of pu-
nishing is in every body ; the other of taking
reparation, which belongs only to the injured
party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who
by being magistrate hath the common right of
punishing put into his hands, can often, where the
public good demands not the execution of the
law, remit the punishment of criminal offences
by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the
satisfaction due to any private man for the
damage he has received* That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in
his own name, and he alone can remit: the
damnified person has this power of appropri-
ating to himself the goods or service of the
offender, by right of self-preservation, as every
man has a power to punish the crime, to pre-
vent its being committed again, by the light he
has of preserving all mankind, and doing all
reasonable things he can in order to that end :
and thus it is, that every man, in the state of
nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both
to deter others from doing the like injury,
which no reparation can compensate, by the
example of the punishment that attends it from
every body, and also to secure men from the
attempts of a criminal, who having renounced
reason, the common rule and measure God

o 2

196" OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust
violence and slaughter he hath committed upon
one, declared war against all mankind, and
therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger,
one of those wild savage beasts, with whom
men can have no society nor security : and upon
this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that
every one had a right to destroy such a crimi-
nal, that after the murder of his brother, he
cries out, Every one that findeth me shall slay
me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all
mankind.

§. 12. By the same reason may a man in the
state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that
law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death ?
I answer, each transgression may be punished
to that degree, and with so much severity, as
will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the of-
fender, give him cause to repent, and terrify
others from doing the like. Every offence,
that can be committed in the state of nature,
may in the state of nature be also punished
equally, and as far forth as it may, in a com-
monwealth : for though it would be besides
my present purpose, to enter here into the
particulars of the law of nature, or its measures
of punishment ; yet, it is certain there is such a
law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a
rational creature, and a studier of that law, as
the positive laws of commonwealths : nay,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT- 11)7

possibly plainer ; as much as reason is easier
to be understood, than the fancies and intricate
contrivances of men, following contrary and
hidden interests put into words; for so truly
are a great part of the municipal laws of coun-
tries, which are only so far right, as they are
founded on the law of nature, by which they are
to be regulated and interpreted.

§. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That
in the state of nature every one has the executive
power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it
will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men
to be judges in their own cases, that self-love
will make men partial to themselves and their
friends : and on the other side, that ill-nature,
passion and revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others ; and hence nothing but con
fusion and disorder will follow ; and that there-
fore God hath certainly appointed government
to restrain the partiality and violence of men.
1 easily grant, that civil government is the pro-
per remedy for the inconveniences of the state
of nature, which must certainly be great, where
men may be judges in their own case, since it
is easy to be imagined, that he who was so un-
just as to do his brother an injury, will scan
be so just as to condemn himself for it ; but I
shall desire those who make this objection, to
remember, that absolute monarchs are but men ;
and if government is to be the remedy of those
evils, which necessarily follow from men's being
judges in their own cases, and the state of na-

198 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

ture is therefore not to be endured, I desire to
know what kind of government that is, and
how much better it is than the state of nature,
where one man, commanding a multitude, has
the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may
do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, with-
out the least liberty to any one to question or
controul those who execute his pleasure? and
in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason,
mistake or passion, must be submitted to?
much better it is in the state of nature, wherein
men are not bound to submit to the unjust will
of another: and if he that judges, judges
amiss in his own, or any other case, he is an-
swerable for it to the rest of mankind.

§. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objec-
tion, where are, or ever were there any men in
such a state of nature ? To which it may suffice
as an answer at present, that since all princes
and rulers of independent governments all
through the world, are in a state of nature, it is
plain the world never was, nor ever will be,
without numbers of men in that state. I have
named all governors of independent communi-
ties, whether they are, or are not, in league
with others : for it is not every compact that
puts an end to the state of nature between men,
but only this one of agreeing together mutually
to enter into one community, and make one
body politic; other promises, and compacts,
men may make one witlranother, and yet still
be in the state of nature. The promises and

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. ][)0

bargains for truck, &c. between the two men in
the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de
la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a
Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of ^America,
are binding- to them, though they are perfectly
in a state of nature, in reference to one another:
for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men,
as men, and not as members of society.

§. 15. To those that say, there were never
any men in the state of nature, I will not only
oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker,
Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10. where he says, The
laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i. e.
the laws of nature, do bind men absolutely, even
as they are men, although they have never any
settled fellowship, never any solemn agreement
amongst themselves what to do, or not to do:
but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves suffi-
cient to furnish ourselves with competent store
of things t needful J or such a life as our nature
doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man;
therefore to supply those defects and imperfec-
tions which are in tis, as living single and solely
by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek
communion and fellowship with others : this
was the cause of metis uniting themselves at
first in politic societies. But ] moreover
affirm, that all men are naturally in that state,
and remain so, till by their own consents they
make themselves members of some politic
society ; and I doubt not in the sequel of this
discourse, to make it very clear.

200 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER III.

Of the State of War.

§. 16. The state of war is a state of enmity
and destruction: and therefore declaring by
word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but
a sedate settled design upon another man's life
puts him in a state of xuar with him against
whom he lias declared such an intention, and
so has exposed his life to the other's power to
be taken away by him, or any one that joins
with him in his defence, and espouses his
quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should
have a right to destroy that which threatens me
with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of
nature, man being- to be preserved as much as
possible, when all cannot be preserved, the
safety of the innocent is to be preferred :
and one may destroy a man who makes war
upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his
being, for the same reason that he may kill a
wolf or a Hon; because such men are not under
the ties of the common-law of reason, have no
other rule, but that of force and violence, and
so may be treated as beasts of prey, those
dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be
sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their
power.

§. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts
to get another man into his absolute power,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 201

does thereby put, himself into a slate of war
with him : it being- to be understood as a decla-
ration of a design upon his life: for I have
reason to conclude, that he who would get me
into his power without my consent, would use
me as he pleased when he had got me there, and
destroy me too when he had a fancy to it ; for
nobody can desire to have me in his absolute
power, unless it be to compel me by force to
that which is against the right of my freedom,
i. e. make me a slave. To be free from such
force is the only security of my preservation ;
and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy
to my preservation, who would take away that
freedom which is the fence to it ; so that he
who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby
puts himself into a state of war with me. He
that, in the state of nature, would take away the
freedom that belongs to any one in that state,
must necessarily be supposed to have a design
to take away every thing else, that freedom
being the foundation of all the rest; as he that,
in the state of society, would take away the
freedom belonging to those of that society or
commonwealth, must be supposed to design
to take away from them every thing else, and
so be looked on as in a state of war.

%. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill

a thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor

declared any design upon his life, any farther

than by use of force, so to get him in his power

us to take away his money, or what he pleases.

202 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

from him ; because using force, where he has
no right, to get me into his power, let his
pretence be what it will, I have no reason to
suppose, that he, who would take away my
liberty, would not, when he had me in his
power, take away every thing else. And there-
fore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who
has put himself into a state of war with me, i. e.
kill him if I can ; for to that hazard does he
justly expose himself, whoever introduces a
state of war, and is aggressor in it.

§. 19. And here we have the plain difference
between the state of nature and the state of war ,
which however some men have confounded,
are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will,
mutual assistance and preservation, and a state
of enmity, malice, violence, and mutual destruc-
tion, are one from another. Men living together
according to reason, without a common
superior on earth, without authority to judge
between them, is properly the state of nature.
But force, or a declared design of force, upon
the person of another, where there is no com-
mon superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is
the state of war : and it is the want of such an
appeal gives a man the right of war even against
an aggressor, though he be in society and a
fellow subject. Thus a thief whom I cannot
harm, but by appeal to the law for having
stolen all that I am worth, 1 may kill, when he
sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat ;
because the law, which was made for my pre-

OP CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 203

servation, where it cannot interpose to secure
my life from present force, which, if lost, is
capable of no reparation, permits me my own
defence, and the right of war, a liberty to kill
the aggressor, because the aggressor allows
not time to appeal to our common judge, nor
the decision of the law, for remedy in a case
where the mischief may be irreparable. Want
of a common judge with authority, puts all
men in a state of nature : force without right,
upon a man's person, makes a state of war,
both where there is, and is not, a common
judge.

§. 20. But when the actual force is over,
the state of ivar ceases between those that are
in society, and are equally on both sides sub-
jected to the fair determination of the law;
because then there lies open the remedy of
appeal for the past injury, and to prevent
future harm : but where no such appeal is, as
in the state of nature, for want of positive
laws, and judges with authority to appeal to,
the state of war once begun, continues, with
a right to the innocent party to destroy the
other whenever he can, until the aggressor
offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such
terms as may repair any wrongs he has already
done, and secure the innocent for the future ;
nay, where an appeal to the law, and consti-
tuted judges, lies open, but the remedy is
denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and
a bare faced wresting of the laws to protect or

204 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

indemnify the violence or injuries of some men,
or party of men, there it is hard to imagine
any thing but a state of war: for where ever
violence is used, and injury done, though by
hands appointed to administer justice, it is
still violence and injury, however coloured
with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the
end whereof being to protect and redress the
innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to
all who are under it ; where ever that is not
bona Jide done, war is made upon the sufferers,
who having no appeal on earth to right them,
they are left to the only remedy in such cases,
an appeal to heaven.

§. 21. To avoid this state of tear (wherein
there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein
every the least difference is apt to end, where
there is no authority to decide between the
contenders) is one great reason of men's put-
ting themselves into society, and quitting the
state of nature : for where there is an autho-
rity, a power on earth, from which relief can
be had by appeal, there the continuance of the
state of war is excluded, and the controversy
is decided by that power. Had there been
any such court, any superior jurisdiction on
earth, to determine the right between Jephtha
and the Ammonites, they had never come to a
state of war: but we see he was forced to
appeal to heaven. The Lord the judge
(says he) be judge this day between the children
of Israel and the children a/' Amnion, Judg. xi.

OP CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 205

27. and then prosecuting, and relying on his
appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and
therefore in such controversies, where the
question is put, who shall be judge! It cannot
be meant, who shall decide the controversy ;
every one knows what Jephtha here tells us,
that the Lord the judge shall judge. Where
there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to
God in heaven. That question then cannot
mean, who shall judge, whether another hath
put himself in a state of war with me, and
whether 1 may, as Jephtha did, appeal to
heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge
in my own conscience, as I will answer it,
at the great day, to the supreme judge of all
men.

CHAPTER IV.

Of SLAVERY.

\. 22. The natural liberty of man is to be
free from any superior power on earth, and not
to be under the will or legislative authority of
man, but to have only the law of nature for
his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to
be under no other legislative power, but that
established, by consent, in the commonwealth ;
nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint
of any law, but what that legislative shall
enact, according to the trust put in it. Free-
dom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells

206 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

us, Observations, A. 55. a liberty for every one
to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and
not to be tied by any laws : but freedom of men
under government is, to have a standing rule to
live by, common to every one of that society,
and made by the legislative power erected
in it ; a liberty to follow my own will in all
things, where the rule prescribes not; and
not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain,
unknown, arbitrary will of another man: as
freedom of nature is, to be under no other re-
straint but the law of nature.

§. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary
power, is so necessary to, and closely joined
with a man's preservation, that he cannot part
with it, but by what forfeits his preservation
and life together: for a man, not having the
power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or
his own consent, enslave himself to any one,
nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary
power of another, to take away his life, when
he pleases. No body can give more power
than he has himself ; and he that cannot take
away his own life, cannot give another power
over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited
his own life, by some act that deserves death ;
he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he
has him in his power) delay to take it, and
make use of him to his service, and he does
him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds
the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value
of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the

OP CIVIL GOVERNMENT 207

will of his master, to draw on himself the
death he desires.

§. 24. This is the perfect condition of sla-
very, which is nothing else, but the state of war
continued, betiveen a lawful conqueror and a cap-
tive : for, if once compact enter between them,
and make an agreement for a limited power
on the one side, and obedience on the other,
the state of war and slavery ceases, as long as
the compact endures : for, as has been said,
no man can, by agreement, pass over to ano-
ther that which he hath not in himself, a power
over his own life.

I confess we find among the Jews, as well
as other nations, that men did sell themselves ;
but it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not
to slavery : for, it is evident, the person sold
was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical
power : for the master could not have power
to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain
time, he was obliged to let go free out of his
service ; and the master of such a servant was
so far from having an arbitrary power over his
life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as
maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set
him free, Exod. xxi.

208 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER V.

Of PROPERTY.

§. 25. Whether we consider natural reason,
which tells us, that men, being once born, have
a right to their preservation, and consequently
to meat and drink, and such other things as
nature affords for their subsistence : or revela-
tion, which gives us an account of those
grants God made of the world to Adam, and
to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that
God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has
given the earth to the children of men ; given
it to mankind in common. But this being
supposed, it seems to some a very great diffi-
culty, how any one should ever come to have
a property in any thing : I will not content
myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make
out property upon a supposition that God gave
the world to Adam, and his posterity in com-
mon, it is impossible that any man, but one
universal monarch, should have any property
upon a supposition, that God gave the world
to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive
of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall
endeavour to shew, how men might come to
have a property in several parts of that which
God gave to mankind in common, and that
without any express compact of all the com-
moners.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 209

§. 26. God, who hath given the world to
men in common, hath also given them reason
to make use of it to the best advantage of life,
and convenience. The earth, and all that is
therein, is given to men for the support and
comfort of their being. And though all the
fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it
feeds, belong to mankind in common, as they
are produced by the spontaneous hand of
nature ; and no body has originally a private
dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind,
in any of them, as they are thus in their natural
state : yet being given for the use of men, there
must of necessity be a means to appropriate
them some way or other, before they can be
of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular
man. The fruit, or venison, which nourishes
the wild Indian, who knows no inclosure, and
is still a tenant in common, must be his, and
so his, i. e. a part of him, that another can no
longer have any right to it, before it can do
him any good for the support of his life.

§. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior
creatures, be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own person : this no
body has any right to but himself. The labour
of his body, and the work of his hands, we
may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then
he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
labour with, and joined to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his property. It

p

210 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

being by him removed from the common state
nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour
something annexed to it, that excludes the
common right of other men : for this labour
being the unquestionable property of the la-
bourer, no man but he can have a right to
what that is once joined to, at least where
there is enough, and as good, left in common
for , others.

§. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns
he picked up under an oak, or the apples he
gathered from the trees in the wood, has cer-
tainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody
can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask
then, when did they begin to be his? when he
digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled?
or when he brought them home ? or when he
picked them up? and it is plain, if the first
gathering made them not his, nothing else
could. That labour put a distinction between
them and common : that added something to
them more than nature, the common mother
of all, had done ; and so they became his
private right. And will any one say, he had
no right, to those acorns or apples, he thus
appropriated, because he had not the consent
of all mankind to make them his ? Was it a
robbery thus to assume to himself, what be-
longed to all in common? If such a consent
as that was necessary, man had starved, not-
withstanding the plenty God had given him.
We see in commons, which remain so by com-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 211

pact, that it is the taking any part of what is
common, and removing' it out of the state na-
ture leaves it in, which begins the property;
without which the common is of no use. And
the taking of this or that part, does not depend
on the express consent of all the commoners.
Thus the grass my horse has bit ; the turfs my
servant has cut ; and the ore I have digged in
any place, where I have a right to them in
common with others, become my property,
without the assignation or consent of any body.
The labour that was mine, removing them out
of that common state they were in, hath fixed
m y p roper ty in th e m .

§. 29. By making an explicit consent of
every commoner necessary to any one's appro-
priating to himself any part of. what is given in
common, children or servants could not cut
the meat, which their father or master had pro-
vided for them in common, without assigning
to every one his peculiar part. Though the
water running in the fountain be every one's,
yet who can doubt but that in the pitcher is
his only who drew it out? His labour hath
taken it out of the hands of nature, where it
was common, and belonged equally to all her
children, and hath thereby appropriated it to
himself.

§. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the
deer that Indian's who hath killed it ; it is
allowed to be his goods, who hath bestowed
his labour upon it, though before it was the

p 2

212 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

common right of every one. And amougst
those who are counted the civilized part of
mankind, who have made and multiplied posi-
tive laws to determine property, this original
law of nature, for the beginning of property, in
what was before common, still takes place ;
and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches
in the ocean, that great and still remaining
common of mankind ; or what ambergrease
any one takes up here, is by the labour that
removes it out of that common state nature left
it in, made his property, who takes that pains
about it. And even amongst us, the hare that
any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues
her during the chase: for being a beast that is
still looked upon as common, and no mans
private" possession; whoever has employed so
much labour about any of that kind, as to find
and pursue her, has thereby removed her from
the state of nature, wherein she was common,
and hath begun a property.

§. 3.1. It will perhaps be objected to this,
that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of
the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any
one may ingress as much as he will. To which
I answer, Not so. The same law of nature,
that does by this means give us property, does
also bound that property too. God has given
us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice
of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how
far as he given it us? To enjoy. As much as
any one can make use of to any advantage of

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 213

life before it spoils, so much lie may by his
labour fix a property in : whatever is beyond
(his, is more than his share, and belongs to
others. Nothing was made by God for man
to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering
the plenty of natural provisions there was a
long time in the world, and the few spenders;
and to how small a part of that provision the
industry of one man could extend itself, and
ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially
keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of
what might serve for his use; there could be
then little room for quarrels or contentions
about property so established.

§. 32. But the chief matter of property being
now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts
that subsist on it, but the earth' itself ; as that
which takes in and carries with it all the rest ;
I think it is plain, that property in that too is
acquired as the former. As much land as a
man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can
use the product of, so much is his property.
He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it for
the common. Nor will it invalidate his right,
to say every body else has an equal title to it ;
and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot
inclose, without the consent of all his fellow-
counnoners, all mankind. God, when he gave
the world in common to all mankind, com-
manded man also to labour, and the penury
of his condition required it of him. God and
his reason commanded him to subdue the earth,

214 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

i. e. improve it for the benefit of life, and there-
in lay out something upon it that was his own,
his labour. He that in obedience to this com-
mand of God subdued, tilled and sowed any
part of it, thereby annexed to it something that
was his property, which another had no title to,
nor could without injury take from him.

§. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any
parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice
to any other man, since there was still enough,
and as good left ; and more than the yet un-
provided could use. So that, in effect, there
was never the less left for others because of his
inclosure for himself: for he that leaves as
much as another can make use of, does as
good as take nothing at all. No body could
think himself injured by the drinking of another
man, though he took a good draught, who had
a whole river of the same water left him to
quench his thirst: and the case of land and
water, where there is enough of both, is per-
fectly the same.

§. 34. God gave the world to men in com-
mon ; but since he gave it them for their bene-
fit, and the greatest conveniencies of life they
were capable to draw from it, it cannot be sup-
posed he meant it should always remain com-
mon and uncultivated. He gave it to the use
of the industrious and rational, (and labour was
to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covet-
ousness of the quarrelsome and contentious.
He that had as good left for his improvement,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. *2lO

as was already taken up, needed not complain,
ought not to meddle with what was already
improved by auother's labour: if he did, it is
plain he desired the benefit of another's pains,
which he had no right to, and not the ground
which God had given him in common with
others to labour on, and whereof there was as
good left, as that already possessed, and more
than he knew what to do with, or his industry
could reach to.

§. 35. It is true, in land that is common in
England, or any other country where there is
plenty of people under government, who have
money and commerce, no one can inclose or
appropriate any part, without the consent of
all his fellow-commoners ; because this is left
common by compact, i. e. by the law of the
land, which is not to be violated. And though
it be common, in respect of some men, it is not
so to all mankind ; but is the joint property of
this country, or this parish. Besides the re-
mainder, after such inclosure, would not be as
good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole
was when they could all make use of the
whole; whereas in the beginning and first
peopling of the great common of the world, it
was quite otherwise. The law man was under,
was rather for appropriating. God command-
ed, and his wants forced him to labour. That
Avas his property which could not betaken from
him wherever he had fixed it. And hence
subduing or cultivating the earth, and having

216 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

dominion, we see are joined together. The
one gave title to the other. So that God, by
commanding to subdue, gave authority so far
to appropriate: and the condition of human
life, which requires labour and materials to
work on, necessarily introduces private pos-
sessions.

§. 36. The measure of property nature has
well set by the extent of men's labour and the
conveniencies of life: no man's labour could
subdue, or appropriate all ; nor could his en-
joyment consume more than a small part ; so
that it was impossible for any man, this way, to
intrench upon the right of another, or acquire
to himself a property, to the prejudice of his
neighbour, who would still have room for as
good, and as large a possession (after the other
had taken out his) as before it was appropriated.
This measure did confine every man's posses-
sion to a very moderate proportion, and such
as he might appropriate to himself, without
injury to any body, in the first ages of the
world, when men were more in danger to be
lost, by wandering from their company in the
then vast wilderness of the earth, than to be
straitened for want of room to plant in. And
the same measure may be allowed still without
prejudice to any body, as full as the world
seems : for supposing a man, or family, in the
state they were at first peopling of the world
by the children of Adam, or Noah : let him
plant in some inland, vacant places of America,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. *2 1 7

we shall find that the possessions he could make
himself upon the measures we have given, would
not be very large, nor, even to this day, preju-
dice the rest of mankind, or give them reason
to complain, or think themselves injured by
this man's encroachment, though the race of
men have now spread themselves to all the
corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed
the small number which was at the beginning.
Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value,
ivithout labour, that I have heard it affirmed,
that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to
plough, sow and reap, without being disturbed,
upon land he has no other title to, but only his
making use of it. But, on the contrary, the in-
habitants think themselves beholden to him,
who, by his industry on neglected, and conse-
quently waste land, has increased the stock of
corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will,
which I lay no stress on ; this I dare boldly
affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.)
that every man should have as much as he
could make use of, would hold still in the
world, without straitening any body : since
there is land enough in the world to suffice
double the inhabitants, had not the invention
of money, and the tacit agreement of men to
put a value on it, introduced by consent, larger
possessions, and a right to them ; which, how
it has done, I shall by and by shew more at
large.
*. o7. This is pertain, that in the beginning,

218 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

before the desire of having more than man
needed had altered the intrinsic value of things,
which depends only on their usefulness to the
life of man: or had agreed that a little piece of
yellow metal, which would keep without wast-
ing or decay, should he worth a great piece of
flesh, or a whole heap of corn ; though men
had a right to appropriate, by their labour,
each one to himself, as much of the things of
nature, as he could use: yet this could not be
much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the
same plenty was still left to those who would
use the same industry. To which let me add,
that he, who appropriates land to himself by
his labour, does not lessen, but increase the
common stock of mankind : for the provisions
serving to the support of human life, produced
by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land,
are (to speak much within compass) ten times
more than those which are yielded by an acre
of land of an equal richness lying waste in
common. And therefore he that incloses land,
and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of
life from ten acres, than he could have from an
hundred left to nature, may truly be said to
give ninety acres to mankind : for his labour
now supplies him with provisions out of ten
acres, which were but the product of an hun-
dred lying in common. I have here rated the
improved land very low, in making its product
but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an
hundred to one : for I ask, whether in the wild

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 2J9

woods and uncultivated waste of America, left
to nature, without any improvement, tillage or
husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy
and wretched inhabitants as many conveniences
of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in
Devonshire, where they are well cultivated.

Before the appropriation of land, he who
gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed,
caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he
could; he that so employed his pains about
any of the spontaneous products of nature, as
any way to alter them from the state which
nature put them in, by placing any of his labour
on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in
them', but if they perished, in his possession,
without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or
the venison putrified, before he could spend it,
he offended against the common law of nature,
and was liable to be punished ; he invaded his
neighbour's share ; for lie had no right farther
than his own use called, for any of them, and
they might serve to afford him conveniences
of life.

§. 38. The same measures governed the pos-
session of land too : whatsoever he tilled and
reaped, laid up and made use of, before it
spoiled, that was his peculiar right ; whatso-
ever he enclosed, and could feed, and make
use of, the cattle and product was also his.
But if either the grass of his inclosure rotted
on the ground, or the fruit of his planting
perished without gathering, and laying up, this

220 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

part of the earth, notwithstanding his inclosure,
was still to be looked on as waste, and might
be the possession of any other. Thus, at the
beginning, Cain might take as much ground
as he could till, and make it his own land, and
yet leave enough to Abels sheep to feed on ;
a few acres would serve for both their posses-
sions. But as families increased, and industry
enlarged their stocks, their possessions enlarged
with the need of them ; but yet it was common-
ly without any fixed property in the ground
they made use of, till they incorporated, settled
themselves together, and built cities ; and then,
by consent, they came in time, to set out the
bounds of their distinct territories, and agree
on limits between them and their neighbours ;
and by laws within themselves, settled the
properties of those of the same society : for we
see, that in that part of the world which was
first inhabited, and therefore like to be best
peopled, even as low down as Abraham s time,
they wandered with their flocks, and their
herds, which was their substance, freely up
and down ; and this Abraham did, in a country
where he was a stranger. Whence it is plain,
that at least a great part of the land lay in
common ; that the inhabitants valued it not,
nor claimed property in any more than they
made use of. But when there was not room
enough in the same place, for their herds to
feed together, they by consent, as Abraham
and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and en-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 221

larged (heir pasture, where it best liked them.
And for the same reason Esau went from his
father, and his brother, and planted in mount
Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.

§. 39. And thus, without supposing any pri-
vate dominion, and property in Adam, over all
the world, exclusive of all other men, which
ran no way be proved, nor any ones property
be made out from it ; but supposing - the world
given, as it was, to the children of men in com-
mon, we see how labour could make men dis-
tinct titles to several parcels of it, for their
private uses ; wherein there could be no doubt
of right, no room for quarrel.

§. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before
consideration it may appear, that the property
of labour should be able to over-balance the
community of land : for it is labour indeed that
puts the difference of value on every thing ; and
let any one consider what the difference is
between an acre of land planted with tobacco
or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an
acre of the same land lying in common, with-
out any husbandry upon it, and he will find,
that the improvement of labour makes the far
greater part of the value. I think it will be
but a very modest computation to say, that
of the products of the earth useful to the life of
man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay,
if we will rightly estimate things as they come
to our use, and cast up the several expences
about them, what in them is purely owing to

222 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that
in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are
wholly to be put on the account of labour.

§.41. There cannot be a clearer demon-
stration of any thing, than several nations of
the Americans are of this, who are rich in land,
and poor in all the comforts of life ; whom na-
ture having furnished as liberally as any other
people, with the materials of plenty, t. e. a
fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what
might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet
for want of improving it by labour, have not
one hundredth part of the conveniencies we
enjoy; and a king of a large and fruitful terri-
tory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse
than a day-labourer in England.

§. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us
but trace some of the ordinary provisions of
life through their several progresses, before
they come to our use, and see how much they
receive of their value from human industry.
Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use,
and great plenty ; yet notwithstanding, acorns,
water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread,
drink and cloathing, did not labour furnish us
with these more useful commodities : for what-
ever bread is more worth than acorns, wine
than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins
or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and
industry ; the one of these being the food and
raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us
with ; the other, provisions which our industry

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 223

and pains prepare for us, which how much
they exceed the other in value, when any one
hath computed, he will then see how much
labour makes the far greatest part of the value
of things we enjoy in this world : and the
ground which produces the materials, is scarce
to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a
very small part of it; so little, that even amongst
us, land left wholly to nature, that hath no im-
provement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is
called, as indeed it is, ivaste; and we shall
find the benefit of it amount to little more than
nothing.

This shews how much numbers of men are
to be preferred to largeness of dominions ; and
that the increase of lands, and the right em-
ploying of them, is the great art of government:
and that prince, who shall be so wise and god-
like, as by established laws of liberty to secure
protection and encouragement to the honest
industry of mankind, against the oppression of
power and narrowness of party, will quickly
be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the
by. To return to the argument in hand,

§. 43. An acre of land, that bears here
twenty bushels of wheat, and another in Ame-
rica, which with the same husbandry, would
do the like, are, without doubt, of the same
natural intrinsic value : but yet the benefit
mankind receives from one in a year, is worth
51. and from the other possibly not worth a
penny, if all the profit an Indian received from

224 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

it were to be valued and sold here ; at least I
may truly say, not one thousandth. It is
labour then which puts the greatest part of value
upon land, without which it would scarcely be
worth any thing: it is to that we owe the
greatest part of all its useful products ; for all
that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of
wheat, is more worth than the product of an
acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all
the effect of labour: for it is not barely the
ploughman's pains, the reaper's and thresher's
toil, and the baker's sweat, is to be counted
into the bread we eat; the labour of those who
broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the
iron and stones, who felled and framed the
timber employed about the plough, mill, oven,
or any other utensils, which are a vast number,
requisite to this corn, from its being seed to be
sown to its being made bread, must all be
charged on the account of labour, and received
as an effect of that : nature and the earth fur-
nished only the almost worthless materials, as
in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue
of things, that industry provided and made use of
about every loaf of bread, before it came to our
use, if we could trace them ; iron, wood, leather,
bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth,
dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and all
the materials made use of in the ship, that
brought any of the commodities made use of by
any of the workmen, toany part of the work ; all
which it would be almost impossible, at least
too long to reckon up.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 225

§. 44. From all which it is evident, that
though the things of nature are given in com-
mon, yet man, by being master of himself, and
proprietor of his own person, and the actions or
labour of it, had still in himself the great foun-
dation of property ; and that, which made up
the great part of what he applied to the sup-
port or comfort of his being, when invention
and arts had improved theconveniencies of life,
was perfectly his own, and did not belong in
common to others.

§. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a
right of property, wherever any one was pleased
to employ it upon what was common, which
remained a long while the far greater part, and
is yet more than mankind makes use of. Men,
at first, for the most part, contented themselves
with what unassisted nature offered to their
necessities ; and though afterwards, in some
parts of the world, (where the increase of
people and stock, with the use of money, had
made land scarce, and so of some value) the
several communities settled the bounds of their
distinct territories, and by laws within them-
selves regulated the properties of the private
men of their society, and so, by compact and
agreement, settled the property which labour
and industry began ; and the leagues that have
been made between several states and king-
doms, either expressly or tacitly disowning all
claim and right to the land in the others posses-
sion, have, by common consent, given up their

Q

226 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

pretences to their natural common right, which
originally they had to those countries, and so
have, by positive agreement, settled a property
amongst themselves, in distinct parts and par-
cels of the earth ; yet there are still great tracts
of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants
thereof not having joined with the rest of man-
kind, in the consent of the use of their common
money) lie tvaste, and are more than the people
who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and
so still lie in common ; though this can scarce
happen amongst that part of mankind that have
consented to the use of money.

§. 46. The greatest part of things really
useful to the life of man, and such as the neces-
sity of subsisting made the first commoners of
the world look after, as it doth the Americans
now, are generally things of short duration!
such as, if they are not consumed by use, will
decay and perish of themselves : gold, silver,
and diamonds, are things that fancy or agree-
ment hath put the value on, more than real use,
and the necessary support of life. Now of
those good things which nature hath provided
in common, every one had a right (as hath been
said) to as much as he could use, and property
in all that he could effect with his labour ; all
that his industry could extend to, to alter from
the state nature had put it in, was his. He that
gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples,
had thereby a property in them, they were his
goods as soon as gathered. He was only to

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 227

look, lhat he used them before they spoiled,
else he took more than his share, and robbed
others. And indeed it was a foolish thing, as
well as dishonest, to hoard up more than he
could make use of. If he gave away a part to
any body else, so that it perished not uselessly
in his possession, these he also made use of.
And if he also bartered away plums, that would
have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last
good for his eating a whole year, he did no
injury ; he wasted not the common stock ;
destroyed no part of the portion of goods that
belonged to others, so long as nothing perished
uselessly in his hand. Again, if he would give
his nuts for a piece of metal, pleased with its
colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or
wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and
keep those by him all his life, he invaded not
the right of others, he might heap up as much
of these durable things as he pleased : the ex-
ceeding of the bounds of his just property not
lying in the largeness of his possession, but the
perishing of any thing uselessly in it.

§. 47. And thus came in the use of money,
some lasting thing that men might keep
without spoiling, and that by mutual consent
men would take in exchange for the truly
useful, but perishable supports of life.

§. 48. And as different degrees of industry

were apt to give men possessions in different

proportions, so this invention of money gave

them the opportunity to continue and enlarge

* q 2

228 Of civil GOVERNMENT.

them : for supposing an island, separate from
all possible commerce with the rest of the
world, wherein there were but an hundred
families, but there were sheep, horses, and
cows, with other useful animals, wholesome
fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred
thousand times as many, but nothing in the
island, either because of its commonness, or
perishableness, fit to supply the place of money ;
what reason could any one have there to en-
large his possessions beyond the use of his
family, and a plentiful supply to its consumption,
either in what their own industry produced, or
they could barter for like perishable, useful
commodities with others? Where there is not
some thing, both lasting and scarce, and so
valuable to be hoarded up, there men will be
apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were
it never so rich, never so free for them to take:
for I ask, what would a man value ten thou-
sand, or an hundred thousand acres of excel-
lent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked
too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts
of America, where he had no hopes of com-
merce with other parts of the world, to draw
money to him by the sale of the product? It
would not be worth the inclosing, and we
should see him give up again to the wild com-
mon of nature, whatever was more than would
supply the conveniencies of life to be had there
for him and his family.

§. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 229

was America, and more so than that is now ;
for no such thing- as money was any where
known. Find out something that hath the
use and value of money amongst his neighbours,
you shall see the same man will begin presently
to enlarge his possessions.

§. 50. But since gold and silver, being little
useful to the life of men in proportion to food,
raiment, and carriage, has its value only from
the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes y
in great part, the measure, it is plain, that men
have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal
possession of the earth, they having, by a tacit
and voluntary consent, found out a way how a
man may fairly possess more land than he him-
self can use the product of, by receiving in ex-
change for the overplus gold and silver, which
may be hoarded up without injury to any one;
these metals not spoiling or decaying in the
hands of the possessor. This partage of things
in an equality of private possessions, men have
made practicable out of the bounds of society,
and without compact, only by putting a value
on gold and silver, and tacitly agreeing in the use
of money : for in governments, the laws regu-
late the right of property, and the possession
of land is determined by positive constitutions.

§. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to
conceive, without any difficulty, how labour
could at first begin a title to property in the
common things of nature, and how the spending
it upon our uses bounded it, 80 that there

230 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

could then be no reason of quarrelling about
title, nor any doubt about the largeness of pos-
session it gave. Right and conveniency went
together ; for as a man had a right to all he
could employ his labour upon, so he had no
temptation to labour for more than he could
make use of. This left no room for controversy
about the title, nor for incroachment on the
right of others ; what portion a man carved to
himself was easily seen; and it was useless, as
well as dishonest, to carve himself too much,
or take more than he needed.

CHAPTER VI.

Of Paternal Power.

§, 52. It may perhaps be censured as an im-
pertinent criticism, in a discourse of this nature,
to find fault with words and names, that have
obtained in the world : and yet possibly it may
not be amiss to offer new ones, when the old
are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of
j)atemal power probably has done, which seems
so to place the power of parents over their
children wholly in the father, as if the mother
had no share in it ; whereas, if we consult rea-
son or revelation, we shall find, she hath an
equal title. This may give one reason to ask,
whether this might not be more properly called
parental power? for whatever obligation nature
and the right of generation lays on children, it

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 231

must certainly bind them equal to both the
concurrent causes of it. And accordingly we
see the positive law of God every where joins
them together, without distinction, when it
commands the obedience of children, Honour
thy father and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12.
Whosoever curseth his father or his mother,
Lev. xx. 0. Ye shall fear every man his mother
and his father, Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey
your parents, &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the stile of the
Old and New Testament.

§. 53. Had but this one thing been well con-
sidered, without looking any deeper into the
matter, it might perhaps have kept men from
running into those gross mistakes, they have
made, about this power of parents ; which,
however it might, without any great harshness,
bear the name of absolute dominion, and regal
authority, when under the title of paternal
power it seemed appropriated to the father,
would yet have sounded but oddly, and in the
very name shewn the absurdity, if this sup-
posed absolute power over children had been
called parental; and thereby have discovered,
that it belonged to the mother too : for it will
but very ill serve the turn of those men, who
contend so much for the absolute power and
authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that
the mother should have any share in it; and it
woidd have but ill supported the monarchy
they contend for, when by the very name it
appeared, that that fundamental authority,

232 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

from whence they would derive their govern-
ment of a single person only, was not placed in
one, but two persons jointly. But to let this
of names pass.

§. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II.
That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be
supposed to understand all sorts of equality :
age or virtue may give men a just precedency :
excellency of parts and merit may place others
above the common level : birth may subject
some, and alliance or benefits others, to pay an
observance to those whom nature, gratitude,
or other respects, may have made it due : and
yet all this consists with the equality, which all
men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or domi-
nion one over another ; which was the equality
I there spoke of, as proper to the business in
hand, being that equal right, that every man
hath, to his natural freedom, without being sub-
jected to the will or authority of any other
man.

§. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in
this full state of equality, though they are born
to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and
jurisdiction over them, when they come into the
world, and for some time after; but it is but a
temporary one. The bonds of this subjection
are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt
up in, and supported by, in the weakness of
their infancy : age and reason, as they grow
up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite
off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 233

§. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his
body and mind in full possession of their
strength and reason, and so was capable, from
the first instant of his being to provide for his
own support and preservation, and govern his
actions according to the dictates of the law of
reason which God had implanted in him. From
him the world is peopled with his descendants,
who are all born infants, weak and helpless,
without knowledge or understanding: but to
supply the defects of this imperfect state, till
the improvement of growth and age hath re-
moved them, Adam and Eve, and after them
all parents were, by the law of nature, tinder
an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate
the children they had begotten; not as their
own workmanship, but the workmanship of
their own maker, the Almighty, to whom they
were to be accountable for them.

§. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam,
was the same that was to govern all his pos-
terity, the law of reason. But his offspring
having another way of entrance into the world,
different from him, by a natural birth, that
produced them ignorant and without the use
of reason, they were not presently under that
law; for no body can be under a law, which
is not promulgated to him ; and by this law
being promulgated or made known by reason
only, he that is not come to the use of his rea-
son, cannot be said to be under this law ; and
Adam's children, being not presently as soon as

234 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

born under this law of reason, were not pre-
se\\t\y free: for law, in its true notion, is not so
much the limitation as the direction of a free
and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and
prescribes no farther than is for the general
good of those under that law: could they be
happier without it, the law, as an useless thing-,
would of itself vanish ; and that ill deserves
the name of confinement which hedges us in
only from bogs and precipices. So that,
however it may be mistaken, the end of law is
not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and
enlarge freedom : for in all the states of created
beings capable of laws, where there is no law,
there is no freedom: fox liberty is, to be free
from restraint and violence from others ; which
cannot be, where there is no law : but freedom
is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to
do what he lists: (for who could be free, when
every other mans humour might domineer over
him ?) but a liberty to dispose and order as he
lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his
whole property, within the allowance of those
laws under which he is, and therein not to be
subject to the arbitrary will of another, but
freely follow his own.

§. 58. The power, then, that parents have
over their children, arises from that duty which
is incumbent on them, to take care of their
offspring, during the imperfect state of child-
hood. To inform the mind, and govern the
actions of their yet ignorant non-age, till reason

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 235

shall take its place, and ease them of that
trouble, is what the children want, and the
parents are bound to ; for God having given
man an understanding to direct his actions,
has allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty
of acting, as properly belonging thereunto,
within the bounds of that law he is under. But
whilst he is in an estate, wherein he has not
understanding of his own to direct his will, he
is not to have any ivill of his own to follow :
he that understands for him, must will for him
too ; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate
his actions ; but when he comes to the estate
that made his father a free man, the son is a
free man too.

§. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is
under, whether natural or civil. Is a man
under the law of nature? What made him free
of that law? what gave him a free disposing of
his property, according to his own will, within
the compass of that law ? I answer, a state of
maturity wherein he might be supposed
capable to know that law, that so he might
keep his actions within the bounds of it. When
he has acquired that state, he is presumed to
know how far that law is to be his guide, and
how far he may make use of his freedom, and
so comes to have it; till then, somebody else
must guide him, who is presumed to know how
far the law allows a liberty. If such a state of
reason, such an age of discretion made him free,
the same shall make his son free loo. Js a man

236 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

under the law of England? What made him
free of that law ? that is, to have the liberty to
dispose of his actions and possessions accord-
ing to his own will, within the permission of
that law? A capacity of knowing* that law;
which is supposed by that law, at the age of
one-and-twenty years, and in some cases
sooner. If this" made the father free, it shall
make the son free too. Till then we see the
law allows the son to have no will, but he is
to be guided by the will of his father or guar-
dian, who is to understand for him. And if
the father die, and fail to substitute a deputy in
his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to
govern his son, during his minority, during his
want of understanding, the law takes care to do
it; some other must govern him, and be a will
to him, till he hath attained to a state of freedom,
and his understanding be fit to take the govern-
ment of his will. But after that, the father
and son are equally free as much as pupil and
tutor after non-age; equally subjects of the
same law together, without any dominion left
in the father over the life, liberty, or estate of
his son, whether they be only in the state and
under the law of nature, or under the positive
laws of an established government.

§. 60. But if, through defects that may
happen out of the ordinary course of nature,
any one conies not to such a degree of reason,
wherein he might be supposed capable of
knowing the law, and so living within the rules

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 237

of it, he is never capable of being a free man,
he is never let loose to the disposure of his
own will (because he knows no bounds to it,
has not understanding, its proper guide) but is
continued under the tuition and government
of others, all the time his own understanding is
uncapable of that charge. And so lunatics and
ideots are never set free from the government
of their parents; children, who are not as yet
come unto those years whereat they may have ;
and innocents which are excluded by a natural
defect from, ever having; thirdly, madmen,
which for the present cannot jwssibly have the
use of right reason to guide themselves, have for
their guide, the reasoji that guideth other men
which are tutors over them, to seek and procure
their good for them, says Hooker, Eccl. Pol.
lib. i. sect. 7. All which seems no more than
that duty, which God and nature has laid on
man, as well as other creatures, to preserve
their off-spring, till they can be able to shift for
themselves, and will scarce amount to an
instance or proof of parents regal authority.

§.61. Thus we are born free, as we are born
rational ; not that we have actually the exer-
cise of either: age, that brings one, brings with
it the other too. And thus we see how natural
freedom and subjection to parents may consist
together, and are both founded on the sameprin-
ciple. A child isyreeby his father's title, by his
father's understanding, which is to govern him
till lie hath it of his own. Thefreedom of a man

238 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

at years of discretion, and the subjection of a
child to his parents whilst yet short of that age,
are so consistent, and so distinguishable, that
the most blinded contenders for monarchy, by
right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference ;
the most obstinate cannot but allow their con-
sistency : for were their doctrine all true, were
the right heir of Adam now known, and by
that title settled a monarch in his throne, in-
vested with all the absolute unlimited power
Sir Robert Filmer talks of; if he should die as
soon as his heir were born, must not the child,
notwithstanding he were never so free, never so
much sovereign, be in subjection to his mother
and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and
education brought him reason and ability to
govern himself and others? The necessities of
his life, the health of his body, and the infor-
mation of his mind, would require him to be
directed by the will of others, and not his own;
and yet will any one think, that this restraint
and subjection were inconsistent with, or
spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he
had a right to, or gave away his empire to those
who had the government of his non-age? This
government over him only prepared him the
better and sooner for it. If any body should
ask me, when my son is of age to be free? I
shall answer, just when his monarch is of age
to govern. Hut at ichat time, says the judicious
Hooker, Eccl. Pol. 1. i. sect. G. a man may be
said to have attained so far forth the use of

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 23!)

reason, as snfficclh to make him capable of those
laws whereby he is then bound to guide his
actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense
to discern, than for any one by skill and learn-
ing to determine.

%. G2. Commonwealths themselves take no-
tice of, and allow, that there is a time when
men are to begin to act like free men, and there-
fore till that time require not oaths of fealty,
or allegiance, or other public owning- of, or
submission to the government of their countries.

§. 03. The freedom then of man, and liberty
of acting according to his own will, is grounded
on his having reason, which is able to instruct
him in that law he is to govern himself by, and
make him know how far he is left to the freedom
of his own will. To turn him loose to an un-
restrained liberty, before he has reason to
guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege
of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out
amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as
wretched, and as much beneath that of a man,
as their's. This is that which puts the autho-
rity into the parents hands to govern the
minority of their children. God hath made it
their business to employ this care on their off-
spring, and hath placed in them suitable incli-
nations of tenderness and concern to temper
this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed
it, to the children's good, as long as they
should need to be under it.

§. 64. But what reason can hence advance

240 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

this care of the parents due to their offspring
into an absolute arbitary dominion of the father,
whose power reaches no farther than by such a
discipline, as he finds most effectual, to give
such strength and health to their bodies, such
vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may
best fit his children to be most useful to them-
selves and others ; and, if it be necessary to
his condition, to make them work, when they
are able, for their own subsistence. But in
this power the mother too has her share with
the father.

§. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to
the father by any peculiar right of nature, but
only as he is guardian of his children, that
when he quits his care of them, he loses his
power over them, which goes along with their
nourishment and education, to which it is in-
separably annexed ; and it belongs as much to
the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the
natural father of another. So little power does
the bare act of begetting- give a man over his
issue ; if all his care ends there, and this be
all the title he hath to the name and authority
of a father. And what will become of this
paternal power in that part of the world, where
one woman hath more than one husband at a
time? or in those parts of America, where,
when the husband and wife part, which hap-
pens frequently, the children are all left to the
mother, follow her, and are wholly under her
care and provision? If the father die whilst

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 241

the children are young, do they not naturally
every where owe the same obedience to their
mother, during their minority, as to their father
were he alive? and will any one say, that the
mother hath a legislative power over her
children? that she can make standing rules,
which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which
they ought to regulate all the concerns of their
property, and bound their liberty all the course
of their lives? or can she inforce the observa-
tion of them with capital punishments? for this
is the proper power of the magistrate, of which
the father hath not so much as the shadow.
His command over his children is but tempo-
rary, and reaches not their life or property : it
is but a help to the weakness and imperfection
of their non-age, a discipline necessary to their
education.: and though a father may dispose
of his own possessions as he pleases, when his
children are out of danger of perishing for want,
yet his power extends not to the lives or goods,
which either their own industry, or another's
bounty has made their's ; nor to their liberty
neither, when they are once arrived to the in-
franchisement of the years of discretion. The
father s empire then ceases, and he can from
thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty
of his son, than that of any other man : and it
must be far from an absolute or perpetual juris-
diction, from which a man may withdraw him-
self, having licence from divine authority to
leave father and mother, and cleave to his ivife.

R

242 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

§. 66. But though there be a time when a
child comes to be as free from subjection to the
will and command of his father, as the father
himself is free from subjection to the will of
any body else, and they are each under no other
restraint, but that which is common to them
both, whether it be the law of nature, or munici-
pal law of their country ; yet this freedom
exempts not a son from that honour which he
ought, by the law of God and nature, to pay
his parents. God having made the parents
instruments in his great design of continuing the
race of mankind, and the occasions of life to
their children: as he hath laid on them an
obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up
their offspring ; so he has laid on the children a
perpetual obligation of honouring their jicwents,
which containing in it an inward esteem and
reverence to be shewn by all outward expres-
sions, ties up the child from any thing that may
ever injure or affront, disturb or endanger, the
happiness or life of those from whom he
received his ; and engages him in all actions of
defence, relief, assistance and comfort of those,
by whose means he entered into being, and has
been made capable of any enjoyments of life :
from this obligation no state, no freedom can
absolve children. But this is very far from
giving parents a power of command over their
children, or an authority to make laws and
dispose as they please of their lives or liberties.
It is one thing to owe honour, respect, gratitude

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 243

and assistance; another to require an absolute
obedience and submission. The honour due to
parents, a monarch in his throne owes his
mother ; and yet this lessens not his authority,
nor subjects him to her government.

§. 67. The subjection of a minor places in
the father a temporary government, which ter-
minates with the minority of the child : and the
honour due from a child places in the parents a
perpetual right to respect, reverence, support
and compliance too, more or less, as the fa-
ther's care, cost, and kindness in his education,
has been more or less. This ends not with
minority, but holds in all parts and conditions
of a man's life. The want of distinguishing
these two powers, viz. that which the father
hath in the right of tuition, during minority,
and the right of honour all his life, may per-
haps have caused a great part of the mistakes
about this matter : for to speak properly of
them, the first of these is rather the privilege
of children, and duty of parents, than any
prerogative of paternal power. The nourish-
ment and education of their children is a
charge so incumbent on parents for their chil-
dren's good, that nothing can absolve them
from taking care of it : and though the power
of commanding and chastising- them go along
with it, yet God hath woven into the principles
of humam nature such a tenderness for their
offspring, that there is little fear that parents
should use their power with too much rigour ;

r 2

244 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

the excess is seldom on the severe side, the
strong bias of nature drawing the other way.
And therefore God Almighty when he would
express his gentle dealing with the Israelites,
he tells them, that though he chastened them,
he chastens them as a man chastens his son,
Deut. viii. 5. i. e. with tenderness and affec-
tion, and kept them under no severer discipline
than what was absolutely best for them, and
had been less kindness to have slackened.
This is that power to which children are com-
manded obedience, that the pains and care of
their parents may not be increased, or ill
rewarded.

§. 68. On the other side, honour and support,
all that which gratitude requires to return for
the benefits received by and from them, is the
indispensible duty of the child, and the proper
privilege of the parents. This is intended for
the parent's advantage, as the other is for the
child's ; though education, the parent's duty,
seems to have most power, because the igno-
rance and infirmities of childhood stand in
need of restraint and correction ; which is a
visible exercise of rule, and a kind of do-
minion. And that duty which is comprehen-
ded in the word honour requires less obedience,
though the obligation be stronger on grown,
than younger children : for who can think the
command, Children obey your parents, requires
in a man, that has children of his own, the
same submission to his father, as it does in his

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 245

yet young children to him ; and that by this
precept he were bound to obey all his lather's
commands, if, out of a conceit of authority, he
should have the indiscretion to treat him still
as a boy ?

§. 69. The first part then of paternal power,
or rather duty, which is education, belongs so
to the father, that it terminates at a certain
season ; when the business of education is
over, it ceases of itself, and is also alienable
before: for a man may put the tuition of his
son in other hands ; and he that has made his
son an apprentice to another, has discharged
him, during that time, of a great part of his
obedience both to himself and to his mother.
But all the duty of honour, the other part,
remains nevertheless entire to them ; nothing-
can cancel that : it is so inseparable from them
both, that the father's authority cannot dis-
possess the mother of this right, nor can any
man discharge his son from honouring her that
bore him. But both these are very far from a
power to make laws, and inforcing them with
penalties, that may reach estate, liberty, limbs
and life. The power of commanding ends
with non-age; and though, after that, honour
and respect, support and defence, and what-
soever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the
highest benefits he is naturally capable of, be
always due from a son to his parents,; yet all
this puts no sceptre into the father's hand, no
sovereign power of commanding. He has no

246 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

dominion over his son's property, or actions ;
nor any right, that his will should prescribe to
his son's in all things ; however it may become
his son in many things, not very inconvenient
to him and his family, to pay a deference
to it.

§. 70. A man may owe honour and respect
to an ancient, or wise man; defence to his
child or friend ; relief and support to the dis-
tressed ; and gratitude to a benefactor, to
such a degree, that all he has, all he can do,
cannot sufficiently pay it : but all these give
no authority, no right to any one, of making
laws over him from whom they are owing.
And it is plain, all this is due not only to the
bare title of father ; not only because, as has
been said, it is owing to the mother too ; but
because these obligations to parents, and de-
grees of what is required of children, may be
varied by the different care and kindness,
trouble and expence, which is often employed
upon one child more than another.

§.71. This shews the reason how it comes
to pass, that parents in societies, where they
themselves are subjects, retain a power over
their children, and have as much right to their
subjection, as those who are in a state of
nature. Which could not possibly be, if all
political power were only paternal, and that in
truth they were one and the same thing : for
then, all paternal power being in the prince,
the subject could naturally have none of it.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 247

But these two powers, political and paternal,
are so perfectly distinct and separate ; are built
upon so different foundations, and given to so
different ends, that every subject, that is a
father, has as much a paternal power over his
children, as the prince has over his : and every
prince, that has parents, owes them as much
filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of
his subjects do theirs ; and can therefore
contain not any part or degree of that kind of
dominion, which a prince or magistrate has
over his subject.

§. 72. Though the obligation on the parents
to bring up their children, and the obligation
on children to honour their parents, contain all
the power on the one hand, and submission on
the other, which are proper to this relation,
yet there is another power ordinarily in the
father, whereby he has a tie on the obedience
of his children ; which though it be common
to him with other men, yet the occasions of
shewing it, almost constantly happening to
fathers in their private families, and the in-
stances of it elsewhere being rare, and less
taken notice of, it passes in the world for a
part of paternal jurisdiction. And this is the
power men generally have to bestow their es-
tates on those who please them best ; the
possession of the father being the expectation
and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in
certain proportions, according to the law and
custom of each country ; yet it is commonly

248 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

in the father's power to bestow it with a more
sparing or liberal hand, according as the be-
haviour of this or that child hath comported
with his will and humour.

§. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience
of children : and there being always annexed
to the enjoyment of land, a submission to the
government of the country, of which that land
is a part; it has been commonly supposed,
that a. father could oblige his posterity to that
government, of which he himself was a subject,
and that his compact held them ; whereas, it
being only a necessary condition annexed to
the land, and the inheritance of an estate
which is under that government, reaches only
those who will take it on that condition, and
so is no natural tie or engagement, but a volun-
tary submission : for every mans children being
by nature as free as himself, or any of his an-
cestors ever were, may, whilst they are in that
freedom, choose what society they will join
themselves to, what commonwealth they will
put themselves under. But if they will enjoy
the inheritance of their ancestors, they must
take it on the same terms their ancestors had
it, and submit to all the conditions annexed to
such a possession. By this power indeed
fathers oblige their children to obedience to
themselves, even when they are past minority,
and most commonly too subject them to this
or that political power, but neither of these by
any peculiar right of fatherhood, but by the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 249

reward they have in their hands to inforce and
recompence such a compliance; and is no
more power than what a French man has over
an English man, who, by the hopes of an
estate he will leave him, will certainly have a
strong tie on his obedience : and if, when it is
left him, he will enjoy it, he must certainly
take it upon the conditions annexed to the
possession of land in that country where it lies,
whether it be France or England.

§. 74. To conclude then, though the father s
power of commanding extends no farther than
the minority of his children, and to a degree
only fit for the discipline and government of
that age ; and though that honour and respect,
and all that which the Latins called piety,
which they indispensibly owe to their parents
all their life time, and in all estates, with all
that support and defence is due to them, gives
the father no power of governing, i. e. making-
laws and enacting penalties on his children ;
though by all this he has no dominion over the
property or actions of his son : yet it is obvious
to conceive how easy it was, in the first ages
of the world, and in places still, where the
thinness of people gives families leave to se-
parate into unpossessed quarters, and they
have room to remove or plant themselves in yet
vacant habitations, for the father of the family
to become the prince of it ;* he had been a

* It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the arch-
philosopher was of, that the chief person in every household

250 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his
children : and since without some government
it would be hard for them to live together, it
was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit
consent of the children when they were grown
up, be in the father, where it seemed without
any change barely to continue ; when indeed
nothing more was required to it, than the per-
mitting the father to exercise alone, in his
family, that executive power of the law of na-
ture, which every free man naturally hath, and
by that permission resigning up to him a mo-
narchical power, whilst they remained in it.
But that this was not by any paternal right,
but only by the consent of his children, is evi-
dent from hence, that no body doubts, but if a
stranger, whom chance or business had brought

was always, as it were, a king : so when numbers of house-
holds joined themselves in civil societies together, kings
were the first kind of governors amongst them, which is also,
as it seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers continued
still in them, who, of fathers, were made rulers ; as also the
ancient custom of governors to do as Aldchisedec, and being
kings, to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at
the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this
is not the only kind of regiment that has been received in
the world. The inconveniences of one kind have caused
sundry others to be devised ; so that in a word, all public
regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have
risen from the deliberate advice, consultation and compo-
sition between men, judging it convenient and behovcful ;
there being no impossibility in nature considered by itself,
but that man might have lived without any public regiment.
Hookers Ecd. P. lib. i. Sect. 10.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 251

to his family, had there killed any of his chil-
dren, or committed any other fact, he might
condemn and put him to death, or otherwise
have punished him, as well as any of his chil-
dren ; which it was impossible he should do by
virtue of any paternal authority over one who
was not his child, but by virtue of that execu-
tive power of the law of nature, which, as a
man, he had a right to : and he alone could
punish him in his family, where the respect of
his children had laid by the exercise of such a
power, to give way to the dignity and authority
they were willing should remain in him, above
the rest of his family.

§. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural
for children, by a tacit, and scarce avoidable
consent, to make way for the father 's authority
and government. They had been accustomed
in their childhood to follow his direction, and
to refer their little differences to him ; and
when they were men, who fitter to rule them?
Their little properties, and less covetousness,
seldom afforded greater controversies ; and
when any should arise, where could they have
a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had
every one been sustained and brought up, and
who had a tenderness for them all? It is no
wonder that they made no distinction betwixt
minority and full age ; nor looked after one-and-
twenty, or any other age that might make them
the free disposers of themselves and fortunes,
when thev could have no desire to be out of

252 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

their pupilage : the government they had been
under, during it, continued still to be more
their protection than restraint; and they could
no where find a greater security to their peace,
liberties, and fortunes, than in the rule of a
father.

§. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families,
by an insensible change, became the politic
monarchs of them too : and as they chanced
to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs,
for several successions, or otherwise ; so they
laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective
kingdoms, under several constitutions and man-
ners, according as chance, contrivance, or oc-
casions happened to mould them. But if
princes have their titles in their fathers right,
and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right
of fathers to political authority, because they
commonly were those in whose hands we find,
de facto, the exercise of government : I say, if
this argument be good, it will as strongly prove,
that all princes, nay princes only, ought to be
priests, since it is as certain, that in the begin-
ning, the father of the family was priest, as that
he teas ruler in his own household.

CHAPTER VII.

Of Political or Civil Society.

§. 77. God having made man such a crea-
ture, that in his own judgement, it was not

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 253

good for him to be alone, put him under strong
obligations of necessity, convenience, and incli-
nation to drive him into society, as well as fitted
him with understanding and language to con-
tinue and enjoy it. The first society was
between man and wife, which gave beginning
to that between parents and children ; to which,
in time, that between master and servant came
to be added : and though all these might, and
commonly did meet together, and make up but
one family, wherein the master or mistress of
it had some sort of rule proper to a family ;
each of these, or all together, came short of
political society, as we shall see, if we consider
the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of
these.

§. 78. Conjugal society is made by a volun-
tary compact between man and woman : and
though it consist chiefly in such a communion
and right in one another's bodies as is necessary
to its chief end, procreation ; yet it draws with
it mutual support and assistance, and a com-
munion of interests too, as necessary not only
to unite their care and affection, but also neces-
sary to their common offspring, who have a
right to be nourished, and maintained by them
till they are able to provide for themselves.

§. 79. For the end of conjunction between
male and female, being not barely procreation,
but the continuation of the species ; this con-
junction betwixt male and female ought to last,
even after procreation, so long as is necessary

254 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

to the nourishment and support of the young
ones, who are to be sustained by those that got
them, till they are able to shift and provide for
themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise
maker hath set to the works of his hands, we
find the inferior creatures steadily obey. In
those viviparous animals which feed on grass,
the conjunction betiveen male and female lasts no
longer than the very act of copulation : because
the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish
the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the
male only begets, but concerns not himself for
the female or young, to whose sustenance
he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of
prey the conjunction lasts longer : because the
dam not being able well to subsist herself, and
nourish her numerous off-spring by her own
prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more
dangerous way of living, than by feeding on
grass, the assistance of the male is necessary
to the maintenance of their common family,
which cannot subsist till they are able to prey
for themselves, but by the joint care of male
and female. The same is to be observed in all
birds, (except some domestic ones, where
plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding,
and taking care of the young brood) whose
young needing food in the nest, the cock and
hen continue mates, till the young are able to
use their wing, and provide for themselves.

§. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not
the only reason, why the male and female in

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 250

mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than
other creatures, viz. because the female is capa-
ble of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with
child again, and brings forth to a new birth,
long before the former is out of a dependency
for support on his parents help, and able to shift
for himself, and has all the assistance that is
due to him from his parents : whereby the father,
who is bound to take care for those he hath
begot, is under an obligation to continue in
conjugal society with the same woman longer
than other creatures, whose young being able
to subsist of themselves, before the time of
procreation returns again, the conjugal bond
dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till
Hymen at his usual anniversary season sum-
mons them again to choose new mates. Wherein
one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great
Creator, who having given to man foresight,
and an ability to lay up for the future, as well
as to supply the present necessity, hath made
it necessary, that society of man and wife should
be more lasting, than of male and female
among other creatures ; that so their industry
might be encouraged, and their interest better
united, to make provision and lay up goods for
their common issue, with uncertain mixture, or
easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society
would mightily disturb.

§. 81. But though these are ties upon man-
kind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm
ami lasting in man, than the other species of

256 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

animals ; yet it would give one reason to en-
quire, why this compact, where procreation and
education are secured, and inheritance taken
care for, may not be made determinable, either
by consent, or at a certain time, or upon cer-
tain conditions, as well as any other voluntary
compacts, there being no necessity in the na-
ture of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it
should always be for life; I mean, to such as
are under no restraint of any positive law,
which ordains all such contracts to be perpe-
tual.

§. 82. But the husband and wife, though
they have but one common concern, yet having
different understandings, will unavoidably
sometimes have different wills too ; it therefore
being necessary that the last determination,
t. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere ; it
naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler
and the stronger. But this reaching but to the
things of their common interest and property,
leaves the wife in the full and free possession
of what by contract is her peculiar right, and
gives the husband no more power over her life
than she has over his; the power of the husband
being so far from that of an absolute monarch,
that the wife has in many cases a liberty to
separate from him, where natural right, or their
contract allows it : whether that contract be
made by themselves in the state of nature, or by
the customs or laws of the country they live in;
and the children upon such separation fall to

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 257

the father or mother's lot, as such contract does
determine.

§. 83. For all the ends of marriage being
to be obtained under politic government, as
well as in the state of nature, the civil magis-
trate doth not abridge the right or power of
either naturally necessary to those ends, viz.
procreation and mutual support and assistance
whilst they are together ; but only decides any
controversy that may arise between man and
wife about them. If it were otherwise, and
that absolute sovereignty and power of life and
death naturally belonged to the husband, and
were necessary to the society between man and
wife, there could be no matrimony in any of
those countries where the husband is allowed
no such absolute authority. But the ends of
matrimony requiring no such power in the
husband, the condition of conjugal society put
it not in him, it being not at all necessary to
that state. Conjugal society could subsist and
attain its ends without it; nay, community
of goods, and the power over them, mutual
assistance and maintenance, and other things
belonging to conjugal society, might be varied
and regulated by that contract which unites
man and wife in that society, as far as may
consist with procreation and the bringing up of
children till they could shift for themselves;
nothing being necessary to any society, that is
not necessary to the ends for which it is made.

§. 84. The society betwixt parents and chil-
s

258 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

dren, and the distinct rights and powers be-
longing respectively to them, I have treated of
so largely in the foregoing chapter, that I shall
not here need to say any thing of it. And I
think it is plain, that it is far different from a
politic society.

§. 85. Master and servant are names as old
as history, but given to those of far different
condition; for a freeman makes himself a
servant to another, by selling him, for a certain
time, the service he undertakes to do, in ex-
change for wages he is to receive : and though
this commonly puts him into the family of his
master, and under the ordinary discipline
thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary
power over him, and no greater than what is
contained in the contract between them. But
there is another sort of servants, which by a
peculiar name we call slaves, who, being cap-
tives taken in a just war, are by the right of
nature subjected to the absolute dominion and
arbitrary power of their masters. These men
having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with
it their liberties, and lost their estates ; and
being in the state of slavery, not capable of any
property, cannot in that state be considered as
any part of civil society ; the chief end whereof
is the preservation of property.

§. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of
a family with all these subordinate relations of
ivife, children, servants, and 'slaves, united under
the domestic rule of a family; which, what re-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 259

semblance soever it may have in its order,
offices, and number too, with a little common-
wealth, yet is very far from it, both in its consti-
tution, power and end : or if it must be thought
a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute
monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but
a very shattered and short power, when it is
plain, by what has been said before, that the
master of the family has a very distinct and.
differently limited power, both as to time and
extent, over those several persons that are in it ;
for excepting the slave (and the family is as
much a family, and his power as paterfamilias
as great, whether there be any slaves in his
family or no) he has no legislative power of
life and death over any of them, and none too
but what & mistress of a family may have as well
as he. And he certainly can have no absolute
power over the whole family, who has but a
very limited one over every individual in it.
But how a family, or any other society of men,
differ from that which is properly political
society, we shall best see, by considering wherein
political society itself consists.

§. 87. Man being born, as has been proved,
with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncon-
trouled enjoyment of all the rights and privi-
leges of the law of nature, equally with any
other man, or number of men in the world, hath
by nature a power, not only to preserve his
property, that is, his life, liberty and estate,
against the injuries and attempts of other men :

s 2

260 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that
law in others, as he is persuaded the offence
deserves, even with death itself, in crimes
where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion,
requires it. But because no political society
can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the
power to preserve the property, and in order
thereunto, punish the offences of all those of
that society : there, and there only is political
society, where every one of the members hath
quitted this natural power, resigned it up into
the hands of the community in all cases that
exclude him not from appealing for protection
to the law established by it. And thus all
private judgment of every particular member
being excluded, the community comes to be
umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent,
and the same to all parties ; and by men
having authority from the community, for the
execution of those rules, decides all the differ-
ences that may happen between any members
of that society concerning any matter of right ;
and punishes those offences which any member
hath committed against the society, with such
penalties as the law hag established : whereby
it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not,
in political society together. Those who are
united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to,
with authority to decide controversies between
them, and punish offenders, are in civil society
one with another : but those who have no such

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 201

common people, I mean on earth, are still in the
state of nature, each being, where there is no
other, judge for himself, and executioner;
which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect
stale of nature.

§. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by
a power to set down what punishment shall
belong to the several transgressions which they
think worthy of it, committed amongst the
members of that society, (which is the power
of making laws) as well as it has the power to
punish any injury done unto any of its mem-
bers, by any one that is not of it, (which is the
power of war and peace;) and all this for the
preservation of the property of all the members
of that society, as far as is possible. But
though every man who has entered into civil
society, and is become a member of any com-
monwealth, has thereby quitted his power to
punish offences, against the law of nature, in
prosecution of his own private judgment, yet
with the judgment of offences, which he has
given up to the legislative in all cases, where
he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a
right to the commonwealth to employ his
force, for the execution of the judgments of the
commonwealth, whenever he shall be called
to it; w r hich indeed are his own judgments,
they being made by himself, or his representa-
tative. And herein we have the original of the
legislative and executive power of civil society,
which is to judge by standing laws, how far

262 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

offences are to be punished, when committed
within the commonwealth ; and also to deter-
mine, by occasional judgments founded on the
present circumstances of the fact, how far
injuries from without are to be vindicated ; and
in both these to employ all the force of all the
members, when there shall be no need.

§. 89. Wherever therefore any number of
men are so united into one society, as to quit
every one his executive power of the law of
nature, and to resign it to the public, there and
there only is a political, or civil society. And
this is done, wherever any number of men, in
the state of nature, enter into society to make
one people, one body politic, under one su-
preme government ; or else when any one joins
himself to, and incorporates with any govern-
ment already made: for hereby he authorizes
the society, or which is all one, the legislative
thereof, to make laws for him, as the public
good of the society shall require : to the exe-
cution whereof, his own assistance (as to his
own decrees) is due. And this puts men out
of a state of nature into that of a common-
2vealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with
authority to determine all the controversies,
and redress the injuries that may happen to
any member of the commonwealth ; which
judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed
by it. And wherever there are any number of
men, however associated, that have no such
decisive power to appeal to, there they are still
in the state of nature.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. '203

§. DO. Hence it is evident, that absolute mo-
narchy, which by some men is counted the only
government in the world, is indeed inconsis-
tent with civil society, and so can be no form of
civil government at all : for the end of civil
society, being to avoid, and remedy those incon-
veniencies of the state of nature, which neces-
sarily follow from every man's being judge in
his own case, by setting up a known authority,
to which every one of that society may appeal
upon any injury received, or controversy that
may arise, and which every one of the* society
ought to obey ; wherever any persons are,
who have not such an authority to appeal to,
for the decision of any difference between them,
there those persons are still in the stale of
nature; and so is every absolute prince, in
respect of those who are under his dominion.

§. 91. For he being supposed to have all,
both legislative and executive power in himself
alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal
lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indif-
ferently, and with authority decide, and from
whose decision relief and redress may be ex-
pected of any injury or inconveniency, that

* The public power of all society is above every soul con-
tained in the same society ; and the principal use of that
power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws
in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewed
which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or
of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hookers. Eccl. Pol. I. i,
sect. 10.

264 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

may be suffered from the prince, or by his
order: so that such a man, however intitled,
Czar, Grand Seignor, or how you please, is as
much in the state of nature, with all under his
dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind :
for wherever any two men are, who have no
standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on
earth, for the determination of controversies of
right betwixt them, there they are still in the
state of nature, * and under all the inconveni-
encies of it, with only this woeful difference to
the subject, or rather slave of an absolute
prince : that whereas, in the ordinary state of

* To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and
wrongs, i. e. such as attend men in the state of nature, there
was no way hut only by growing into composition and agree-
ment amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of govern-
ment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto,
that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern,
by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy estate of the rest
might be procured. Men always knew that where force and
injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves ;
they knew that howevermen may seek theirown commodity,
yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to
be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be with-
stood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take
upon him to determine his own right, and according to his
own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as
much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he
greatly affects partial ; and therefore that strifes and trou-
bles would be endless, except they gave their common con-
sent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree
upon, without which consent there would be no reason that
one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over an
other, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. I. i. sect. 10.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 205

nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right,
and according to the best of his power, to main-
tain it; now, whenever his property is invaded
by the will and order of his monarch, he has
not only to appeal, as those in society ought to
have, but as if he were degraded from the com-
mon state of rational creatures, is denied a
liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and
so is exposed to all the misery and inconve-
niencies, that a man can fear from one, who
being in the unrestrained state of nature, is
yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with
power.

§. 92. For he that thinks absolute power pu-
rifies mens blood, and corrects the baseness of
human nature, need read but the history of
this, or any other age, to be convinced of the
contrary. He that would have been insolent
and injurious in the woods of America, would
not probably be much better in a throne ;
where perhaps learning and religion shall be
found out to justify all that he shall do to his
subjects, and the sword presently silence all
those that dare question it: for what the pro-
lection of absolute monarchy is, what kind of
fathers of their countries it makes princes to
be, and to what a degree of happiness and
security it carries civil society, where this sort
of government is grown to perfection, he, that
will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may
easily see.

§. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well

2GG OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

as other governments of the world, the sub-
jects have an appeal to the law, and judges
to decide any controversies, and restrain any
violence that may happen betwixt the subjects
themselves, one amongst another. This every
one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves
to be thought a declared enemy to society and
mankind, who should go about to take it
away. But whether this be from a true love of
mankind and society, and such a charity as we
owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt :
for this is no more than what every man, who
loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may,
and naturally must do, keep those animals from
hurting, or destroying one another, who labour
and drudge only for his pleasure and advan-
tage ; and so are taken care of, not out of any
love the master has for them, but love of him-
self, and the profit they bring him : for if it be
asked, what security, ivhat fence is there, in
such a state, against the violence and oppression
of this absolute ruler? the very question can
scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you,
that it deserves death only to ask after safety.
Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant,
there must be measures, laws and judges, for
their mutual peace and security : but as for the
ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all
such circumstances ; because he has power to
do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he
does it. To ask how you may be guarded
from harm, or injury, on that side where the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 207

strongest hand is to do it, is presently the
voice of faction and rebellion : as if when men
quitting the state of nature entered into society,
they agreed that all of them but one should be
under the restraint of laws, but that he should
still retain all the liberty of the state of nature,
increased with power, and made licentious by
impunity. This is to think, that men are so
foolish, that they take care to avoid what mis-
chiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes;
but are content, nay, think it safety, to be
devoured by lions.

§. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to
amuse people's understandings, it hinders not
men from feeling ; and when they perceive,
that any man, in what station soever, is out of
the bounds of the civil society which they are
of, and that they have no appeal on earth
against any harm, they may receive from him,
they are apt to think themselves in the state of
nature, in respect of him whom they find to
be so ; and to take care, as soon as they can,
to have that safety and security in civil society,
for which it was first instituted, and for which
only they entered into it. And therefore,
though perhaps at first, (as shall be shewed
more at large hereafter in the following part of
this discourse,) some one good and excellent
man having got a pre-eminency amongst the
rest, had this deference paid to his goodness
and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority,
that the chief rule, with arbitration of their dif-

268 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

ferences, by a tacit consent devolved into his,
without any other caution, but the assurance
they had of his uprightness and wisdom ; yet
when time, giving authority, and (as some men
would persuade us) sacredness of customs,
which the negligent, and unforeseeing inno-
cence of the first ages began, had brought in
successors of another stamp, the people finding
their properties not secure under the govern-
ment, as it then was, (whereas government has
no other end but the preservation of property*)
could never be safe nor at rest, nor think them-
selves in civil society, till the legislature was
placed in collective bodies of men, call them
senate, parliament, or what you please. By
which means every single person became sub-
ject, equally with other the meanest men, to
those laws, which lie himself, as part of the
legislative, had established ; nor could any one,
by his own authority, avoid the force of the
law, when once made ; nor by any pretence of

* At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was
once appointed, it may be that nothing was then farther
thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted
unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule, till by
experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so
as the thing which they had devised for a remedy did indeed
but increase the sore, which it would have cured. They saw,
that to lice by one mans will, became the cause of all mens
misery. This constrained them to come unto laws, wherein
all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the
penalties of transgressing them. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. I. i.
sect. 10.

*

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 2G9

superiority plead exemption, thereby to license
his own, or the miscarriages of any of his de-
pendents. No man in civil society can be ex-
empted from the laws of it:* for if any man
may do what he thinks fit, and there be no
appeal on earth, for redress or security against
any harm he shall do ; I ask, whether he be
not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so
can be no part or member of that civil society ;
unless any one will say, the state of nature and
civil society are one and the same thing, which
I have never yet found any one so great a
patron of anarchy as to affirm.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Beginning oj Political Societies.

§. 95. Men being, as has been said, by na-
ture, all free, equal, and independent, no one
can be put out of this estate, and subjected to
the political power of another, without his own
consent. The only way whereby any one di-
vests himself of his natural liberty, and puts
on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing
with other men to join and unite into a com-
munity, for their comfortable, safe and peace-
able living one amongst another, in a secure
enjoyment of their properties, and a greater

* Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth
therefore over-rule each several part of the same body.
Hooker s, Eccl. Pol. I. i. sect. 10.

270 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

security against any, that are not of it. This?
any number of men may do, because it injures
not the freedom of the rest ; they are left as
they were in the liberty of the state of nature.
When any number of men have so consented to
make one community or government, they are
thereby presently incorporated, and make one
body politic, wherein the majority have a right
to act and conclude the rest.

§. 96. For when any number of men have,
by the consent of every individual, made a
community, they have thereby made that com-
munity one body, with a power to act as one
body, which is only by the will and determi-
nation of the majority: for that which acts
any community, being only the consent of the
individuals of it, and it being necessary to
that which is one body to move one way ; it is
necessary the body should move that way
whither the greater force carries it, which is the
consent of the majority : or else it is impossible
it should act or continue one body, one com-
munity, which the consent of every individual
that united into it, agreed that it should ; and
so every one is bound by that consent to be
concluded by the majority. And therefore
we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act
by positive laws, where no number is set by
that positive law which impowers them, the
act of the majority passes for the act of the
whole, and of course determines, as having
by the law of nature and reason, the power of
the whole.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 271

<§. 97. And thus every man, by consenting
with others to make one body politic under
one government, puts himself under an obli-
gation to every one of that society, to submit
to the determination of the majority, and to be
concluded by it; or else this original compact,
whereby he with others incorporates into one
society, would signify nothing, and be no com-
pact, if he be left free, and under no other ties
than he was in before in the state of nature.
For what appearance would there be of any
compact? what new engagement if he were no
farther tied by any decrees of the society, than
he himself thought fit, and did actually con-
sent to ? This would be still as great a liberty,
as he himself had before his compact, or any
one else in the state of nature hath, who may
submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if
he thinks fit.

§. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall
not, in reason, be received as the act of the
whole, and conclude every individual ; nothing
but the consent of every individual can make
any thing to be the act of the whole : but such
a consent is next to impossible ever to be had,
if we consider the infirmities of health, and
avocations of business, which in a number,
though much less than that of a common-
wealth, will necessarily keep many away from
the public assembly. To which if we add the
variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests,
which unavoidably happen in all collections

272 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

of men, the coming into society upon such terms
would be only like Cato's coming into the thea-
tre, only to go out again. Such a constitution as
this would make the mighty Leviathan of a
shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures,
and not let it outlast the day it was born in:
which cannot be supposed, till we can think,
that rational creatures should desire and con-
stitute societies only to be dissolved : for
where the majority cannot conclude the rest,
there they cannot act as one body, and conse-
quently will be immediately dissolved again.

§. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of
nature unite into a community, must be under-
stood to give up all the power, necessary to the
ends for which they unite into society, to the
majority of the community, unless they ex-
pressly agreed in any number greater than the
majority. And this is done by barely agreeing
to unite into one political society, which is all
the compact that is, or needs be, between the
individuals, that enter into, or make up a
commonwealth. And thus that, which begins
and actually constitutes any political society,
is nothing but the consent of any number of
freemen capable of a majority to unite and in-
corporate into such a society. And this is that,
and that only, which did, or could give begin-
ning to any lawful government in the world.

§. 100. To this 1 find two objections made.

First, That there are no instances to bej'ound
in story, of a company oj y men independent, and

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 273

equal one amongst another, that met together,
and in this way began and set up a government.

Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men
should do so, because all men being bom under
government, they are to submit to that, and are
not at liberty to begin a new one.

§. 101. To the first there is this to answer,
That it is not at all to be wondered, that
history gives us but a very little account of men,
that lived together in the state of nature. The
inconveniences of that condition, and the love
and want of society, no sooner brought any
number of them together, but they presently
united and incorporated, if they designed to
continue together. And if we may not suppose
men ever to have been in the state of nature,
because we hear not much of them in such a
state, we may as well suppose the armies of
Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, be-
cause we hear little of them, till they were men,
and imbodied in armies. Government is every
where antecedent to records, and letters seldom
come in amongst a people till a long continua-
tion of civil society has, by other more neces-
sary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and
plenty : and then they begin to look after the
history of their founders, and search into their
original, when they have outlived the memory
of it: for it is with commoniucalths as with
particular persons, they are commonly ignorant
of their own births and infancies: and if they
know any thing of their original, they are

T

274 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

beholden for it, to the accidental records that
others have kept of it. And those that we have,
of the beginning of any polities in the world,
excepting that of the Jews, where God him-
self immediately interposed, and which favours
not at all paternal dominion, are all either plain
instances of such a beginning as I have men-
tioned, or at least have manifest footsteps of it.
"§. 102. He must shew a strange inclination
to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees
not with his hypothesis, who will not allow,
that the beginning of Rome and Venice were
by the uniting together of several men free and
independent one of another, amongst whom
there was no natural superiority or subjection.
And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken,
he tells us, that in many parts of America there
was no government at all. There are great
and apparent conjectures, says he, that these
men, speaking of those of Peru, for a long time
had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived
hi troops, as they do to this day in Florida, the
Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other
nations, tvhich have no certain kings, but as occa-
sion is offered, in peace or tear, they choose their
captains as they please, l.i. c. 25. If it be said,
that every man there was born subject to his
father, or the head of his family; that the sub-
jection due from a child to a father took not
away his freedom of uniting into what political
society he thought fit, has been already proved.
But be that as it will, these men, it is evident,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 275

were actually free\ and whatever superiority
some politicians now would place in any of
them, they themselves claimed it not, but by
consent were all equal, till by the same consent
they set rulers over themselves. So that their
politic societies all began from a voluntary union,
and the mutual agreement of men freely acting
in the choice of their governors, and forms of
government.

§. 103. And I hope those who went away
from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by
Justin, 1. iii. c. 4. will be allowed to have been
freemen independent one of another, and to have
set up a government over themselves, by their
own consent. Thus I have given several exam-
ples out of history, of people free and in the state
of nature, that being met together incorporated
and began a commonwealth. And if the want
of such instances be an argument to prove that
government were not, nor could not be so begun,
I suppose the contenders for paternal empire
were better to let it alone, than urge it against
natural liberty : for if they can give so many
instances, out of history, of governments begun
upon paternal right, I think (though at best an
argument from what has been, to what should
of right be, has no great force) one might, without
any great danger, yield them the cause. But
if I might advise them in the case, they would
do well not to search too much into the original
of governments, as they have begun de facto,
lest they should find, at the foundation of most

t 2

270 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

of them, something very little favourable to the
design they promote, and such a power as they
contend for.

§. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain
on our side, that men are naturally free, and
the examples of history shewing, that the
governments of the world, that were begun in
peace, had their beginning laid on that founda-
tion, and were made by the consent of the peo-
ple; there can be little room for doubt, either
where the right is, or what has been the
opinion, or practice of mankind, about ihefirst
erecting- of governments.

§. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back
as far as history will direct us, towards the
original of commoniuealths, we shall generally
find them under the government and adminis-
tration of one man. And I am also apt to
believe, that where a family was numerous
enough to subsist by itself, and continued
entire together, without mixing with others, as
it often happens, where there is much land,
and few people, the government commonly be-
gan in the father : for the father having, by the
law of nature, the same power with every man
else to punish, as he thought fit, any offences
against that law, might thereby punish his
transgressing children, even when they were
men, and out of their pupilage ; and they were
very likely to submit to his punishment, and
all join with him against the offender, in their
turns, giving him thereby power to execute his

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 277

sentence against any transgression, and so in
effect make him the law-maker, and governor
over all that remained in conjunction with his
family. He was fittest to be trusted ; paternal
affection secured their property and interest
under his care ; and the custom of obeying
him, in their childhood, made it easier to
submit to him, rather than to any other. If
therefore they must have one to rule them, as
government is hardly to be avoided amongst
men that live together; who so likely to be
the man as he that was their common father;
unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect
of mind or body made him unfit for it? But
when either the father died, and left his next
heir, for want of age, wisdom, courage, or any
other qualities, less fit to rule ; or where seve-
ral families met, and consented to continue
together; there, it is not to be doubted, but
they used their natural freedom, to set up him,
whom they judged the ablest, and most likely,
to rule well over them. Conformable here-
unto we find the people of America, who (living-
out of the reach of the conquering swords, and
spreading domination of the two great empires
of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own na-
tural freedom, though, ccctcris paribus, they
eommonly prefer the heir of their deceased
king; yet if they find him any way weak, or
uncapable, they pass him by, and set up the
stoutest and bravest man for their ruler

106. Tims, though looking back as far as

278 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

records give us any account of peopling the
world, and the history of nations, we common-
ly find the government to be in one hand ; yet
it destroys not that which I affirm, viz, that
the beginning of politic society depends upon
the consent of the individuals, to join into, and
make one society; who, when they are thus
incorporated, might set up what form of go-
vernment they thought fit. But this having
given occasion to men to mistake, and think,
that by nature government was monarchical,
and belonged to the father, it may not be amis
here to consider, why people in the beginning
generally pitched upon this form, which though
perhaps the father's pre-eminency might, in the
first institution of some commonwealths, give
a rise to, and place in the beginning, the power
in one hand ; yet it is plain that the reason,
that continued the form of government in a
single person, was not any regard, or respect
to paternal authority ; since all petty monar-
chies, that is, almost all monarchies, near their
original, have been commonly, at least upon
occasion, elective.

§. 107. First then, in the beginning of things,
the father's government of the childhood of
those sprung from him, having accustomed
them to the rule of one man, and taught them
that where it was exercised with care and
skill, with affection and love to those under it,
it was sufficient to procure and preserve to
men all the political happiness they sought for

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 279

in society. It was no wonder that they should
pitch upon, and naturally run into that form
of government, which from their infancy they
had been all accustomed to ; and which, by
experience, they had found both easy and
safe. To which, if we add, that monarchy
being simple, and most obvious to men, whom
neither experience had instructed in forms of
government, nor the ambition or insolence of
empire had taught to beware of the encroach-
ments of prerogative, or the inconveniencies of
absolute power, which monarchy in succession
was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them ;
it was not at all strange, that they should not
much trouble themselves to think of methods
of restraining any exorbitances of those to
whom they had given the authority over them,
and of balancing the power of government, by
placing several parts of it in different hands.
They had neither felt the oppression of tyranni-
cal dominion, nor did the fashion of the age,
nor their possessions, or way of living, (which
afforded little matter for covetousness or am-
bition) give them any reason to apprehend or
provide against it ; and therefore it is no
wonder they put themselves into such a frame
of government, as was not only, as 1 said,
most obvious and simple, but also best suited
to their present state and condition; which
stood more in need of defence against foreign
invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of
laws. The equality of a simple poor way of

280 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

living, confining their desires within the narrow
bounds of each man's small property, made
few controversies, and so no need of many
laws to decide them, or variety of officers to
superintend the process, or look after the
execution of justice, where there were but few
trespasses, and few offenders. Since then
those, who liked one another so well as to join
into society, cannot but be supposed to have
some acquaintance and friendship together,
and some trust one in another ; they could not
but have greater apprehensions of others, than
of one another : and therefore their first care
and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how
to secure themselves against foreign force. It
was natural for them to put themselves under
a frame of government which might best serve
to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest
man to conduct them in their wars, and lead
them out against their enemies, and in this
chiefly be their ruler.

\. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the
Indians in America, which is still a pattern of
the first ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the
inhabitants were too few for the country, and
want of people and money gave men no
temptation to enlarge their possessions of land,
or contest for wider extent of ground, are little
more than generals of their armies; and though
they command absolutely in war, yet at home
and in time of peace they exercise very little
dominion, and have but a verv moderate

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 201

sovereignty, the resolutions of peace and war
being ordinarily either in the people, or in a
council. Though the war itself, which admits
not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves
the command into the king's sole authority.

\. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief
business of their judges, and first kings, seems
to have been to be captains in war, and leaders
of their armies ; which (besides what is signi-
fied by going out and in before the people,
which was to march forth to war, and home
again in the heads of their forces) appears
plainly in the story of Jephlha. The Ammo-
nites making war upon Israel, the Gileadites
in fear send to Jephtha, a bastard of their
family whom they had cast off, and article
with him, if he will assist them against the
Ammonites, to make him their ruler; which
they do in these words, And the people made
him head and captain over them, Judges xi. 11.
which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge*
And he judged Israel, Judges xii. 7. that is,
was their captain-general six years. So when
Jotham upbraids the Shechemites with the
obligation they had to Gideon, who had been
their judge and ruler, he tells them, He fought
for you, and adventured his life jar, and de-
livered you out of the hands of Midian, J"g. ix.
J 7. Nothing mentioned of him, but what he
did as a general: and indeed that is all is
found in his history, or in any of the rest of
the judges. And Abimclech particularly is

202 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

called king, thought at most he was but their
general. And when, being weary of the ill
conduct of Samuels sons, the children of
Israel desired a king, like all the nations to
judge them, and to go out before them, and to
fight their battles, 1 Sam. viii. 20. God grant-
ing their desire, says to Samuel, 1 ivill send
thee a man, and thou shall anoint him to be
captain over my people Israel, that he may save
my people out of the hands of the Philistines,
ix. 16. As if the only business of a king had
been to lead out their armies, and light in their
defence; and accordingly at his inauguration
pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to
Saul, that the Lord had anointed him to be
captain over his inheritance, x. 1 . And there-
fore those, who after Saul's being solemnly
chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mis-
pah, were unwilling to have him their king,
made no other objection but this, How shall
this man save us? v. 27. as if they should have
said, this man is unfit to be our king, not
having skill and conduct enough in war, to be
able to defend us. And when God resolved
to transfer the government to David, it is in
these words, Hut note thy kingdom shall not
continue: the Lord hath sought him a man
after his own heart, and the Lord hath com-
manded him to be captain over his people, xiii.
14. As if the whole kingly authority were no-
thing else but to be their general : and there-
fore the tribes who had stuck to Saul's family,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 203

and opposed David's reign, when they came
to Hebron with terms of submission to him,
they tell him, amongst other arguments they
had to submit to him as to their king, that
he was in effect their king in Sauls time, and
therefore they had no reason but to receive
him as their king now. Also (say they) in
time past y tvhen Saul ivas king over us, thou
ivast he that leddest out and broughtest in
Israel, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shall
feed my people Israel, and thou shalt be a
captain over Israel.

§. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees
greiv up into a commonwealth, and the fatherly
authority being continued on to the elder son,
every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly
submitted to it, and the easiness and equality
of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced,
till time seemed to have confirmed it, and
settled a right of succession by prescription : or
whether several families, or the descendents of
several families, whom chance, neighbourhood,
or business brought together, uniting into so-
ciety, the need of a general, whose conduct
might defend them against their enemies in
war, and the great confidence the innocence
and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such
as are almost all those which begin govern-
ments, that ever come to last in the world) gave
men one of another, made the first beginners of
of commonwealths generally put the rule into
one man's hand, without any other express

284 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

limitation or restraint, but what the nature of
the thing, and the end of government required :
which ever of those it was that at first put the
rule into the hands of a single person, certain
it is no body was intrusted with it but for the
public good and safety, and to those ends, in
the infancies of commonwealths, those who had
it commonly used it. And unless they had
done so, young societies could not have sub-
sisted ; without such nursing fathers tender and
careful of the public weal, all governments
would have sunk under the weakness and infir-
mities of their infancy, and the prince and the
people had soon perished together.

§. 111. But though the golden age (before
vain ambition, and amor sceleralus kabendi, evil
concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into
a mistake of true power and honour) had more
virtue, and consequently better governors, as
well as less vicious subjects ; and there was
then no stretching prerogative on the one side,
to oppress the people ; nor consequently on
the other, any dispute about privilege, to lessen
or restrain the power of the magistrate, and so
no contest betwixt rulers and people about
governors or government: yet, when ambition
and luxury in future ages* would retain and

• At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once
approved, it may be nothing was then farther thought upon
for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their
•wisdom and discretion which were to rule, till by experience
they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 285

increase the power, without doing the business
for which it was given; and aided by flattery,
taught princes to have distinct and separate
interests from their people, men found it neces-
sary to examine more carefully the original and
rights of government; and to find out ways to
restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the abuses
of that power, which they having intrusted in
another's hands only for their own good, they
found was made use of to hurt them.

§. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is,
that people that were naturally free, and by
their own consent either submitted to the
government of their father, or united together
out of different families to make a government,
should generally put the rule into one mans
hands, and chuse to be under the conduct of a
single person, without so much as by express
conditions limiting or regelating his power,
which they thought safe enough in his honesty
and prudence ; though they never dreamed of
monarchy being Jure Divino, which we never
heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to
us by the divinity of this last age ; nor ever
allowed paternal power to have a right to do-
minion, or to be the foundation of all govern-

thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed hut
increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw,
that to live by one man's will, became the cause of all men's
misery. This constrained them to come unto laws wherein
all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penal-
ties of transsressino; them. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. I. i. sect. 10.

286 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

ment. And thus much may suffice to shew,
that as far as we have any light from history,
we have reason to conclude, that all peaceful
beginnings of government have been laid in the
consent of the 'people. I say peaceful, because
I shall have occasion in another place to speak
of conquest, which some esteem a way of
beginning of governments.

The other objection I find urged against the
beginning of polities in the way 1 have men-
tioned, is this, viz.

§. 113. That all men being born under govern-
ment, some or other, it is impossible any of them
should ever be free, and at liberty to unite
together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to
erect a lauf id government.

If this argument be good; I ask, how came
so many lawful monarchies into the world? for
if any body, upon this supposition, can shew
me any one man in any age of the world free
to begin a lawful monarchy, I will be bound to
shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the
same time to unite and begin a new government
under a regal, or any other form ; it being
demonstration, that if any one, born under the
dominion of another, may be no free as to have
a right to command others in a new and distinct
empire, every one that is born under the dominion
of another may be so free too, and may become
a ruler, or subject, of a distinct separate govern-
ment. And so by this their own principle,
either all men, however born, are free, or else

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 287

there is but one lawful prince, one lawful govern-
ment in the world. And then they have nothing
to do, but barely to shew us which that is ; which
when they have done, I doubt not but all man-
kind will easily agree to pay obedience to him.

§. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to
their objection, to shew that it involves them
in the same difficulties that it doth those they
use it against; yet I shall endeavour to discover
the weakness of this argument a little farther.

All men, say they, are born under government,
and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a
neiv one. Every one is bom a subject to his
father or his prince, and is therefore under the
perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. It is
plain mankind never owned nor considered
any such natural subjection that they were born
in, to one or to the other that tied them, with-
out their own consents, to a subjection to them
and their heirs.

§. 115. For there are no examples so fre-
quent in history, both sacred and profane, as
those of men withdrawing themselves, and their
obedience from the jurisdiction they were born
under, and the family or community they were
bred up in, and setting up new governments in
other places ; from whence sprang all that
number of petty commonwealths in the begin-
ning of ages, and which always multiplied, as
long as there was room enough, till tiie stronger,
or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and
those great ones again breaking to pieces,

288 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

dissolved into lesser dominions. All which
are so many testimonies against paternal
sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not
the natural right of the father descending to
his heirs, that made governments in the begin-
ning, since it was impossible, upon that ground,
there should have been so many little king-
doms ; all must have been but only one universal
monarchy, if men had not been at liberty to
separate themselves from their families, and
the government, be it what it will, that was
set up in it, and go and make distinct common-
wealths and other governments as they thought
fit.

§. 116. This has been the practice of the
world from its first beginning to this day ; nor
is it now any more hindrance to the freedom
of mankind, that they are bom under constituted
and ancient polities, that have established laws,
and set forms of government, than if they were
born in the woods, amongst the unconfined
inhabitants, that run loose in them: for those,
who would persuade us, that by being bom
under any government, ive are naturally subjects
to it, and have no more any title or pretence to
the freedom of the state of nature, have no other
reason (bating that of paternal power, which
we have already answered) to produce for it,
but only, because our fathers or progenitors
passed away their natural liberty, and thereby
bound up themselves and their posterity to a
perpetual subjection to the government, which

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 289

they themselves submitted to. It is true, that
whatever engagements or promises any one has
made for himself, he is under the obligation of
them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever,
bind his children or posterity : for his son, when
a man, being altogether as free as the father,
any act of the father can no more give away the
liberty of the son, than it can of any body else :
he may indeed annex such conditions to the
land, he enjoyed as a subject of any common-
wealth, as may oblige his son to be of that
community, if he will enjoy those possessions
which were his fathers ; because that estate
being his father's property, he may dispose, or
settle it, as he pleases.

§. 117. And this has generally given the oc-
casion to mistake in this matter ; because com-
monwealths not permitting any part of their
dominions to be dismembered, nor to be
enjoyed by any but those of their community,
the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions
of his father, but under the same terms his
father did, by becoming a member of the
society; whereby he puts himself presently
under the government he finds there established,
as much as any other subject of that common-
wealth. And thus the consent of free men
bom under government, which only makes them
members of it, being given separately in their
turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in
a multitude together; people take no notice
of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not

u

290 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects
as they are men.

§. 118. But, it is plain governments them-
selves understand it otherwise ; they claim no
power over the son, because of that they had
over the father; nor look on children as being
their subjects, by their fathers being* so. If a
subject of England have a child, by an En-
glish woman in France, whose subject is he?
Not the king of England" s ; for he must have
leave to be admitted to the privileges of it :
nor the king of France's; for how then has his
father a liberty to bring him away, and breed
him as he pleases? and whoever was judged
as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred
against a country, for being barely born in it
of parents that were aliens there ? It is plain
then, by the practice of governments them-
selves, as well as by the law of right reason,
that a child is born a subject of no country or
government. He is under his father's tuition
and authority, till he comes to age of discre-
tion ; and then he is a freeman, at liberty what
government he will put himself under, what
body politic he will unite himself to : for if an
Englishman s son, born in France, be at liberty,
and may do so, it is evident there is no tie
upon him by his father's being a subject of
this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any
compact of his ancestors. And why then hath
not his son, by the same reason, the same
liberty, though he be born any where else?

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 291

Since -the power that a father hath naturally
over his children, is the same, wherever they
be born, and the ties of natural obligations are
not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms
and commonwealths.

§. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed,
naturally free, and nothing being able to put
him into subjection to any earthly power, but
only his own consent; it is to be considered,
what shall be understood to be a sufficient
declaration of a man's consent, to make him
subject to the laws of any government. There
is a common distinction of an express and
tacit consent, which will concern our present
case. Nobody doubts but an express consent,
of any man entering into any society, makes
him a perfect member of that society, a sub-
ject of that government. The difficulty is,
what ought to be looked upon as a tacit con-
sent, and how far it binds, i. e. how far any
one shall be looked on to have consented, and
thereby submitted to any government, where
he has made no expressions of it at all. And
to this I say, that every man, that hath any
possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the
dominions of any government, doth thereby
give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged
to obedience to the laws of that government,
during such enjoyment, as any one under it;
whether this his possession be of land, to him
and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a
week ; or whether it be barely travelling freely

u 2

292 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

on the highway ; and in effect, it reaches as fai
as the very being of any one within the territo-
ries of that government.

§. 120. To understand this the better, it is
fit to consider, that every man, when he at
first incorporates himself into any common-
wealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto,
annexes also, and submits to the community,
those posssessions, which he has, or shall
acquire, that do not already belong to any
other government: for it would be a direct
contradiction, for any one to enter into society
with others for the securing and regulating of
property ; and yet to suppose his land, whose
property is to be regulated by the laws of the
society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction
of that government, to which he himself, the
proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the
same act therefore, whereby any one unites his
person, which was before free, to any common-
wealth ; by the same he unites his possessions,
which were before free, to it also ; and they
become, both of them, person and possession,
subject to the government and dominion of
that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being.
Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inhe-
ritance, purchase, permission, or otherways,
enjoys any part of the land, so annexed to, and
under the government of that commonwealth,
must take it with the condition it is under; that
is, of submitting to the government of the com-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 293

■momvealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as
far forth as any subject of it.

§. 121. But since the government has a di-
rect jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches
the possessor of it, (before he has actually in-
corporated himself in the society) only as he
dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation
any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment,
to submit to the government , begins and ends
with the enjoyment; so that whenever the
owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit
consent to the government, will, by donation,
sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he
is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into
any other commonwealth; or to agree with
others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in
any part of the world, they can find free and
unpossessed : whereas, he that has once, by
actual agreement, and any express declaration,
given his consent to be of any commonwealth,
is perpetually and indispensibly obliged to be,
and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can
never be again in the liberty of the state of
nature ; unless, by any calamity, the govern-
ment he was under comes to be dissolved ; or
else by some public act cuts him off from being
any longer a member of it.

§. 122. But submitting to the laws of any
country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges
and protection under them, makes not a man
member of that society: this is only a local
protection and homage due to and from all

294 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

those, who, not being in a state of war, come
within the territories belonging' to any govern-
ment, to all parts whereof the force of its laws
extends. But this no more makes a man a
member of that society, a perpetual subject of
that commonwealth, than it would make a man
a subject to another, in whose family he found
it convenient to abide for some time ; though,
whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to
comply with the laws, and submit to the go-
vernment he found there. And thus we see,
that foreigners, by living all their lives under
another government, and enjoying the privi-
leges and protection of it, though they are
bound, even in conscience, to submit to its
administration, as far forth as any denison ;
yet do not thereby come to be subjects or mem-
bers of that commonwealth. Nothing can
make any man so, but his actually entering
into it by positive engagement, and express
promise and compact. This is that which I
think concerning the beginning of political
societies, and that consent which makes any one
a member of any commonwealth.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Ends of Political Society and
Government.

%. 123. If man in the state of nature be so
free, as has been said ; if he be absolute lord

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 295

of his own person and possessions, equal to
the greatest, and subject to no body, why will
he part with his freedom ? why will he give up
this empire, and subject himself to the domi-
nion and controul of any other power? To
which it is obvious to answer, that though in
the state of nature he hath such a right, yet
the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and con-
stantly exposed to the invasion of others : for
all being kings as much as he, every man his
equal, and the greater part no strict observers
of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the
property he has in this state is very unsafe,
very unsecure. This makes him willing to
quit a condition, which, however free, is full
of fears and continual dangers : and it is not
without reason, that he seeks out, and is
willing to join in society with others, who are
already united, to have a mind to unite, for
the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties
and estates, which I call by the general name,
property.

%. 124. The great and chief end, therefore,
of men's uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their properly. To which in
the state of nature there are many things
wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled,
known law, received and allowed by common
consent to be the standard of right and wrong,
and the common measure to decide all con-

296 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

troversies between them : for though the law of
nature be plain and intelligible to all rational
creatures ; yet men being biassed by their in-
terest, as well as ignorant for want of study of
it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding
to them in the application of it to their parti-
cular cases.

§. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature
there wants a known unci indifferent judge, with
authority to determine all differences according
to the established law : for every one in that
state being both judge and executioner of the
law of nature, men being partial to themselves,
passion and revenge is very apt to carry them
too far, and with too much heat, in their own
cases ; as well as negligence, and uncon-
cernedness, to make them to remiss in other
men's.

§. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there
often wants poiuer to back and support the sen-
tence when right, and to give it due execution.
They who by any injustice offended, will
seldom fail, where they are able, by force to
make good their injustice ; such resistance
many times makes the punishment dangerous,
and frequently destructive, to those who
attempt it.

<§. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all
the privileges of the state of nature, being but
in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are
quickly driven into society. Hence it comes
to pass, that we seldom find any number of

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 297

men live any time together in this state. The
inconveniencies that they are therein exposed
to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of
the power every man has of punishing the trans-
gressions of others, make them take sanctuary
under the established laws of government, and
therein seek the preservation of their property.
It is this makes them so willingly give up every
one his single power of punishing, to be exer-
cised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it
amongst them ; and by such rules as the com-
munity, or those authorized by them to that
purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have
the original right and rise of both the legislative
and executive poiver, as well as of the govern-
ments and societies themselves.

§. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit
the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man
has two powers.

The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for
the preservation of himself, and others within
the permission of the law of nature: by which
law, common to them all, he and all the rest of
mankind are one community, make up one
society, distinct from all other creatures. And
were it not for the corruption and vitiousness
of degenerate men, there would be no need of
any other ; no necessity that men should sepa-
rate from this great and natural community,
and by positive agreements combine into
smaller and divided associations.

The other power a man has in the state of

298 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

nature, is the power to punish the crimes com-
mitted against that law. Both these he gives
up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it,
or particular politic society, and incorporates
into any commonwealth, separate from the rest
of mankind.

§. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatso-
ever he thought for the preservation of himself,
and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regu-
lated by laws made by the society, so far forth
as the preservation of himself, and the rest of
that society shall require ; which laws of the
society in many things confine the liberty he
had by the law of nature.

§. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he
wholly gives up, and engages his natural force,
(which he might before employ in the execution
of the law of nature, by his own single authority,
as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of
the society, as the law thereof shall require : for
being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy
many conveniencies from the labour, assistance,
and society of others in the same community,
as well as protection from its whole strength ;
he is to part also with as much of his natural
liberty, in providing for himself, as the good
prosperity, and safety of the society shall re-
quire ; which is not only necessary, but just,
since the other members of the society do the
like.

§. 131. But though men, when they enter
into society, give up the equality, liberty, and

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 299

executive power they had in the state of nature,
into the hands of the society, to be so far
disposed of by the legislative, as the good of
the society shall require ; yet it being only with
an intention in every one the better to preserve
himself, his liberty and property ; (for no
rational creature can be supposed to change his
condition with an intention to be worse) the
power of the society, or legislative constituted
by them, can never be supposed to extend far I her
than the common good ; but is obliged to secure
every one's property, by providing against those
three defects above mentioned, that made the
state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so
whoever has the legislative or supreme power
of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by
established standing laivs, promulgated and
known to the people, and not by extemporary
decrees ; by indifferent and upright judges,
who are to decide controversies by those laws;
and to employ the force of the community at
home, only in the execution of such laws, or
abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries,
and secure the community from inroads and
invasion. And all this to be directed to no
other end, but the peace, safety, and public good
of the people.

300 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER X.

Of the Forms of a Commonwealth.

%. 132. The majority having, as has been
shewed, upon men's first uniting into society,
the whole power of the community naturally in
them, may employ all that power in making
laws for the community from time to time, and
executing those laws by officers of their own
appointing : and then the form of the govern-
ment is a perfect democracy : or else may put
the power of making laws into the hands of a
few select men, and their heirs or successors;
and then it is an oligarchy : or else into the
hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy :
if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary
monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his
death the power only of nominating a successor
to return to them an elective monarchy. And
so accordingly of these the community may
make compounded and mixed forms of govern-
ment, as they think good. And if the legisla-
tive power be at first given by the majority to
one or more persons only for their lives, or any
limited time, and then the supreme power to
revert to them again; when it is so reverted,
the community may dispose of it again anew
into what hands they please, and so constitute
a new form of government : for the form of
goverment depending upon the placing the su-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 301

preme power, which is the legislative, it being
impossible to conceive that an inferior power
should prescribe to a superior, or any but the
supreme make laws, according 1 as the power
of making laws is placed, such is the form of
the commonwealth.

§. 133. By commonwealth, I must be under-
stood all along to mean, not a democracy, or
any form of government, but any independent
community, which the Latins signified by the
word civitas, to which the word which best
answers in our language, is commonwealth, and
most properly expresses such a society of men,
which community or city in English does not;
for there may be subordinate communities in a
government ; and city amongst us has a quite
different notion from commonwealth : and
therefore to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to
use the word commonwealth in that sense, in
which I find it used by king James the first ;
and I take it to be its genuine signification;
which if any body dislike, I consent with him
to change it for a better.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.

§. 134. The great end of men's entering into
society, being the enjoyment of their properties
in peace and safety, and the great instrument
and means of that being the laws established in

302 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

that society; the first and fundamental positive
law of all commonwealths is the establishing of
the legislative power : as the first and funda-
mental natural law, which is to govern even the
legislative itself, is the preservation of the society ;
and (as far as will consist with the public
good) of every person in it. This legislative is
not only the supreme power of the common-
wealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands
where the community have once placed it : nor
can any edict of any body else, in what form
soever conceived, or by what power soever
backed, have the force and obligation of a law,
which has not its sanction from that legislative
which the public has chosen and appointed :
for without this the law could not have that,
which is absolutely necessary to its being a
law, * the consent of the society, over whom no
body can have a power to make laws, but by
their own consent, and by authority received

* The lawful power of making laws to command whole
politic societies of men, belonging so properly unto the
same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what
kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and
not by express commission immediately and personnally re-
ceived from God, or else by authority derived at the first
from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws,
it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not there-
fore which public approbation hath not made so. Hooker's
Eccl. Pol. I. i. sect. 10. Of this point therefore we are to
note, that sith men naturally have no full and perfect power
to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utter-
ly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. .303

from them ; and therefore all the obedience,
which by the most solemn ties any one can be
obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this
supreme power, and is directed by those laws
which it enacts : nor can any oaths to any foreign
power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate
power, discharge any member of the society
from his obedience to the legislative, acting pur-
suant to their trust : nor oblige him to any
obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or
farther than they do allow ; it being ridiculous
to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey
any power in the society, which is not the
supreme.

\. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed
in one or more, whether it be always in being, or
or only by intervals, though it be the supreme
power in every commonwealth ; yet,

First, It is not, nor can possibly be abso-
lutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of
the people: for it being but the joint power of
every member of the society given up to that
person or assembly, which is legislator ; it can
be no more than those persons had in a state
of nature before they entered into society, and
gave up to the community : for no body can
transfer to another more power than he has in

command ment living. And to be commanded we do consent,
when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time
before consented, without revoking the same after by the like
universal agreement.

Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available
bv consent. Ibid.

304 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary
power over himself, or over any other, to de-
stroy his own life, or take away the life or pro-
perty of another. A man, as has been proved,
cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power
of another ; and having in the state of nature
no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or
possession of another, but only so much as the
law of nature gave him for the preservation of
himself, and the rest of mankind ; this is all he
doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and
by it to the legislative power, so that the legis-
lative can have no more than this. Their
power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to
the public good of the society. It is a power,
that hath no other end but preservation, and
therefore can never* have a right to destroy,

* Two foundations there are which bear up public socie-
ties ; the one a natural inclination, whereby all men desire
sociable life and fellowship ; the other an order, expressly or
secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in
living together: the latter is that which we call the law of
a common-weal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts
whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work
in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws poli-
tic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men,
are never framed as they should be, unless presuming tire
will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse
from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature ; in a
word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved
mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly
provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions,
that they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which
societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not
perfect. Hookers Eccl. Pol. L i. sect. 10.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 305

enslave, or designedly to impoverish the sub-
jects. The obligations of the law of nature
cease not in society, but only in many cases
are drawn closer, and have by human laws
known penalties annexed to them, to inforce
their observation. Thus the law of nature
stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators
as well as others. The rules that they make
for other men's actions, must, as well as their
own and other men's actions, be conformable
to the law of nature, i. e. to the will of God,
of which that is a declaration, and the funda-
mental law of nature being the preservation of
mankind, no human sanction can be good, or
valid against it.

§. 136. Secondly, * The legislative, or su-
preme authority, cannot assume to itself a
power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees,
but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the
rights of the subject by promulgated standing
laws, and known authorized judges : for the law
of nature being unwritten, and so no where
to be found but in the minds of men, they who

• Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions
they must direct, howbeit such measures they are as have
also their higher rules to be measured by, which rules are
two, the law of God, and the law of nature ; so that laws
human must be made according to the general laws of nature,
and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture,
otherwise they are ill made. Hooker s Eccl. Pol. I. hi. sect. 9.

To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem
unreasonable. Ibid. I. i. sect. 10.

X

300 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

through passion or interest shall miscite, or
misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of
their mistake where there is no established
judge : and so it serves not, as it ought, to
determine the rights, and fence the properties
of those that live under it, especially where
every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner
of it too, and that in his own case : and he
that has right on his side, having ordinarily
but his own single strength, hath not force
enough to defend himself from injuries, or to
punish delinquents. To avoid these inconve-
niencies, which disorder men's properties in
the state of nature, men unite into societies,
that they may have the united strength of the
whole society to secure and defend their pro-
perties, and may have standing rules to bound
it, by which every one may know what is his.
To this end it is that men give up all their
natural power to the society which they enter
into, and the community put the legislative
power into such hands as they think fit, with
this trust, that they shall be governed by de-
clared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and pro-
perty will still be at the same uncertainty, as it
was in the state of nature.

§. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or govern-
ing without settled standing laws, can neither
of them consist with the ends of society and
government, which men would not quit the
freedom of the state of nature for, and tie
themselves up under, were it not to preserve

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 307

their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by slated
rules of right and property to secure their
peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that
they should intend, had they a power so to do,
to give any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary
•power over their persons and estates, and put a
force into the magistrate's hand to execute his
unlimited will arbitrary upon them. This were
to put themselves into a worse condition than
the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty
to defend their right against the injuries of
others, and were upon equal terms of force to
maintain it, whether invaded by a single man,
or many in combination. Whereas by suppo-
sing they have given up themselves to the
absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator,
they have disarmed themselves, and armed
him, to make a prey of them when he pleases ;
he being in a much worse condition, who is
exposed to the arbitrary power of one man,
who has the command of 100,000, than he
that is exposed to the arbitrary power of
100,000 single men ; no body being secure,
that his will, who has such a command, is
better than that of other men, though his force
be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore,
whatever form the commonwealth is under,
the ruling power ought to govern by declared
and received laws, and not by extemporary
dictates and undetermined resolutions: for
then mankind will be in a far worse condition
than in the state of nature, if they shall have

x -2

303 OP CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

armed one, or a few men with the joint power
of a multitude, to force them to obey at plea-
sure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of
their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till
that moment unknown wills, without having
any measures set down which may guide and
justify their actions : for all the power the
government has, being only for the good of the
society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at
pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by esta-
blished and promulgated laws; that both the
people may know their duty, and be safe and
secure within the limits of the law ; and the
rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be
tempted, by the power they have in their hands,
to employ it to such purposes, and by such
measures, as they would not have known, and
own not willingly.

§. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot
take from any man any part of his property
without his own consent: for the preservation
of property being the end of government, and
that for which men enter into society, it neces-
sarily supposes and requires, that the people
should have property, without which they must
be supposed to lose that, by entering into
society, which was the end for which they
entered into it ; too gross an absurdity for any
man to own. Men therefore in society having
property, they have such a right to the goods,
which by the law of the community are theirs,
that nobody hath a right to take their sub-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 309

stance or any part of it from them, without
their own consent : without this they have no
property at all ; for I have truly no property in
that, wich another can by right take from me,
when he pleases, against my consent. Hence
it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or
legislative power of any commonwealth can do
what it will, and dispose of the estates of the
subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them
at pleasure. This is not much to be feared
in governments where the legislative consists,
wholly or in part, in assemblies which are
variable, whose members, upon the dissolution
of the assembly, are subjects under the com-
mon laws of their country, equally with the
rest. But in governments, where the legislative
is in one lasting assembly always in being, or
in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there
is danger still, that they will think themselves
to have a distinct interest from the rest of the
community ; and so will be apt to increase
their own riches and power, by taking what
they think fit from the people : for a man's
property is not at all secure, though there be
good and equitable laws to set the bounds of
it between him and his fellow-subjects, if he
who commands those subjects have power to
take from any private man, what part he
pleases of his property, and use and dispose of
it as he thinks good.

§. 139. But government, into whatsoever
hands it is put, being, as I have before shewed,

310 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

intrusted with this condition, and for this end,
that men might have and secure their proper-
ties; the prince, or senate, however it may
have power to make laws, for the regulating
of property between the subjects one amongst
another, yet can never have a power to take to
themselves the whole, or any part of the sub-
jects property, without their own consent: for
this would be in effect to leave them no pro-
perty at all. And to let us see, that even
absolute power, where it is necessary, is not
arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited
by that reason, and confined to those ends,
which required it in some cases to be absolute,
we need look no farther than the common
practice of martial discipline: for the preser-
vation of the army, and in it of the whole
commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience
to the command of every superior officer, and
it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most
dangerous or unreasonable of them ; but yet
we see, that neither the serjeant, that could
command a soldier to march up to the mouth
of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is
almost sure to perish, can command that sol-
dier to give him one penny of his money ; nor
the general, that can condemn him to death
for deserting his post, or for not obeying the
most desperate orders, can yet, with all his
absolute power of life and death, dispose of
one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize
one jot of his goods ; whom yet he can com-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. .'ill

maud any thing-, and hang for the least dis-
obedience; because such a blind obedience
is necessary to that end, for which the com-
mander has his power, viz. the preservation of
the rest; but the disposing of his goods has
nothing to do with it.

§. 140. It is true, governments cannot be
supported without great charge, and it is lit
every one who enjoys his share of the protec-
tion should pay out of his estate his proportion
for the maintenance of it. But still it must be
with his own consent, i. e. the consent of the
majority, giving it either by themselves, or their
representatives chosen by them : for if any one
shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the
people, by his own authority, and without such
consent of the people, he thereby invades the
fundamental law of property, and subverts the
end of government : for what property have I
in that, which another may by right take, when
he pleases, to himself?

§. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot
transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands : for it being but a delegated power from
the people, they who have it cannot pass it
over to others. The people alone can appoint
the form of the commonwealth, which is by
constituting the legislative, and appointing in
whose hands that shall be. And when the
people have said, We will submit to rules, and
be governed by laws made by such men, and
in such forms, no bodv else can say other men

312 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

shall make laws for them ; nor can the people
be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted
by those whom they have chosen, and autho-
rized to make laws for them. The power of
the legislative, being derived from the people
by a positive voluntary grant and institution,
can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laivs, and
not to make legislators, the legislative can have
no power to transfer their authority of making
laws, and place it in other hands.

§. 142. These are the bounds, which the
trust, that is put in them by the society, and
the law of God and nature, have set to the legis-
lative power of every commonwealth, in all
forms of government.

First, they are to govern by promulgated
established laics, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor,
for the favourite at court, and the country man
at plough.

Secondly, These laws also ought to be de-
signed for no other end ultimately, but the good
of the people.

Thirdly, they must not raise Taxes on the
property of the people, without the consent of the
people, given by themselves, or their deputies.
And this properly concerns only such govern-
ments, where the legislative is always in being,
or at least where the people have not reserved
any part of the legislative to deputies, to be
from time to time chosen bv themselves.

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 313

Fourthly, the legislative neither must nor can
transfer the power of making laws to any body
else, or place it any where, but where the
people have.

CHAPTER XII.

Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative
Power of the Commonwealth.

§. 143. The legislative power is that, which
has a right to direct how the force of the com-
monwealth shall be employed for preserving
the community and members of it. But because
those laws which are constantly to be executed,
and whose force is always to continue, may be
made in a little time ; therefore there is no
need, that the legislative should be always in
being, not having always business to do. And
because it may be too great a temptation to
human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the
same persons, who have the power of making-
laws, to have also in their hands the power to
execute them, whereby they may exempt them-
selves from obedience to the laws they make,
and suit the law, both in its making, and execu-
tion, to their own private advantage, and thereby
come to have a distinct interest from the rest
of the community, contrary to the end of
society and government: therefore in well-
ordered commonwealths, where the good of
the whole is so considered, as it ought, the

314 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

legislative power is put into the hands of divers
persons, who duly assembled, have by them-
selves, or jointly with others, a power to make
laws, which when they have done, being sepa-
rated again, they are themselves subject to the
laws they have made ; which is a new and near
tie upon them, to take care, that they make
them for the public good.

§. 144. But because the laws, that are at
once, and in a short time made, have a constant
and lasting force, and need a perpetual execu-
tion, or an attendance thereunto ; therefore it
is necessary there should be a power always
in being, which should see to the execution
of the laws that are made, and remain in
force. And thus the legislative and executive
power come often to be separated.

§. 145. There is another power in every
commonwealth* which one may call natural,
because it is that which answers to the power
every man naturally had before he entered into
society : for though in a commonwealth the
members of it are distinct persons still in refer-
ence to one another, and as such are governed
by the laws of the society; yet in reference to
the rest of mankind, they make one body,
which is, as every member of it before was,
stilt in the state of nature with the rest of man-
kind. Hence it is, that the controversies that
happen between any man of the society with
those that are out of it, are managed by the
public; and an injury done to a member of

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 315

their body, engages the whole in the reparation
of it. So that under this consideration, the
whole community is one body in the state of
nature, in respect of all other states or persons
out of its community.

§. 146. This therefore contains the power of
war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all
the transactions, with all persons and commu-
nities without the commonwealth, and may be
called federative, if any one pleases. So the
thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the
name.

§. 147. These two powers, executive and
federative, though they be really distinct in
themselves, yet one comprehending the execu-
tion of the municipal laws of the society within
itself, upon all that are parts of it ; the other the
management of the security and interest of the
public without, with all those that it may receive
benefit or damage from, yet they are always
almost united. And though this federative
power in the well or ill management of it be of
great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is
much less capable to be directed by antecedent,
standing, positive laws, than the executive ;
and so must necessarily be left to the prudence
and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to
be managed for the public good : for the laws
that concern subjects one amongst another,
being to direct their actions, may well enough
precede them. But what is to be done iu refer-
ence to foreigners, depending much upon their

316 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

actions, and the variation of designs and
interests, must be left in great part to the pru-
dence of those, who have this power committed
to them, to be managed by the best of their
skill, for the advantage of the commonwealth.
§. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and
federative power of every community be really
distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be
separated, and placed at the same time, in the
hands of distinct persons : for both of them re-
quiring the force of the society for their exer-
cise, it is almost impracticable to place the force
of the commonwealth in distinct, and not sub-
ordinate hands ; or that the executive and fede-
rative power should be placed in persons, that
might act separately, whereby the force of the
public would be under different commands :
which would be apt some time or other to cause
disorder and ruin.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of the Subordination of the Powers of the
Commonwealth.

§. 149. Though in a constituted common-
wealth, standing upon its own basis, and acting
according to its own nature, that is, acting for
the preservation of the community, there can
be but one supreme power, which is the legis-
lative, to which all the rest are and must be
subordinate, yet the legislative being only a

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 317

fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there
remains still in the people a supreme power to
remove or alter the legislative, when they find
the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed
in them : for all power given with trust for the
attaining an end, being- limited by that end,
whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or
opposed, the trust must necessarily he forfeited,
and the power devolve into the hands of those
that gave it, who may place it anew where they
shall think best for their safety and security.
And thus the community perpetually retains a
supreme power of saving themselves from the
attempts and designs of any body, even of their
legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish,
or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs
against the liberties and properties of the sub-
ject : for no man or society of men, having a
power to deliver up their preservation, or con-
sequently the means of it, to the absolute will
and arbitrary dominion of another ; whenever
any one shall go about to bring them into such
a slavish condition, they will always have a
right to preserve what they have not a power to
part with : and to rid themselves of those who
invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalter-
able law of self-preservation, for which they en-
tered into society. And thus the community
may be said in this respect to be always the su-
preme power, but not as considered under any
form of government, because this power of the
people can never take place till the government
be dissolved.

318 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

§. 150. In all cases, whilst the government
subsists, the legislative is the supreme power:
for what can give laws to another, must needs
be superior to him ; and since the legislative is
no otherwise legislative of the society, but by
the right it has to make laws for all the parts,
and for every member of the society, prescrib-
ing rules to their actions, and giving power of
execution, where they are transgressed, the
legislative must needs be the supreme, and all
other powers, in any members or parts of the
society, derived from and subordinate to it.

§. 151. In some commonwealths, where the
legislative is not always in being, and the execu-
tive is vested in a single person, who has also a
share in the legislative ; there that single person
in a very tolerable sense may also be called
supreme : not that he has in himself all the su-
preme power, which is that of law-making ; but
because he has in him the supreme execution,
from whom all inferior magistrates derive all
their several subordinate powers, or at least the
greatest part of them : having also no legisla-
tive superior to him, there being no law to be
made without his consent, which cannot be
expected should ever subject him to the other
part of the legislative, he is properly enough in
this sense supreme. But yet it is to be observed
that though oaths of allegiance and fealty are
taken to him, it is not to him as supreme legis-
lator, but as supreme executor of the law, made
by a joint power of him with others ; allegiance

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 319

being nothing but an obedience according- to law,
which when he violates, he has no right to obe-
dience, nor can claim it otherwise than as the
public person vested with the power of the law,
and so is to be considered as the image,
phantom, or representative of the common-
wealth, acted by the will of the society, de-
clared in its laws ; and thus he has no will, no
power, but that of the law. But when he quits
this representation, this public will, and acts by
his own private will, he degrades himself, and
is but a single private person without power,
and without will, that has any right to obedience;
the members owing no obedience but to the
public will of the society.

§. 152. The executive power, placed any-
where but in a person that has also a share in
the legislative, is visibly subordinate and ac-
countable to it, and may be at pleasure changed
and displaced ; so that it is not the supreme
executive power, that is exempt from subordi-
nation, but the supreme executive power vested
in one, who having a share in the legislative,
has no distinct superior legislative to be sub-
ordinate and accountable to, farther than he
himself shall join and consent ; so that he is no
more subordinate than he himself shall think
fit, which one may certainly conclude will be
but very little. Of other ministerial and subor-
dinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not
speak, they being so multiplied with infinite
variety, in the different customs and constitu-

320 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

tions of distinct commonwealths, that it is im-
possible to give a particular account of them
all. Only thus much, which is necessary to
our present purpose, we may take notice of
concerning them, that they have no manner of
authority, any of them, beyond what is by
positive grant and commission delegated to
them, and are all of them accountable to some
other power in the commonwealth.

§. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much
as convenient, that the legislative should
be always in being; but absolutely neces-
sary that the executive power should, because
there is not always need of new laws to be
made, but always need of execution of the
laws that are made. When the legislative
hath put the execution of the laws, they make,
into other hands, they have a power still to
resume it out of those hands, when they find
cause, and to punish for any mal- ad ministration
against the laws. The same holds also in
regard of the federative power, that and the
executive being both ministerial and subordinate
to the legislative, which, as has been shewed, in
a constituted commonwealth is the supreme.
The legislative also in this case being supposed
to consist of several persons, (for if it be a
single person, it cannot but be always in being,
and so will, as supreme, naturally have the
supreme executive power, together with the
legislative) may assemble, and exercise their
legislature, at the times that either their original

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 321

constitution, or their own adjournment, appoints,
or when they please ; if neither of these hath
appointed any time, or there be no other way
prescribed to convoke them : for the supreme
power being- placed in them by the people, it
is always in them, and they may exercise it
when they please, unless by their original con-
stitution, they are limited to certain seasons,
or by an act of their supreme power they have
adjourned to a certain time ; and when that
time comes, they have a right to assemble and
act again.

§. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be
made up of representatives chosen for that time
by the people, which afterwards return into the
ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in
the legislature but upon a new choice, this
power of ch using must also be exercised by
the people, either at certain appointed seasons,
or else when they are summoned to it; and
in this latter case, the power of convoking the
legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive,
and has one of these two limitations in respect
of time : that either the original constitution
requires their assembling and acting at certain
intervals, and then the executive power does
nothing but ministerially issue directions for
their electing and assembling, according to
due forms ; or else it is left to his prudence to
call them by new elections, when the occasions
or exigencies of the public require the amend-
ment of old, or making of new laws, or the re-

Y

322 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

dress or prevention of any inconveniencies, that
lie on, or threaten the people.

§. 155. It may be demanded here, What if
the executive power, being possessed of the
force of the commonwealth, shall make use of
that force to hinder the meeting and acting of
the legislative, when the original constitution,
or the public exigencies require it? I say,
using force upon the people without authority,
and contrary to the trust put in him that does
so, is a state of war with the people, who have
aright to reinstate their legislative in the exercise
of their power : for having erected a legislative,
with an intent they should exercise the power
of making laws, either at certain set times, or
when there is need of it, when they are hin-
dered by any force from what is so necessary
to the society, and wherein the safety and
preservation of the people consists, the people
have a right to remove it by force. In all
state and conditions, the true remedy of force
without authority, is to oppose force to it.
The use of force without authority always puts
him that uses it into a state of tear, as the ag-
gressor, and renders him liable to be treated ac-
cordingly.

<§. 156. The poiver of assembling and dismis-
sing the legislative, placed in the executive,
gives not the executive a superiority over it, but
is a fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety
of the people, in a case where the uncertainty
and variableness of human affairs could not
bear a steady fixed rule: for it not being

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 323

possible, that the first framers of the govern-
ment should, by any foresight, be so much
masters of future events, as to be able to prefix
so just periods of return and duration to the
assemblies of the legislative, in all times to
come, that might exactly answer all the exi-
gencies of the commonwealth ; the best reme-
dy could be found for this defect, was to trust
this to the prudence of one who was always
to be present, and whose business it was to
watch over the public good. Constant fre-
quent meetings of the legislative, and long con-
tinuations of their assemblies, without neces-
sary occasion, could not but be burdensome
to the people, and must necessarily in time
produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and
yet the quick turn of affairs might be some-
times such as to need their present help : any
delay of their convening might endanger the
public ; and sometimes too their business might
be so great, that the limited time of their
sitting might be too short for their work, and
rob the public of that benefit which could be
had only from their mature deliberation. What
then could be done in this case to prevent the
community from being exposed some time or
other to eminent hazard, on one side or the
other, by fixed intervals and periods, set to the
meeting and acting of the legislative, but to in-
trust it to the prudence of some, who being
present, and acquainted with the state of pub-
lic affairs, might make use of this prerogative

y 2

324 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

for the public good? and where else could
this be so well placed as in his hands, who
was intrusted with the execution of the laws
for the same end ? Thus supposing the regula-
tion of times for the assembling and sitting of
the legislative, not settled by the original con-
stitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the
executive, not as an arbitrary power depend-
ing on his good pleasure, but with this trust
always to have it exercised only for the public
weal, as the occurrences of times and change
of affairs might require. Whether settled pe-
riods of their convening, or a liberty left to the
prince for convoking the legislative, or perhaps a
mixture of both, hath the least inconvenience
attending it, it is not my business here to en-
quire, but only to shew, that though the execu-
tive power may have the prerogative of con-
voking and dissolving such conventions of the
legislative, yet it is not thereby superior to it.

§. 157. Things of this world are in so con-
stant a flux, that nothing remains long in the
same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power,
change their stations, flourishing mighty cities
come to ruin, and prove in time neglected
desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented
places grow into populous countries, filled with
wealth and inhabitants. But things not always
changing equally, and private interest often
keeping up customs and privileges, when the
reasons of them are ceased, it often comes to
pass, that in governments, where part of the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 325

legislative consists of representatives chosen by
the people, that in tract of time this represen-
tation becomes very unequal and dispropor-
tionate to the reasons it was at first established
upon. To what gross absurdities the follow-
ing of custom, when reason has left it, may
lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the
bare name of a town, of which there remains
not so much as the ruins, where scarce so
much housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabi-
tants than a shepherd is to be found, sends as
many representatives to the grand assembly of
law-makers, as a whole county numerous in
people, and powerful in riches. This strangers
stand amazed at, and every one must confess
needs a remedy; though most think it hard
to find one, because the constitution of the
legislative being the original and supreme act
of the society, antecedent to all positive laws
in it, and depending wholly on the people, no
inferior power can alter it. And therefore the
people, when the legislative is once constituted,
having, in such a government as we have been
speaking of, no power to act as long as the go-
vernment stands ; this inconvenience is thought
incapable of a remedy.

§. 158. Solus populi suprema lex, is certainly
so just and fundamental a rule, that he, who
sincerely follows it, cannot dangerously err. If
therefore the executive, who has the power of
convoking the legislative, observing rather the
true proportion, than fashion of representation^

326 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

regulates, not by old custom, but true reason,
the number of members, in all places that have
a right to be distinctly represented, which no
part of the people however incorporated can
pretend to, but in proportion to the assistance
which it affords to the public, it cannot be
judged to have set up a new legislative, but to
have restored the old and true one, and to have
rectified the disorders which succession of time
had insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced :
For it being the interest as well as intention of
the people, to have a fair and equal representa-
tive; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an
undoubted friend to, and establisher of the
government, and cannot miss the consent and
approbation of the community; prerogative
being nothing but a power, in the hands of the
prince, to provide for the public good, in such
cases, which depending upon unforeseen and
uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable
laws could not safely direct; whatsoever shall
be done manifestly for the good of the people,
and the establishing the government upon its
true foundations, is and always will be, just
prerogative. The power of erecting new corpo-
rations, and therewith new representatives,
carries with it a supposition, that in time the
measures of representation might vary, and those
places have a just right to be represented which
before had none ; and by the same reason,
those cease to have a right, and be too incon-
siderable for such a privilege, which before

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 327

had it. 'Tis not a change from the present
state, which perhaps corruption or decay has
introduced, that makes an inroad upon the
government, but the tendency of it to injure or
oppress the people, and to set up one part or
party, with a distinction from, and an unequal
subjection of the rest. Whatsoever cannot but
be acknowledged to be of advantage to the
society, and people in general, upon just and
lasting measures, will always, when done, justify
itself; and whenever the people shall chuse
their representatives upon just and undeniably
equal measures, suitable to the original frame ot
the government, it cannot be doubted to be the
will and act of the society, whoever permitted
or caused them so to do.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF PREROGATIVE.

§. 159. Where the legislative and executive
power are in distinct hands, (as they are in all
moderated monarchies, and well-framed govern-
ments) there the good of the society requires,
that several things should be left to the discre-
tion of him that has the executive power : for the
legislators not being able to foresee, and
provide by laws, for all that may be useful to
the community, the executor of the laws,
having the power in his hands, has by the
common law of nature a right to make use of

328 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

it for the good of the society, in many cases,
where the municipal law has given no direction,
till the legislative can conveniently be assembled
to provide for it. Many things there are, which
the law can by no means provide for; and those
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him
that has the executive power in his hands, to
be ordered by him as the public good and
advantage shall require : nay, it is fit that the
laws themselves should in some cases give way
to the executive power, or rather to this funda-
mental law of nature and government, viz.
That as much as may be all the members of the
society are to be preserved : for since many
accidents may happen, wherein a strict and
rigid observation of the laws may do harm ;
(as not to pull down an innocent man's house
to stop the fire, when the next to it is burning)
and a man may come sometimes within the
reach of the law, which makes no distinction
of persons, by an action that may deserve
reward and pardon ; 'tis fit the ruler should
have a power, in many cases, to mitigate the
severity of the law, and pardon some offenders:
for the end of government being the preserva-
tion of all, as much as may be, even the guilty
are to be spared, where it can prove no preju-
dice to the innocent.

§. 160. This power to act according to dis-
cretion, for the public good, without the pres-
cription of the law, and sometimes even against
it, is that which is called prerogative: for since

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 329

in some governments the law-making power is
not always in being, and is usually too nume-
rous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requi-
site to execution ; and because also it is im-
possible to foresee, and so by laws to provide
for, all accidents and necessities that may con-
cern the public, or to make such laws as will
do no harm, if they are executed with an in-
flexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon
all persons that may come in their way ; there-
fore there is a latitude left to the executive
power, to do many things of choice which the
laws do not prescribe.

§. 161. This power, whilst employed for the
benefit of the community, and suitably to the
trust and ends of the government, is undoubted
prerogative, and never is questioned : for the
people are very seldom or never scrupulous or
nice in the point ; they are far from examining
prerogative, whilst it is in any tolerable degree
employed for the use it was meant, that is, for
the good of the people, and not manifestly
against it ; but if there comes to be a question
between the executive power and the people,
about a thing claimed as a prerogative ; the
tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to
the good or hurt of the people, will easily
decide that question.

§. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the
infancy of governments, when commonwealths
differed little from families in number of people,
they differed from them too but little in number

330 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

of laws : and the governors, being as the fathers
of them, watching over them for their good, the
government was almost a\\ prerogative. A few
established laws served the turn, and the dis-
cretion and care of the ruler supplied the rest.
But when mistake or flattery prevailed with
weak princes to make use of this power for
private ends of their own, and not for the public
good, the people were fain by express laws to
get prerogative determined in those points
wherein they found disadvantage from it: and
thus declared limitations of prerogative were by
the people found necessary in cases which they
and their ancestors had left, in the utmost
latitude, to the wisdom of those princes who
made no other but a right use of it, that is, for
the good of their people.

163. And therefore they have a very wrong
notion of government, who say, that the people
have incroached upon the prerogative, when they
have got any part of it to be defined by positive
laws : for in so doing they have not pulled
from the prince anything that of right belonged
to him, but only declared, that that power
which they indefinitely left in his or his ances-
tors hands, to be exercised for their good, was
not a thing which they intended him when he
used it otherwise: for the end of government
being the good of the community, whatsoever
alterations are made in it, tending to that end,
cannot be an incroachment upon any body, since
no body in government can have a right tending

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 331

to any other end : and those only are incroach-
metits which prejudice or hinder the public
good. Those who say otherwise, speak as if
the prince had a distinct and separate interest
from the good of the community, and was not
made for it; the root and source from which
spring almost all those evils and disorders which
happen in kingly governments. And indeed,
if that be so, the people under his govern-
ment are not a society of rational creatures,
entered into a community for their mutual
good ; they are not such as have set rulers over
themselves, to guard, and promote that good ;
but are to be looked on as an herd of inferior
creatures under the dominion of a master, who
keeps them and works them for his own plea-
sure or profit. If men were so void of reason,
and brutish, as to enter into society upon such
terms, prerogative might indeed be, what some
men would have it, an arbitrary power to do
things hurtful to the people.

§. 164. But since a rational creature cannot
be supposed, when free, to put himself into
subjection to another, for his own harm ;
(though, where he finds a good and wise ruler,
he may not perhaps think it either necessary or
useful to set precise bounds to his power in all
things) prerogative can be nothing but the
peoples permitting their rulers to do several
things, of their own free choice, where the law
was silent, and sometimes too against the
direct letter of the law, for the public good ;

332 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

and their acquiescing in it when so done : for
as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust
put into his hands, and careful of the good of
his people, cannot have too much prerogative,
that is, power to do good ; so a weak and ill
prince, who would claim that power which his
predecessors exercised without the direction
of the law, as a prerogative belonging to him
by right of his office, which he may exercise at
his pleasure, to make or promote an interest
distinct from that of the public, gives the people
an occasion to claim their right, and limit that
power, which, whilst it was exercised for their
good, they were content should be tacitly
allowed.

§. 165. And therefore he that will look into
the history of England, will find, that preroga-
tive was always largest in the hands of our
wisest and best princes ; because the people,
observing the whole tendency of their actions
to be the public good, contested not what was
done without law to that end : or, if any human
frailty or mistake (for princes are but men,
made as others) appeared in some small decli-
nations from that end ; yet 'twas visible, the
main of their conduct tended to nothing but
the care of the public. The people therefore,
finding reason to be satisfied with these princes,
whenever they acted without, or contrary to
the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they
did, and, without the least complaint, let them
inlarge their prerogative as they pleased, judg-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 333

ing rightly, that they did nothing herein to the
prejudice of their laws, since they acted con-
formable to the foundation and end of all laws,
the public good.

§. 166. Such godlike princes indeed had
some title to arbitrary power by that argument,
that would prove absolute monarchy the best
government, as that which God himself governs
the universe by ; because such kings partake
of his wisdom and goodness. Upon this is
founded that saying, That the reigns of good
princes have been always most dangerous to
the liberties of their people: for when their
successors, managing the government with
different thoughts, would draw the actions of
those good rulers into precedent, and make
them the standard of their prerogative : as if
what had been done only for the good of the
people was a right in them to do, for the harm
of the people, if they so pleased ; it has often
occasioned contest, and sometimes public
disorders, before the people could recover their
original right, and get that to be declared not
to be prerogative, which truly was never so ;
since it is impossible that any body in the
society should ever have a right to do the
people harm ; though it be very possible, and
reasonable, that the people should not go about
to set any bounds to the prerogative of those
kings, or rulers, who themselves transgressed
not the bounds of the public good : for prero-

334 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

gative is nothing but the power of doing public
good without a rule.

§. 167. The power of calling parliaments in
England, as to precise time, place, and dura-
tion, is certainly a prerogative of the king, but
still with this trust, that it shall be made use of
for the good of the nation, as the exigencies of
the times, and variety of occasions, shall require;
for it being impossible to foresee which should
always be the fittest place for them to assemble
in, and what the best season ; the choice of
these was left with the executive power, as
might be most subservient to the public good,
and best suit the ends of parliaments.

§. 1G8. The old question will be asked in
this matter of prerogative, But ivho shall be
judge when this power is made a right use of?
I answer : between an executive power in being,
with such a prerogative, and a legislative that
depends upon his will for ther convening, there
can be no judge on earth ; as there can be none
between the legislative and the people, should
either the executive, or the legislative, when
they have got the power in their hands, design,
or go about to enslave or destroy them. The
people have no other remedy in this, as in all
other cases where they have no judge on earth,
but to appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in such
attempts, exercising a power the people never
put into their hands, (who can never be supposed
to consent that any body should rule over them
for their harm) do that which they have not a

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 335

right to do. And where the body of the people,
or any single man, is deprived of their right, oi-
ls under the exercise of a power without right,
and have no appeal on earth, then they have a
liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they
judge the cause of sufficient moment. And
therefore, though the people cannot he judge, so
as to have, by the constitution of that society,
any superior power, to determine and give effec-
tive sentence in the case ; yet they have, by a
law antecedent and paramount to all positive
laws of men, reserved that ultimate determi-
nation to themselves which belongs to all man-
kind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz.
to judge, whether they have just cause to make
their appeal to heaven. And this judgment
they cannot part with, it being out of a man's
power so to submit himself to another, as to
give him a liberty to destroy him ; God and
nature never allowing a man so to abandon
himself, as to neglect his own preservation :
and since he cannot take away his own life,
neither can he give another power to take it.
Nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual
foundation for disorder: for this operates not,
till the inconveniency is so great, that the
majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find
a necessity to have it amended. But this the
executive power, or wise princes, never need
come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of
all others, they have most need to avoid, as of
all others the most perilous.

336 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER XV.

Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power,
considered together.

§. 169. Though I have had occasion to speak
of these separately before, yet the great mis-
takes of late about government having, as I
suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct
powers one with another, it may not, perhaps,
be amiss to consider them here together.

§. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power
is nothing but that which parents have over their
children, to govern them for the children's good,
till they come to the use of reason, or a state of
knowledge, wherein they may be supposed
capable to understand that rule, whether it be
the law of nature, or the municipal law of their
country, they are to govern themselves by :
capable, I say, to know it, as well as several
others, who live as freemen under that law.
The affection and tenderness which God hath
planted in the breast of parents towards their
children, makes it evident, that this is not
intended to be a severe arbitrary government,
but only for the help, instruction, and preserva-
tion of their offspring. But happen it as it will,
there is, as 1 have proved, no reason why it
should be thought to extend to life and death,
at any time, over their children, more than over
any body else ; neither can there be any pre-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 337

tence why this parental power should keep the
child, when grown to a man, in subjection to
the will of his parents, any farther than having
received life and education from his parents,
obliges him to respect, honour, gratitude, assis-
tance and support, all his life, to both father
and mother. And thus, 'tis true, the paternal
is a natural government, but not at all extending
itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which
is political. The power of the father doth not
reach at all to the property of the child, which
is only in his own disposing.

§. 171. Secondly, Political power is that
power, which every man having in the state of
nature, has given up into the hands of the
society, and therein to the governors, whom
the society hath set over itself, with this express
or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their
good, and the preservation of their property :
now this power, which every man has in the
state of nature, and which he parts with to the
society in all such cases where the society
can secure him, is to use such means, for the
preserving of his own property, as he thinks
good, and nature allows him; and to punish
the breach of the law of nature in others, so as
(according to the best of his reason) may most
conduce to the preservation of himself, and the
rest of mankind. So that the end and measure
of this power, when in every man's hands in
the state of nature, being the preservation of all
of his society, that is, all mankind in general,

z

338 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

it can have no other end or measure, when in
the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the
members of that society in their lives, liberties,
and possessions ; and so cannot be an absolute,
arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes,
which are as much as possible to be preserved ;
but a power to make laws, and annex such
penalties to them, as may tend to the preserva-
tion of the whole, by cutting off those parts,
and those only, which are so corrupt, that
they threaten the sound and healthy, without
which no severity is lawful. And this power
has its original only from compact and agree-
ment, and the mutual consent of those who
make up the community.

§. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an
absolute, arbitrary power one man has over
another, to take away his life, whenever he
pleases. This is a power, which neither na-
ture gives, for it has made no such distinction
between one man and another ; nor compact
can convey : for man not having such an
arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give
another man such a power over it ; but it is the
effect only of forfeiture, which the aggressor
makes' of his own life, when he puts himself
into the state of war with another : for having
quitted reason, which God hath given to be the
rule betwixt man and man, and the common
bond whereby human kind is united into one
fellowship and society ; and having renounced
the way of peace which that teaches, and

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 339

made use of the force of war, to compass his
unjust ends upon another, where he has no
right; and so revolting from his own kind to
that of beasts, by making force, which is
their's, to be his rule of right, he renders him-
self liable to be destroyed by the injured
person, and the rest of mankind that will join
with him in the execution of justice, as any
other wild beast, or noxious brute, with whom
mankind can have neither society nor security.*
And thus captives, taken in a just and lawful
war, and such only, are subject to a despot ical
power, which, as it arises not from compact,
so neither is it capable of any, but is the state
of war continued : for what compact can be
made with a man that is not master of his
own life? what condition can he perform? and
if he be once allowed to be master of his own
life, the despotical, arbitrary poiver of his
master ceases. He that is master of himself,
and his own life, has a right too to the means
of preserving it ; so that as soon as compact
enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his
absolute power, and puts an end to the state
of war, who enters into conditions with his
captive.

§. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz.
paternal poiver to jmreuts for the benefit of their
children during their minority, to supply their
want of ability, and understanding how to

* Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus,
Noxious brute that is destructive to their being.

z 2

340 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

manage their property. (By property I must
be understood here, as in other places, to mean
that property which men have in their persons
as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives
the second, viz. political power to governors for
the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in
the possession and use of their properties.
And forfeiture gives the third, despot ical power
to lords for their own benefit, over those who
are stripped of all property.

§. 174. He that shall consider the distinct
rise and extent, and the different ends of these
several powers, will plainly see, that paternal
power comes as far short of that of the magis-
trate, as despotical exceeds it; and that absolute
dominion, however placed, is so far from being
one kind of civil society, that it is as inconsistent
with it, as slavery is with property. Paternal
power is only where minority makes the child
incapable to manage his property ; political,
where men have property in their own disposal ;
and despotical, over such as have no property
at all.

CHAPTER XVI.

Of CONQUEST.

{. 175. Though governments can originally
have no other rise than that before mentioned,
nor politics be founded on any thing but the
consent of the people ; yet such have been the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 341

disorders ambition has filled the world with,
(hut in the noise of war, which makes so great
a part of the history of mankind, this consent is
little taken notice of: and therefore many have
mistaken the force of arms for the consent of
the people, and reckon conquest as one of the
originals of government. Hut conquest is as far
from setting up any government, as demolishing
an house is from building a new one in the
place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new
frame of a commonwealth, by destroying the
former ; but, without the consent of the people,
can never erect a new one.

§. 170'. That the aggressor, who puts himself
into the state of war with another, and unjustly
invades another man's right, can, by such an
unjust war, never come to have a right over the
conquered, will be easily agreed by all men,
who will not think, that robbers and py rates
have a right of empire over whomsoever they
have force enough to master; or that men are
bound by promises, which unlawful force extorts
from them. Should a robber break into my
house, and with a dagger at my throat make
me seal deeds to convey my estate to him,
would this give him any title ( Just such a
title, by his sword, has an unjust conqueror,
who forces me into submission. The injury
and the crime is equal, whether committed by
the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain.
The title of the offender, and the number of his
followers, make no difference in the offence,

342 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference
is, great robbers punish little ones, to keep
them in their obedience; but the great ones
are rewarded with laurels and triumphs, be-
cause they are too big for the weak hands of
justice in this world, and have the power in
their own possession, which should punish
offenders. What is my remedy against a
robber, that so broke into my house ? Appeal
to the laAV for justice. But perhaps justice is
denied, or I am crippled and cannot stir,
robbed and have not the means to do it. If
God has taken away all means of seeking
remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But
my son, when able, may seek the relief of the
law, which I am denied : he or his son may
renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But
the conquered, or their children, have no court,
*no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they
may appeal, as Jephtha did, to heaven, and
repeat their appeal till they have recovered the
native right of their ancestors, which was, to
have such a legislative over them, as the
majority should approve, and freely acquiesce
in. If it be objected, This would cause endless
trouble; I answer, no more than justice does,
where she lies open to all that appeal to her.
He that troubles his neighbour without a cause,
is punished for it by the justice of the court he
appeals to : and he that appeals to heaven must
be sure he has right on his side; and aright
too I lint is worth the trouble and cost of the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 343

appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that
cannot be deceived, and will be sure to retri-
bute to every one according to the mischiefs
he hath created to his fellow-subjects ; that is,
any part of mankind : from whence it is plain,
that he that conquers in an unjust war, can
thereby have no title to the subjection and obedi-
ence of the conquered.

§. 177. But supposing victory favours the
right side, let us consider a conqueror in a law-
ful tvar, and see what power he gets, and over
whom.

First, It is plain he gets no power by his con-
quest over those that conquered with him. They
that fought on his side cannot suffer by the
conquest, but must at least be as much freemen
as they were before. And most commonly they
serve upon terms, and on condition to share
with their leader, and enjoy a part of the spoil,
and other advantages that attend the conquer-
ing sword ; or'at least have a part of the subdued
country bestowed upon them. And the con-
quering people are not, 1 hope, to be slaves by
conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew
they are sacrifices to their leader's triumph.
They, that found absolute monarchy upon the
title of the sword, make their heroes, who are
the founders of such monarchies, arrant Draic-
cansirs and forget they had any officers and
soldiers that fought on their side in the battles
they won, or assisted them in the subduing, or
shared in possessing, the countries they master-

344 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

ed. We are told by some, that the English
monarchy is founded in the Norman conquest,
and that our princes have thereby a title to
absolute dominion : which if it were true, (as
by the history it appears otherwise) and that
William had a right to make war on this island:
yet his dominion by conquest could reach no
farther than to the Saxons and Britons, that
were then inhabitants of this country. The
Normans that came with him, and helped to
conquer, and all descended from them, are
freemen, and no subjects by conquest ; let that
give what dominion it will. And if I, or any
body else, shall claim freedom, as derived from
them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary :
and it is plain, the law, that has made no dis-
tinction between the one and the other, intends
not there should be any difference in their
freedom or privileges.

<§. 178. But supposing, which seldom hap-
pens, that the conquerors and conquered never
incorporate into one people, under the same
laws and freedom ; let us see next what power a
lawful conqueror has over the subdued: and that
I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute
power over the lives of those who by an unjust
war have forfeited them ; but not over the lives
or fortunes of those who engaged not in the
war, nor over the possessions even of those
who were actually engaged in it.

§. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror
gets no power but only over those who have

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 345

actually assisted, concurred, or consented to
that unjust force that is used against him : for
the people having given to their governors no
power to do an unjust thing, such as is to
make an unjust war, (for they never had 'such
a power in themselves) they ought not to be
charged as guilty of the violence and injustice
that is committed in an unjust war, any farther
than they actually abet it; no more than they
are to be thought guilty of any violence or
oppression their governors should use upon
the people themselves, or any part of their
fellow-subjects, they having impowered them no
more to the one than to the other. Conquerors,
it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make
the distinction, but they willingly permit the
confusion of war to sweep all together: but
yet this alters not the right ; for the conqueror's
power over the lives of the conquered, being-
only because they have used force to do, or
maintain an injustice, he can have that power
only over those who have concurred in that
force; all the rest are innocent ; and he has no
more title over the people of that country, who
have done him no injury, and so have made no
forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any
other, who, without any injuries or provoca-
tions, have lived upon fair terms with him.

§. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gels,
over those he overcomes in a just war, isperfectly
despolicak he has an absolute povveroverthe lives
oi those, who by putting themselves in a state

346 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

of war, have forfeited them ; but he has not
thereby a right and title to their possessions.
This I doubt not, but at first sight will seem a
strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to
the practice of the world ; there being nothing
more familiar in speaking of the dominion of
countries, than to say such an one conquered
it : as if the conquest, without any more ado,
conveyed a right of possession. But when we
consider, that the practice of the strong and
powerful, how universal soever it may be, is
seldom the rule of right, however it be oue part
of the subjection of the conquered, not to argue
against the conditions cut out to them by the
conquering sword.

§. 181. Though in all war there be usually
a complication of force and damage, and the
aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate, when
he uses force against the persons of those he
makes war upon, yet it is the use of force only
that puts a man into the state of war: for
whether by force he begins the injury, or else
having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he
refuses to make reparation, and by force main-
tains it, (which is the same thing, as at first to
have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force,
that makes the war : for he that breaks open my
house, and violently turns me out of doors ; or
having peaceably got in, by force keeps me out,
does in effect the same thing ; supposing we are
in such a state, that we have no common judge
on earth, whom I may appeal to, and to whom

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 347

we are both obliged to submit : for of such I
am now speaking. It is the unjust use of force,
then, that puis a man into the state of war with
another; and thereby he that is guilty of it
makes a forfeiture of his life : for quitting
reason, which is the rule given between man
and man, and using force, the way of beasts,
lie becomes liable to be destroyed by him lie
uses force against, as any savage ravenous
beast, that is dangerous to his being.

§. 182. But because the miscarriages of the
father are no faults of the children, and they
may be rational and peaceable, notwithstand-
ing the brntishness and injustice of the father;
the father, by his miscarriages and violence,
can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his
children in his guilt or destruction. His goods,
which nature, that willeth the preservation of
all mankind as much as is possible, hath made
to belong to the children to keep them from
perishing, do still continue to belong to his
children : for supposing them not to have
joined in the war, either through infancy, ab-
sence, or choice, they have done nothing to
forfeit them : nor has the conqueror any right
to take them away, by the bare title of having
subdued him that by force attempted his de-
struction ; though perhaps he may have some
right to them, to repair the damages he has
sustained by the war, and the defence of his
own right ; which how far it reaches to the
possessions of the conquered, we shall see by-

348 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

and-by. So that he that by conquest has a
right over a maris person to destroy him if he
pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate
to possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal
force the aggressor has used, that gives his
adversary a right to take away his life, and
destroy him if he pleases, as a noxious crea-
ture ; but it is damage sustained that alone
gives him title to another man's goods : for
though I may kill a theif that sets on me in
the highway, yet I may not (which seems less)
take away his money, and let him go : this
would be robbery on my side. His force, and
the state of war he puts himself in, made him
forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his
goods. The right then of conquest extends
only to the lives of those who joined in the war,
not to their estates, but only in order to make
reparation for the damages received, and the
charges of the war, and that too with reser-
vation of the right of the innocent wife and
children.

§. 183. Let the conqueror have as much
justice on his side, as could be supposed, he
has no right to seize more than the vanquished
could forfeit : his life is at the victor's mercy ;
and his service and goods he may appropriate,
to make himself reparation ; but he cannot
take the goods of his wife and children; they
too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and
their shares in the estate he possessed : for ex-
ample, t in the state of nature (and all com-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 349

monwcalths are in the state of nature one with
another) have injured another man, and refu-
sing to give satisfaction, it conies to a state
of war, wherein my defending by force what
I had gotten unjustly, makes me the aggressor.
I am conquered : my life, it is true, as forfeit,
is at mercy, but not my wife's and children's.
They made not war, nor assisted in it. 1
could not forfeit their lives ; they were not
mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in my
estate ; that neither could I forfeit. And my
children also, being born of me, had a right to
be maintained out of my labour or substance.
Here then is the case : the conqueror has a
title to reparation for damages received, and
the children have a title to their fathers estate
for their subsistence : for as to the wife's share,
whether her own labour or compact, gave her
a title to it, it is plain, her husband could not
forfeit what was her's. What must be done
in the case? I answer; the fundamental law
of nature being, that all, as much as may be,
should be preserved, it follows, that if there be
not enough fully to satisfy both, viz. for the
conqueror s losses, and children's maintenance,
he that hath, and to spare, must remit some-
thing of his full satisfaction, and give w r ay to
the pressing and preferable title of those who
are in danger to perish without it.

§. 184. But supposing the charge and
damages of the tear are to be made up to the
conqueror, to the utmost farthing; and that

350 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

the children of the vanquished, spoiled of all
their fathers goods, are to be left to starve and
perish : yet the satisfying of what shall, on this
score, be due to the conqueror, will scarce give
him a title to any country he should conquer :
for the damages of war can scarce amount to
the value of any considerable tract of land, in
any part of the world, where all the land is
possessed, and none lies waste. And if 1
have not taken away the conqueror's land,
which, being vanquished, it is impossible I
should ; scarce any other spoil I have done
him can amount to the value of mine, suppo-
sing it equally cultivated, and of an extent any
way coming near what I had over-run of his.
The destruction of a year's product or two
(for it seldom reaches four or five) is the ut-
most spoil that usually can be done : for as to
money, and such riches and treasure taken
away, these are none of nature's goods, they
have but a fantastical imaginary value: nature
has put no such upon them : they are of no
more account by her standard, than the wam-
pompeke of the Americans to an European
prince, or the silver money of Europe would
have been formerly to an American. And
five years product is not worth the perpetual
inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and
none remains waste, to be taken up by him
that is disseized : which will be easily granted,
if one do but take away the imaginary value
of money, the disproportion being more than

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 351

between five and five hundred; though, at the
same time, half a year's product is more worth
than the inheritance, where there being more
land than the inhabitants possess and make
use of, any one has liberty to make use of the
waste: but there conquerors take little care
to possess themselves of the lands of the van-
quished. No damage therefore, that men in
the state of nature (as all princes and govern-
ments are in reference to one another) suffer
from one another, can give a conqueror power
to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished,
and turn them out of that inheritance, which
ought to be the possession of them and their
descendants to all generations. The conqueror
indeed will be apt to think himself master : and
it is the very condition of the subdued not to be
able to dispute their right. But if that be all,
it gives no other title than what bare force gives
to the stronger over the weaker: and, by this
reason, he that is strongest will have a right to
whatever he pleases to seize on.

§. 185. Over those then that joined with him
in the war, and over those of the subdued
country that opposed him not, and the posterity
even of those that did, the conqueror, even in
a just war, hath, by his conquest, no right of
dominion: they are free from any subjection to
him, and if their former government be dis-
solved, they are at liberty to begin and erect
another to themselves.

§. 180. The conqueror, it is true, usually.

352 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

by the force he has over them, compels them,
with a sword at their breasts, to stoop to his
conditions, and submit to such a government
as he pleases to afford them ; but the enquiry
is, what right he has to do so? If it be said,
they submit by their own consent, then this
allows their own consent to be necessary to give
the conqueror a title to rule over them. It
remains only to be considered, whether promises
extorted by force, without right, can be thought
consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall
say, they bind not at all ; because whatsoever
another gets from me by force, I still retain the
right of, and he is obliged presently to restore.
He that forces my horse from me, ought
presently to restore him, and I have still a
right to retake him. By the same reason, he
that forced a promise from me, ought presently
to restore it, i. e. quit me of the obligation of
it ; or I may resume it myself, i. e. chuse
whether I will perform it: for the law of nature
laying an obligation on me only by the rules
she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the viola-
tion of her rules : such is the extorting any thing
from me by force. Nor does it at all alter the
case to say, I gave my promise, no more than it
excuses the force, and passes the right, when
I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver my
purse myself to a thief, who demands it with
a pistol at my breast.

§. 187. From all which it follows that the
government of a conqueror, imposed by force on

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 353

the subdued, against whom he had no right of
war, or who joined not in the war against him,
where he had right, has no obligation upon
them.

§. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men
of that community, being all members of the
same body politic, may be taken to have joined
in that unjust war wherein they are subdued,
and so their lives are at the mercy of the
conqueror.

§. 189. I say, this concerns not their children
who are in their minority : for since a father
hath not, in himself, a power over the life or
liberty of his child, no act of his can possibly
forfeit it. So that the children, whatever may
have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and
the absolute power of the conqueror reaches no
farther than the persons of the men that were
subdued by him, and dies with them : and
should he govern them as slaves, subjected to
his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such
right of dominion over their childre?i. He can
have no power over them but by their own con-
sent, whatever he may drive them to say or do ;
and he has no lawful authority, whilst force,
and not choice, compels them to submission.

§. 190. Every man is born with a double
right: First , aright of freedom to his person,
which no other man has a power over, but the
free disposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a
right, before any other man, to inherit with his
brethren his father 's goods.

2 a

354 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

§. 191. By the first of these, a man is na-
turally free from subjection to any government,
though he be born in a place under its jurisdic-
tion ; but if he disclaim the lawful government
of the country he was born in, he must also
quit the right that belonged to him by the laws
of it, and the possessions there descending to
him from his ancestors, if it were a government
made by their consent.

§. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any
country, who are descended, and derive a title
to their estates from those who are subdued,
and had a government forced upon them
against their free consents, retain a right to
the j>ossession of their ancestors, though they
consent not freely to the government, whose
hard conditions were by force imposed on the
possessors of that country : for the first con-
queror never having had a title to the land of that
country, the people who are the descendents
of, or claim under those who were forced to
submit to the yoke of a government by con-
straint, have always a right to shake it off, and
free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny
which the sword hath brought in upon them,
till their rulers put them under such a frame of
government, as they willingly and of choice
consent to. Who doubts but the Grecian
christians, descendents of the ancient possessors
of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish
yoke, which they have so long groaned under,
whenever they have an opportunity to doit?

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 355

For no government can have a right to obedi-
ence from a people who have not freely con-
sented to it ; which they can never be supposed
to do, till either they are put in a full state of
liberty to chuse their government and governors,
or at least till they have such standing laws, to
which they have by themselves or their repre-
sentatives given their free consent, and also till
they are allowed their due property, which is
so to be proprietors of what they have, that no
body can take away any part of it without their
own consent, without which, men under any
government are not in the state of freemen, but
are direct slaves under the force of war.

§. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a
just war has a right to the estates, as well as
power over the persons, of the conquered ;
which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of
absolute power will follow from hence, in the
continuance of the government ; because the
descendants of these being all freemen, if he
grants them estates and possessions to inhabit
his country, (without which it would be worth
nothing) whatsoever he grants them, they have,
so far as it is granted, property in. The nature
whereof is, that without a man's oivn consent, it
cannot be taken from him.

§. 194. Their persons are free by a native
right, and their properties, be they more or less,
arc their own, and at their own dispose, and not
at his ; or else it is no property. Supposing
the conqueror gives to one man a thousand
2a2

356 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

acres, to him and his heirs for ever ; to another
he lets a thousand acres for his life, under the
rent of 50/. or 500/. per ann. has not the one of
these a right to his thousand acres for ever, and
the other, during his life, paying the said rent ?
and hath not the tenant for life a property in
all that he gets over and above his rent, by
his labour and industry during the said term,
supposing it be double the rent? Can any one
say, the king, or conqueror, after his grant,
may by his power of conqueror take away all,
or part of the land from the heirs of one, or
from the other during his life, he paying the
rent? or can he take away from either the
goods or money they have got upon the said
land, at his pleasure? If he can, then all free
and voluntary contracts cease, and are void
in the world ; there needs nothing to dissolve
them at any time, but power enough : and all
the grants and promises of men in power are
but mockery and collusion : for can there be
any thing more ridiculous than to say, I give
you and yours this for ever, and that in the
surest and most solemn way of conveyance
can be devised ; and yet it is to be understood,
that I have a right, if 1 please, to take it away
from you again to-morrow?

§. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes
are exempt from the laws of their country;
but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the
laws of God and nature. No body, no power,
can exempt lhem from the obligations of that

OF CIVIL GOVERNMBNT 357

eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong,
in the case of promises, that oranipotehcy it-
self can be tied by them. Grants, promises,
and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty:
whatever some flatterers say to princes of the
world, who altogether, with all their people
joined to them, are, in comparison of the great
God, but as drop of the bucket, or a dust on
the balance, inconsiderable, nothing!

§. 190. The short of the case in conquest is
this : the conqueror, if he have a just cause,
has a despotical right over the persons of all,
that actually aided, and concurred in the war
against him, and a right to make up his damage
and cost out of their labour and estates, so he
injure not the right of any other. Over the
rest of the people, if there were any that con-
sented not to the war, and over the children of
the captives themselves, or the possessions of
either, he has no power ; and so can have, by
virtue of conquest, no lawful title himself to do-
minion over them, or derive it to his posterity ;
but is an aggressor, if he attempts upon their
properties, and thereby puts himself in a state
of war against them, and has no better a right
of principality, he, nor any of his successors,
than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here
in England; or Spartacus, had he conquered
Italy, would have had ; which is to have their
yoke cast off, as soon as God shall give those
under their subjection courage and opportunity
(o do it. Thus, notwithstanding whatever title

358 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

the kings of Assyria had over Judah by the
sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off
the dominion of that conquering empire. And
the Lord was with Hezekiah, and he prospered ;
zvherefore he went forth, and he rebelled against
the king of Assyria, and served him not, 2 Kings
xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking off
a power, which force, and not right, hath set
over any one, though it hath the name of
rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is
that which he allows and countenances, though
even promises and covenants, when obtained by
force, have intervened : for it is very probable,
to any one that reads the story of Ahaz and
Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians sub-
dued Ahaz, and deposed him, and made He-
zekiah king in his father's life-time ; and that
Haekiah by agreement had done him homage,
and paid him tribute all this time.

CHAPTER XVIL

Of USURPATION.

\. 197. As conquest may be called a foreign
usurpation, so usurpation is a kind of domestic
conquest, with this difference, that an usurper
can never have right on his side, it being no
usurpation, but where one is got into the pos-
session oj what another has a right to. This,
so far as it is usurpation, is a change only of
persons, but not of the forms and rules of the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. :>Gl>

government : for if the usurper extend his powei
beyond what of right belonged to the lawful
princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it
is tyranny added to usurpation.

§. 198. In all lawful governments, the desig-
nation of the persons, who are to bear rule, is
as natural and necessary a part as the form of
the government itself, and is that which had its
establishment originally from the people; the
anarchy being much alike, to have no form of
government at all ; or to agree, that it shall be
monarchical, but to appoint no way to design
the person that shall have the power, and be
the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with
the form of government established, have rules
also of appointing those who are to have any
share in the public authority, and settled me-
thods of conveying the right to them : for the
anarchy is much alike, to have no form of
government at all : or to agree that it shall be
monarchical, but to appoint no way to know
or design the person that shall have the power,
and be the monarch. Whoever gets into the
exercise of any part of the power, by other
ways than what the laws of the community
have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed,
though the form of the commonwealth be still
preserved ; since he is not the person the
laws have appointed, and consequently not the
person the people have consented to. Nor can
such an usurper, or any deriving from him,
ever have a title, till the people arc both at

360 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

liberty to consent, and have actually consented
to allow, and confirm in him the power he hath
till then usurped.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of TYRANNY.

§. 199. As usurpation is the exercise of
power, which another hath a right to ; so tyranny
is the exdrcise of power beyond right, which no
body can have a right to. And this is making
use of the power any one has in his hands, not
for the good of those who are under it, but for
his own private separate advantage. When the
governor, however intitled, makes not the law,
but his will the rule ; and his commands and
actions are not directed to the preservation of
the properties of his people, but the satisfaction
of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or
any other irregular passion.

§. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or
reason, because it comes from the obscure hand
of a subject, I hope the authority of a king will
make it pass with him. King James the first
in his speech to the parliament, 1603, tells
them thus, I will ever prefer the weal of the
public, and of the whole commonwealth, in
making of good laws and constitutions, to any
particular and private ends oj mine; thinking
ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to
be my greatest weal and worldly felicity; a point

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 301

wherein a lawful kino- doth directly differ from
a tyrant : for I do acknowledge, that the special
and greatest point of difference that is between
a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is this,
that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant
doth think his kindgom and people are only
ordained for satisfaction of his desires and un-
reasonable appetites, the righteous and just Icing
doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be
ordained for the prociuing of the wealth and
property of his people. And again, in his speech
to the parliament, 1009, he hath these words,
The king binds himself by a double oath, to the
observation of the fundamental laws of his king-
dom ; tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound
to protect as well the people, as the laws of his
kingdom ; and expressly, by his oath at his coro-
nation ; so as every just king, in a settled king-
dom, is bound to observe that paction to his
people, by his laws, in framing his government
agreeable thereunto, according to that paction
which God made with Noah after the deluge.
Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and
heat, and summer and winter, and day and night,
shall not cease while the earth remaineth. And
therefore a king governing in a settled kingdom,
leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant,
as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his
laws. And a little after, Therefore all kings
that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to
bound themselves within the limits of their laws;
and they- that persuade them the contrary, arc

362 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

vipers, and pests both against them and the
commonwealth. Thus that learned king, who
well understood the notion of things, makes
the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant to
consist only in this, that one makes the laws
the bounds of his power, and the good of the
public, the end of his government; the other
makes all give way to his own will and appetite.

§. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is
proper only to monarchies : other forms of
government are liable to it, as well as that : for
wherever the power, that is put in any hands
for the government of the people, and the
preservation of their properties, is applied to
other ends, and made use of to impoverish,
harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and
irregular commands of those that have it; there
it presently becomes tyranny, whether those
that thus use it are one or many, Thus we
read of the thirty tyrants at Athens, as well as
one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion
of the Decemviri at Rome was nothing better.

§. 202. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins,
if the law be transgressed to another's harm ;
and him whosoever in authority exceeds the
power given him by the law, and makes use of
the force he has under his command, to com-
pass that upon the subject, which the law
allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate ;
and, acting without authority, may be opposed,
as any other man, who by force invades the
right of another. This is acknowledged in

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. .}(;.'}

subordinate magistrates. He that hath autho-
rity to seize my person in the street, may he
opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours
to break into my house to execute a writ,
notwithstanding that I know he has such a
warrant, and such a legal authority, as will
impower him to arrest me abroad. And why
this should not hold in the highest, as well as
in the most inferior magistrate, I would gladly
be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest
brother, because he has the greatest part of his
father's estate, should thereby have a right to
take away any of his younger brothers portions ?
or that a rich man, who possessed a whole
country, should from thence have a right to
seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden
of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully
possessed of great power and riches, exceed-
ingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of
Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much less
a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the
endamaging another without authority is, that
it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding
the bounds of authority is no more a right in a
great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable
in a king than a constable ; but it is so much the
worse in him, in that he has more trust put in
him, has already a much greater share than the
rest of his brethren, and is supposed, from the
advantages of his education, employment, and
counsellors, to be more knowing in the mea-
sures of right and wrong.

364 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

§. 203. May the commands then of a prince
be opposed ? may he be resisted as often as any
one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine
he has not right done him ? This will unhinge
and overturn all polities, and, instead of govern-
ment and order, leave nothing but anarchy and
confusion.

§. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be
opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful
force; whoever makes any opposition in any
other case, draws on himself a just condem-
nation both from God and man ; and so no
danger or confusion will follow, as is often
suggested, for,

§. 205. First, As, in some countries, the
person of the prince by the law is sacred ; and
so, whatever he commands or does, his person
is still free from all question or violence, not
liable to force, or any judicial censure or con-
demnation. But yet opposition may be made
to the illegal acts of any inferior officer, or
other commissioned by him ; unless he will, by
actually putting himself into a state of war with
his people, dissolve the government, and leave
them to that defence which belongs to every
one in the state of nature : for of such things
who can tell what the end will be? and a
neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an
odd example. In all other cases the sacredness
of the person exempts him from all inconveniences ,
whereby he is secure, whilst the government
stands, from all violence and harm, whatso-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 36T>

over ; than which there cannot be a wiser con-
stitution : for the harm he can do in his own
person not being likely to happen often, nor to
extend itself far; nor being able by his single
strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the
body of the people, should any prince have so
much weakness, and ill-nature, as to be willing
to do it, the inconveniency of some partieular
mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when
a heady prince comes to the throne, are well
recompensed by the peace of the public, and
security of the government, in the person of
the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach
of danger : it being safer for the body, that some
few private men should be sometimes in danger
to suffer, than that the head of the republic
should be easily, and upon slight occasions,
exposed.

§. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging-
only to the king's person, hinders not, but they
may be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who
use unjust force, though they pretend a com-
mission from him, which the law authorizes
not ; as is plain in the case of him that has the
king's writ to arrest a man, which is a full com-
mission from the king ; and yet he that lias it
cannot break open a man's house to do it, nor
execute this command of the king upon certain
days, nor in certain places, though this com-
mission have no such exception in it ; but they
are the limitations of the law, which if any one
transgress, the kings commission excuses him

366 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

not: for the king's authority being given him
only by the law, he cannot impower any one to
act against the law, or justify him, by his com-
mission, in so doing ; the commission, or com-
mand of any magistrate, ivhere he has no
authority, being as void and insignificant, as
that of any private man ; the difference between
the one and the other being that the magistrate
has some authority so far, and to such ends,
and the private man has none at all : for it is
not the commission, but the authority, that gives
the right of acting ; and against the laivs there
can be no authority. But, notwithstanding
such resistance, the king's person and authority
are still both secured, and so no danger to
governor or government.

§. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government
wherein the person of the chief magistrate is
not thus sacred ; yet this doctrine of the law-
fulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of
his power, ivill not upon every slight occasion
indanger him, or imbroil the government: for
where the injured party may be relieved, and
his damages repaired by appeal to the law,
there can be no pretence for force, which is
only to be used where a man is intercepted
from appealiug to the law : for nothing is to
be accounted hostile force, but where it leaves
not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is
such force alone, that puts him that uses it into
a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist
him. A man with a sword in his hand de-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 307

mands my purse in the highway, when perhaps
I have not twelve pence in my pocket : this
man I may lawfully kill. To another I deliver
1001. to hold only whilst I alight, which he
refuses to restore me, when I am got up again,
but draws his sword to defend the possession
of it by force, if I endeavour to retake it. The
mischief this man does me is a hundred, or
possibly a thousand times more than the other
perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he
really did me any ;) and yet 1 might lawfully
kill the one, and cannot so much as hurt the
other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain ;
because the one using force, which threatened
my life, I could not have time to appeal to the
law to secure it: and when it was gone, it was
too late to appeal. The law could not restore
life to my dead carcass: the loss was irrepa-
rable ; which to prevent, the law of nature gave
me a right to destroy him, who had put himself
into a state of war with me, and threatened my
destruction. But in the other case, my life not
being in danger, I may have the benefit of
appealing to the law, and have reparation for my
1001. that way.

§. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts
done by the magistrate be maintained (by the
power he has got,) and the remedy which is
due by law be by the same power obstructed ;
yet the right of resisting, even in such manifest
acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight
oceasions, disturb the government : for if it reach

3G8 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

no farther than some private men's cases,
though they have a right to defend themselves,
and to recover by force what by unlawful force
is taken from them; yet the right to do so will
not easily engage them in a contest, wherein
they are sure to perish ; it being as impossible
for one, or a few oppressed men to disturb the
government, where the body of the people do
not think themselves concerned in it, as for a
raving madman, or heady malcontent to overturn
a well-settled state ; the people being as little
apt to follow the one, as the other.

§. 209. But if either these illegal acts have
extended to the majority of the people ; or if
the mischief and oppression has lighted only
on some few, but in such cases, as the prece-
dent, and consequences seem to threaten all ;
and they are persuaded in their cosciences,
that their laws, and with them their estates,
liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps
their religion too ; how they will be hindered
from resisting illegal force, used against them,
I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I
confess, that attends all governments whatso-
ever, when the governors have brought it to
this pass, to be generally suspected of their
people ; the most dangerous state which they
can possibly put themselves in ; wherein they
are the less to be pitied, because it is so easy
to be avoided ; it being as impossible for a
governor, if he really means the good of his
people, aud the preservation of them, and their

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 36*9

laws together, not to make them see and
feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to
let his children see he loves, and takes care of
them.

§. 210. But if all the world shall observe
pretences of one kind, and actions of another;
arts used to elude the law, and the trust of
prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in
some things left m the prince's hand to do
good, not harm to the people) employed con-
trary to the end for which it was given : if the
people shall find the ministers and subordinate
magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and
favoured, or laid by, proportionably as they
promote or oppose them : if they see several
experiments made of arbitrary power, and that
religion underhand favoured, (though publicly
proclaimed against) which is readiest to intro-
duce it; and the operators in it supported, as
much as may be ; and when that cannot be
done, yet approved still, and liked the better:
If a long train of actions shew the councils
all tending that way ; how can a man any
more hinder himself from being persuaded in
his own mind, which way things are going ; or
from casting about how to save himself, than
he could from believing the captain of the ship
he was in was carrying him, and the rest of his
company to Algiers, when he found him al-
ways steering that course, though cross winds,
leaks in his ship, and want of men and provi-
sions did often force him to turn his course

2 B

370 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

another way for some time, which he steadily
returned to again, as soon as the wind, wea-
ther, and other circumstances would let him?

CHAPTER XIX.

Of the Dissolution of Government.

§. 211. He that will with any clearness speak
of the dissolution of government, ought in the
first place to distinguish between the dissolution
of the society and the dissolution of the govern-
ment. That which makes the community, and
brings men out of the loose state of nature,
into one politic society, is the agreement which
every one has with the rest to incorporate, and
act as one body, and so be one distinct com-
monwealth. The usual, and almost only way
whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad
of foreign force making a conquest upon them :
for in that case, (not being able to maintain
and support themselves, as one intire and in-
dependent body) the union belonging to that
body which consisted therein, must necessarily
cease, and so every one return to the state he
was in before, with a liberty to shift for him-
self, and provide for his own safety, as he
thinks fit, in some other society. Whenever
the society is dissolved, it is certain the govern-
ment of that society cannot remain. Thus
conquerors swords often cut up governments
by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 371

.separating the subdued or scattered multitude
from the protection of, and dependence on, that
society, which ought to have preserved them
from violence. The world is too well instructed
in, and too forward to allow of, this way of
dissolving of governments, to need any more
to be said of it; and there wants not much
argument to prove, that where the society is
dissolved, the government cannot remain ; that
being as impossible, as for the frame of an
house to subsist when the materials of it are
scattered and dissipated by a whirlwind, or
jumbled into a confused heap by an earth-
quake.

§. 212. Besides this overturning from with-
out, governments are dissolved from within,

First, When the legislative is altered. Civil
society being a state of peace, amongst those
who are of it, from whom the state of war is
excluded by the umpirage which they have
provided in their legislative, for the ending all
differences that may arise amongst any of
them, it is in their legislative, that the members
of a commonwealth are united, and combined
together into one coherent living body. This
is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to
the commonwealth: from hence the several
members have their mutual influence, sympathy
and connexion : and therefore, when the legis-
lative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and
death follows : for the essence and unity of the
society consisting in having one will, the legis-
2b2

372 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

lative, when once established by the majority,
has the declaring, and as it were keeping of
that will. The constitution of the legislative is
the first and fundamental act of society, where-
by provision is made for the continuation of
their union, under the direction of persons, and
bonds of laws, made by persons authorized
thereunto, by the consent and appointment
of the people, without which no one man, or
number of men, amongst them, can have au-
thority of making laws that shall be binding
to the rest. When any one or more, shall
take upon them to make laws, whom the
people have not appointed so to do, they make
laws without authority, which the people are
not therefore bound to obey ; by which means
they come again to be out of subjection, and
may constitute to themselves a new legislative,
as they think best, being in full liberty to resist
the force of those, who without authority
would impose any thing upon them. Every
one is at the disposure of his own will, when
those who had, by the delegation of the society,
the declaring of the public will, are excluded
from it, and others usurp the place, who have
no such authority or delegation.

§. 213. This being usually brought about by
such in the commonwealth who misuse the
power they have ; it is hard to consider it
aright, and know at whose door to lay it,
without knowing the form of government in
which it happens. Let us. suppose then the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 373

legislative placed in the concurrence of three
distinct persons.

1. A single hereditary person, having the
constant, supreme, executive power, and with
it the power of convoking- and dissolving the
other two within certain periods of time.

2. An assembly of hereditary nobility.

3. An assembly of representatives chosen,
pro tempore, by the people. Such a form of
government supposed, it is evident,

§. 214. First, That when such a single per-
son, or prince, sets up his own arbitrary will
in place of the laws, which are the will of the
society, declared by the legislative, then the
legislative is changed: for that being in effect
the legislative, whose rules and laws are put
in execution, and required to be obeyed ; when
other laws are set up, and other rules pre-
tended, and inforced, than what the legislative
constituted by the society have enacted, it is
plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever
introduces new laws, not being thereunto au-
thorized by the fundamental appointment of
the society, or subverts the old, disowns and
overturns the power by which they were made,
and so sets up a new legislative.

§. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders
the legislative from assembling in its due time,
or from acting freely, pursuant to those ends
for which it was constituted, the legislative is
altered: for it is not a certain number of men,
no, nor their meeting, unless they have also

374 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

freedom of debating, and leisure of perfecting,
what is for the good of the society, wherein
the legislative consists : when these are taken
away or altered, so as to deprive the society of
the due exercise of their power, the legislative
is truly altered ; for it is not names that consti-
tute governments, but the use and exercise of
those powers that were intended to accompany
them ; so that he, who takes away the freedom,
or hinders the acting of the legislative in its
due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative,
and puts an end to the government.

§. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary
power of the prince, the electors, or ways of
election are altered, without the consent, and
contrary to the common interest of the people,
there also the legislative is altered: for, if others
than those whom the society hath authorized
thereunto, do chuse, or in another way than
what the society hath prescribed, those chosen
are not the legislatived appointed by the
people.

§. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the
people into subjection of a foreign power, either
by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly
a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution
of the government : for the end why people en-
tered into society being to be preserved one
intire, free, independent society, to be governed
by its own laws ; this is lost, whenever they are
given up into the power of another.

§. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. .375

the dissolution of the government in these cases
is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; be-
cause he having - the force, treasure and oiiices
of the state to employ, and often persuading
himself, or being flattered by others, that as
supreme magistrate he is uncapable of con-
troul ; he alone is in a condition to make great
advances toward such changes, under pretence
of lawful authority, and has it in his hands
to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious,
seditious, and enemies to the government:
whereas no other part of the legislative, or
people, is capable by themselves to attempt
any alteration of the legislative, without open
and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken
notice of, which, when it prevails, produces
effects very little different from foreign con-
quest. Besides, the prince in such a form of
government, having the power of dissolving the
other parts of the legislative, and thereby ren-
dering them private persons, they can never in
opposition to him, or without his concurrence,
alter the legislative by a law, his consent being
necessary to give any of their decrees that
sanction. But yet, so far as the other parts
of the legislative any way contribute to any
attempt upon the government, and do either
promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder such
designs, they are guilty, and partake in this,
which is certainly the greatest crime men can
be guilty of one towards another.

§. 2 If) There is one way more whereby

376 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

such a government may be dissolved, and that
is, when he who has the supreme executive
power neglects and abandons that charge, so
that the laws already made can no longer be
put in execution. This is demonstratively to
reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to
dissolve the government: for laws not being
made for themselves, but to be, by their ex-
ecution, the bonds of the society, to keep
every part of the body politic in its due
place and function ; when that totally ceases,
the government visibly ceases, and the people
become a confused multitude, without order
or connexion. Where there is no longer the
administration of justice, for the securing of
men's rights, nor any remaining power within
the community to direct the force, or provide
for the necessities of the public, there certainly
is no government left. Where the laws cannot
be executed, it is all one as if there were no
laws ; and a government without laws is, I
suppose, a mystery in politics, unconceivable
to human capacity, and inconsistent with hu-
man society.

§. 220. In these and the like cases, when the
government is dissolved, the people are at
liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a
new legislative, differing from the other, by the
change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall
find it most for their safety and good : for the
society can never, by the fault of another, lose
the native and original right it has to preserve

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 377

itself, which can only be done by a settled
legislative, and a fair and impartial execution
of the laws made by it. But the state of man-
kind is not so miserable that they are not
capable of using this remedy, till it be too late
to look for any. To tell people they may
provide for themselves, by erecting a new legis-
lative, when by oppression, artifice, or being
delivered over to a foreign power, their old
one is gone, is only to tell them, they may
expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is
past cure. This is in effect no more than to
bid them first be slaves, and then to take care
of their liberty ; and when their chains are on,
tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if
barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and
men can never be secure from tyranny, if there
be no means to escape it till they are perfectly
under it : and therefore it is that they have not
only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

§. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another
way whereby governments are dissolved, and
that is, when the legislative, or the prince,
either of them, act contrary to their trust.

First, The legislative acts against the trust
reposed in them, when they endeavour to
invade the property of the subject, and to make
themselves, or any part of the community,
masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives,
liberties, or fortunes of the people.

§. 2*22. The reason why men enter into
society, is the preservation of their property;

378 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

and the end why they ehuse and authorize a
legislative, is, that there may be laws made,
and rules set, as guards and fences to the
properties of all the members of the society, to
limit the power, and moderate the dominion of
every part and member of the society : for since
it can never be supposed to be the will of the
society, that the legislative should have a power
to destroy that which every one designs to
secure, by entering into society, and for which
the people submitted themselves to legislators
of their own making ; whenever the legislators
endeavour to takeaway, and destroy the property
of the people, or to reduce them to slavery
under arbitrary power, they put themselves
into a state of war with the people, who are
thereupon absolved from any farther obedience,
and are left to the common refuge, which God
hath provided for all men, against force and
violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative
shall transgress this fundamental rule of society ;
and either by ambition, fear, folly or corrup-
tion, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into
the hands of any other, an absolute power over
the lives, liberties, and estates of the people ;
by this breach of trust they forfeit the power
the people had put into their hands for quite
contrary ends, and it devolves to the people,
who have a right to resume their original liberty,
and, by the establishment of a new legislative,
(such as they shall think fit) provide for their
own safety and security, which is the end for

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 379

which they are in society. What I have said
here, concerning the legislative in general,
holds true also concerning the supreme execu-
tor, who having a double trust put in him, both
to have a part in the legislative, and the
supreme execution of the law, acts against
both, when he goes about to set up his own
arbitrary will as the law of the society.' He
acts also contrary to his trust, when he either
employs the force, treasure, and offices of the
society, to corrupt the representatives, and gain
them to his purposes ; or openly pre-engages
the electors, and prescribes to their choice,
such, whom he has by solicitations, threats,
promises, or otherwise, won to his designs ;
and employs them to bring in such, who have
promised beforehand what to vote, and what
to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and
electors, and new-model the ways of election,
what is it but to cut up the government by the
roots, and poison the very fountain of public
security? for the people having reserved to
themselves the choice of their representatives,
as the fence to their properties, could do it for
no other end, but that they might always be
freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and
advise, as the necessity of the common-wealth,
and the public good should upon examination,
and mature debate, be judged to require. This,
those who give their votes before they hear the
debate, and have weighed the reasons on all
sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare

380 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

such an assembly as this, and endeavour to
set up the declared abettors of his own will,
for the true representatives of the people, and
the law-makers of the society, is certainly as
great a breach of trust, and as perfect a decla-
ration of a design to subvert the government,
as is possible to be met with. To which, if one
shall add rewards and punishments visibly
employed to the same end, and all the arts of
perverted law made use of to take off and
destroy all that stand in the way of such a
design, and will not comply and consent to
betray the liberties of their country, it will be
past doubt what is doing. What power they
ought to have in the society, who thus employ
it contrary to the trust went along with it in its
first institution, is easy to determine ; and one
cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted
any such thing as this, cannot any longer be
trusted.

§. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that
the people being ignorant, and always discon-
tented, to lay the foundation of government in
the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of
the people, is to expose it to certain ruin : and
710 government rcillbe able long to subsist, if the
people may set up a new legislative, whenever
they take offence at the old one. To this I
answer, Quite the contrary. People are not
so easily got out of their old forms, as some are
apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed
with to amend the acknowledged faults in the

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 381

frame they have been accustomed to. And if
there be any original defects, or adventitious
ones introduced by time, or corruption ; it is
not an easy thing- to be changed, even when
all the world sees there is an opportunity for it.
This slowness and aversion in the people to
quit their old constitutions, has, in the many
revolutions which have been seen in this king-
dom, in this and former ages, still kept us to,
or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still
brought us back again to our old legislative of
king, lords and commons: and whatever
provocations have made the crown be taken
from some of our princes heads, they never
carried the people so far as to place it in
another line.

§. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis
lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which
I answer,

First, No more than any other hypothesis :
for when the people are made miserable, and
find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbi-
trary power, cry up their governors, as much as
you will, for sOns of Jupiter ; let them be
sacred and divine, descended, or authorized
from heaven : give them out for whom or what
you please, the same will happen. The people
generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will
be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves
of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They
will wish, and seek for the opportunity, which
in the change, weakness and accidents of

382 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

human affairs, seldom delays long to offer
itself. He must have lived but a little while in
the world, who has not seen examples of this
in his time : and he must have read very little,
who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts
of governments in the world.

§. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions
happen not upon every little mismanagement in
public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling
part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and
all the slips of human frailty, will be borne by
the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a
long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices,
all tending the same way, make the design
visible to the people, and they cannot but feel
what they lie under, and see whither they are
going ; it is not to be wondered at, that they
should then rouze themselves, and endeavour
to put the rule into such hands which may
secure to them the ends for which government
was at first erected ; and without which, ancient
names, and specious forms, are so far from
being better, that they are much worse, than the
state of nature, or pure anarchy ; the incon-
veniencies being all as great and as near, but
the remedy farther off and more difficult.

§. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine
of a power in the people of providing for their
safety a-new, by a new legislative, when their
legislators have acted contrary to their trust,
by invading their property, is the best fence
against rebellion, and the probablest means to

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 303

hinder it : for rebellion being an opposition, not
to persons, but authority, which is founded
only in the constitutions and laws of the
government ; those, whoever they be, who by
force break through, and by force justify their
violation of them, are truly and properly rebels:
for when men, by entering into society and
civil government, have excluded force, and
introduced laws for the preservation of property,
peace, and unity amongst themselves, those who
set up force again in opposition to the laws, do
rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of
war, and are properly rebels : which they who
are in power, (by the pretence they have to
authority, the temptation of force they have in
their hands, and the flattery of those about
them) being likeliest to do ; the properest way
to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger
and injustice of it, who are under the greatest
temptation to run into it.

§. 227. In both the forementioned cases,
when either the legislative is changed, or the
legislators act contrary to the end for which
they were constituted ; those who are guilty
are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by force
takes away the established legislative of any
society, and the laws by them made, pursuant
to their trust, he thereby takes away the um-
pirage, which every one had consented to, for
a peaceable decision of all their controversies,
and a bar to the state of war amongst them.
They, who remove, or change, the legislative,

384 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

take away this decisive power, which no body
can have, but by the appointment and consent
of the people ; and so destroying the authority
which the people did, and nobody else can set
up, and introducing a power which the people
hath not authorized, they actually introduce
a state of ivar, which is that of force without
authority: and thus, by removing the legisla-
tive established by the society, (in whose
decisions the people acquiesced and united, as
to that of their own will) they untie the knot,
and expose the jteople a-new to the state of ivar.
And if those, who by force take away the legis-
lative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as
has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so;
when they, who were set up for the protection,
and preservation of the people, their liberties
and properties, shall by force invade and en-
deavour to take them away ; and so they
putting themselves into a state of war with
those who made them the protectors and guar-
dians of their peace, are properly, and with the
greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.

§. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foun-
dation for rebellion,meim that it may occasion
civil wars, or intestine broils, to tell the people
they are absolved from obedience when illegal
attempts are made upon their liberties or pro-
perties, and may oppose the unlawful violence
of those who were their magistrates, when they
invade their properties contrary to the trust
put in them ; and that therefore this doctrine

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 385

is not to be allowed, being so destructive to
the peace of the world : they may as well say,
upon the same ground, that honest men may
not oppose robbers or pirates, because this
may occasion disorder or bloodshed. If any
mischief come in such cases, it is not to be
charged upon him who defends his own right,
but on him that invades his neighbours. If the
innocent honest man must quietly quit all he
has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent
hands upon it, 1 desire it may be considered,
what a kind of peace there will be in the
world, which consists only in violence and
rapine; and which is to be maintained only for
the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who
would not think it an admirable peace betwixt
the mighty and the mean, when the lamb,
without resistance, yielded his throat to be
torn by the imperious wolf ? Polyphemus 's den
gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace,
and such a government, wherein Ulysses and
his companions had nothing to do, but quietly
to suffer themselves to be devoured. And no
doubt Ulysses, who was a prudent man, prea-
ched up passive obedience, and exhorted them
to a quiet submission, by representing to them
of what concernment peace was to mankind ;
and by shewing the inconveniencies might hap-
pen, if they should offer to resist Polyphemus,
who had now the power over them.

§. 229. The end of government is the good
of mankind ; and which is best for mankind,

2 c

.386 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

that the people should be always exposed to
the boundless will of tyranny, or that the
rulers should be sometimes liable to be oppo-
sed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of
their power, and employ it for the destruction,
and not the preservation of the properties of
their people ?

§. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief
can arise from hence, as often as it shall please
a busy head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the
alteration of the government. It is true, such
men may stir, whenever they please ; but it
will be only to their own just ruin and perdi-
tion : for till the mischief be grown general,
and the ill designs of the rulers become visible,
or their attempts sensible to the greater part,
the people, who are more disposed to suffer than
right themselves by resistance, are not apt to
stir. The examples of particular injustice, or
oppression of here and there an unfortunate
man, moves them not. But if they universally
have a persuasion, grounded upon manifest
evidence, that designs are carrying on against
their liberties, and the general course and
tendency of things cannot but give them
strong suspicions of the evil intention of their
governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who
can help it, if they, who might avoid it, bring
themselves into tins suspicion ? Are the people
to be blamed, if they have the sense of rational
creatures, and can think of things no otherwise
than as they find and feel them ? And is it not

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 307

rather their fi mil, who put things into such a
posture, that they would not have them thought
to be as they are? I grant, that the pride, am-
bition, and turbulency of private men have
sometimes caused great disorders in common-
wealths, and factions have been fatal to states
and kingdoms. But whether the mischief hath
oftener begun in the people's wantonness, and a
desire to cast off the lawful authority of their
rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and endeavours
to get and exercise an arbitrary power over
their people ; whether oppression or disobedi-
ence, gave the first rise to the disorder, I leave
it to impartial history to determine. This I
am sure, whoever, either ruler or subject, by
force goes about to invade the rights of either
prince or people, and lays the foundation for
overturning the constitution and frame of any
just government, is highly guilty of the greatest
crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to
answer for all those mischiefs of blood, rapine,
and desolation, which the breaking to pieces
of governments bring on a country. And he
who does it, is justly to be esteemed the com-
mon enemy and pest of mankind, and is to be
treated accordingly.

§.231. That subjects or foreigners, attempt-
ing by force on the properties of any people,
may be resisted with force, is agreed on all
hands. But that magistrates, doing the same
thing, may be resisted, hath of late been de-
nied : as if those who had the greatest privi-
2 c 2

388 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

leges and advantages by the law, had thereby
a power to break those laws, by which alone
they were set in a better place than their
brethren : whereas their offence is thereby the
greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater
share they have by the law, and breaking also
that trust, which is put into their hands by
their brethren.

§. 232. Whosoever uses force ivithout right,
as every one does in society, who does it with-
out law, puts himself into a state of war with
those against whom he so uses it ; and in that
state all former ties are cancelled, all other
rights cease, and every one has a right to defend
himself, and to resist the aggressor. This is so
evident, that Barclay himself, that great asser-
tor of the power and sacredness of kings, is
forced to confess, That it is lawful for the
people, in some cases, to resist their king ; and
that too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to
shew, that the divine law shuts up the people
from all manner of rebellion. Whereby it is
evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since
they may in some cases, resist, all resisting of
princes is not rebellion. His words are these.
Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus tyrannicce
crudelitati Sf furori jugulum semper jweebebit ?
Ergone multitudo civitates suas fame, ferro, 6f
flamma vastari, seque, conjuges, <£■ liberos for-
tunes ludibrio fy tyranni libidini exponi, inque
omnia vilce pericula omnesque miserias Sf moles-
lias a rege deduct patient ur ? Num illis quod

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 389

omni animantiunt generi est a naturd tributum,
denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi repellant, sesc<j ; ub
injuria tueantur? Hide breviter responsum sit,
Popalo universe* negari defensionem, quce juris
naturalisest, neque ultionem qua prajler naturam
est adversus regent concedi debere. Quaproptcr
si rex non in singulares tantum pcrsonas aliquot
privatum odium exerccat, sed corpus ctiam rei-
publica, cujus ipse caput est, i. e. totum populum,
vel insignent aliquant ejus partem iinmani fy in-
toleranda, scevitid sen tyrannide divcxel; populo,
quidem, hoc casu rcsislendi ac tuendi se ab injuria
potestas competit, sed tuendi sc tantum, nan enim
in principem invadendi: §• restituenda injuria
illata, non recedendi a debitd revcrenliu propter
accept am injur iam. Prcesentem denique impe-
tum propulsandi non vim prateritam ulciscenti
jus habet. Horum enim alterum a naturd est,
ut vitam scilicet corpusque tueantur. Alterum
verb contra naturam, ut inferior de superiori
suppliciunt sumat. Quod itaque populus malum,
antequam factum sit, impedire potest, ne fiat, id
postquam factum est, in regent author em sceleris
vindicare nott potest : populus igitur hoc amplius
qudm privatus quispiam habet: quod huic, vel
ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto Suchanano,
nullum nisi in patentia rented ium superest. Ciim
ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim
ferre omnino debet) resistere cum reverentid pos-
sit. Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. Hi. c. 8,

390 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

Ill English thus :

§. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the
people then ahvays lay themselves open to the
cruelty and rage of tyranny ? 3Iust they see their
cities pilaged, and laid in ashes, their ivives and
children exposed to the tyrant's lust and fury,
and themselves and families reduced by their
king to ruin, and all the miseries of want and
oppression, and yet sit still? 3hist men alone
be debarred the common privilege of opposing
force with force, which nature allows so freely
to all other creatures for their preservation
from injury ? I answer : Self-defence is a part
of the law of nature ; nor can it be denied the
community, even against the king himself: but
to revenge themselves upon him, must by no
means be allowed them : it being not agreeable
to that law. Wherefore if the king shall sheiv
an hatred, not only to some particular persons,
but sets himself against the body of the common-
wealth, whereof he is the head, and shall, with
intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the
ii'hole, or a considerable part of the people, in
this case the people have a right to resist and
defend themselves from injury : but it must be
ivith this caution, that they only defend them-
selves, but do not attack their prince : they 7nay
repair the damages received, but must not for
any provocation exceed the bounds of due reve-
rence and reaped. They may repulse the present

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 301

attempt, but must not revenge past violences:
for it is natural for us to defend life and limb,
but that an inferior should punish a superior, is
against nature. The mischief which is designed
them, the people may prevent before it be done ;
but when it is done, they must not revenge it on
the king, though author of the villany. This
therefore is the "privilege of the people in general,
above ivhat any private person hath ; that par-
ticular men are allowed by our adversaries them-
selves (Buchanan only excepted) to have no
other remedy but patience; but the body of the
people may ivith respect resist intolerable tyrau-
n V i for when it is but moderate, they ought to
endure it.

%. 234. Thus far that great advocate of mo-
narchical power allows of resistence.

§. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limi-
tations to it, to no purpose :

First, He says, it must be with reverence.

Secondly, It must be without retribution, or
punishment ; and the reason he gives is, because
an inferior cannot punish a superior.

First, How to resist force without striking
again, or how to strike with reverence, will
need some skill to make intelligible. He that
shall oppose an assault only with a shield to
receive the blows, or in any more respectful
posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate
the confidence and force of the assailant, will
quickly be at an end of his resistance, and will
find such a defence serve onlv to draw on

392 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous
a way of resisting, as Juvenal thought it of
fighting ; ubi tu pulsus, ego vapulo tantum. And
the success of the combat will be unavoidably
the same he there describes it :

— Libert as pauperis hcec est :

Pulsatus rogat, <Sf pugnis concisus adorat,

Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.

This will always be the event of such an im-
aginary resistance, where men may not strike
again. He therefore who may resist must be
allowed to strike. And then let our author, or
any body else, join a knock on the head, or a
cut on the face, with as much reverence and
respect as he thinks fit. He that can reconcile
blows and reverence, may, for aught I know,
desire for his pains, a civil, respectful cudgeling
wherever he can meet with it.

Secondly, As to his second, An inferior
cannot punish a superior ; that is true, generally
speaking, whilst he is his superior. But to
resist force with force, being the state of ivar
that levels the jmrties, cancels all former rela-
tion of reverence, respect, and superiority: and
then the odds that remains, is, that he, who
opposes the unjust aggressor, has this supe-
riority over him, that he has a right, when he
prevails, to punish the offender, both for the
breach of the peace, and all the evils that
followed upon it. Barclay therefore, in another

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 393

place, more coherently to himself, denies it to
be lawful to resist a king in any case. But he
there assigns two cases, whereby a king may
nn-king himself. His words are,

Quid ergo, nulline casus iucidere possunl
quibus populo sese erigere atque in regem im-
potentius dominantem arma capcre Sf invadere
jure suo sudque authoritate liceat? Nulli eerie
quamdiu rex manet. Semper enim ex divinis id
obstat, Regem honorificato ; & qui potestati
resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit: non alias igitur
in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat
propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc
enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis
constituit liber: hoc modo populus 8f superior
efficitur, reverse ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante
regem inauguratum in interregno habuit. At
sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi qua?
/tunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima
animo perlustrem, duo tantum i?ivetiio, duos,
inquam, casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege
non regem se facit fy omni honor e fy dignitate
regali atque in subditos potestate destituit ;
quorum ctiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unns
est, Si rcgnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Ne-
rone Jertur, quod is nempe senatum populumque
llomanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flam-
maque vastarc, ac novas sibi sedes qucerere decre-
visset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit
se neque cirem neque principem senatui amplius
fore, inquc animo habuerit interempto utriusque
ordinis elcclissimo quoque Alexandrian! commi-

394 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

grave, ac ut populum uno iclu interimeret, unam
ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis me-
ditatur <Sf molitur serio, omnem regnandi cwram
ty animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in
subditos amittit, ut dominus servi pro derelicto
habit i dominium.

§. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus
client elam se contulit, ac regnum quod Uberum
a majoribus fy populo traditum accepit, alienee
ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte
non ed mente id agit populo pla?ie ut incommo-
det : tamen quia quod prcecipuum est regice
dignitatis amisit, ut summits scilicet in regno
secundum Deum sit, fy solo Deo inferior, atque
jwpidum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum, cu-
jus libertatem sartam Sf tectam conservare debuit,
in alterius gentis ditionem fy potestatem dedidit ;
hue velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut
nee quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat,
ne in eum cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam
transferat ; atque ita eo facto Uberum jam &f
sua potestatis populum relinquit, cujus rei exem-
plum unum annates Scotici suppeditant. Bar-
clay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 16.

Which in English runs thus :

§. 237. What then, can there be no case
happen ivherein the people may of right, and
by their own authority, help themselves, take
arms, cuul set upon their king, imperiously
domineering over them? None at all, whilst

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 395

he remains a king. Honour the king, and
he that resists the power, resists the ordinance
of God ; are divine oracles thai will never
permit it. The people therefore can never come
by a power over him, unless he does something
that makes him cease to be a king: for then
he divests himself of his crown and dignity,
and returns to the state of a private man,
and the people become free and superior, the
power which they had in the interregnum, be-
fore they crowned him king, devolving to them
again. Hut there are but few miscarriages
which bring the matter to this state. After
considering it ivell on all sides, I can find but
tw'o. Two cases there are, I say, whereby a
king, ipso facto, becomes no king, and loses all
power and regal authority over his people;
which are also taken notice of by Winzerus.

The first is, If he endeavour to overturn
the government, that is, if he have a purpose
and design to ruin the kingdom and common-
wealth, as it is recorded of Nero, that he
resolved to cut off the senate and people of
Rome, lay the city waste with fire and sword,
and then remove to some other place. And
of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he
would be no longer a head to the people or
senate, and that he had it in his thoughts
to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks,
and then retire to Alexandria: and he wished
that the people had but one neck, that he might
dispatch them all at a bloiv. Such designs

39G OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

as these, when . any king harbours in his
thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immedi-
ately gives up all the care and thought of the
commonwealth; and consequently forfeits the
poiver of governing his subjects, as a master
does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath
abandoned.

§. 238. The other case is, When a king makes
himself the dependent of another, and subjects
his kingdom which his ancestors left him, and
the people put free into his hands, to the do-
minion of another : for however perhaps it may
not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet
because he has hereby lost the principal part of
regal dignity, viz. to be next and immediately
under God, supreme in his kingdom ; and also
because he betrayed or forced his people, whose
liberty he ought to have carefully preserved, into
the power and dominion of a foreign nation.
JBy this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he
himself looses the power he had in it before,
without transferring any the least right to those
on whom he would have bestowed it ; and so by
this act sets the people jree, and leaves them at
their own disposal. One example of this is to be
found in the Scotch Annals.

§. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great
champion of absolute monarchy, is forced to
allow, that a king may be resisted, and ceases
to be a king. That is, in short, not to multiply
cases, in whatsoever he has no authority, there
he is no king, and may be resisted: for whereso-

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 397

ever the authority ceases, the king ceases too,
and becomes like other men who have no au-
thority. And these two cases he instances in,
differ little from those above mentioned, to be
destructive to governments, only that he has
omitted the principle from which his doctrine
flows ; and that is, the breach of trust, in not
preserving the form of government agreed on,
and in not intending the end of government
itself, which is the public good and preserva-
tion of property. When a king has dethroned
himself, and put himself in a state of war with
his people, what shall hinder them from prose-
cuting him who is no king, as they would any
other man, who has put himself into a state
of war with them ; Barclay, and those of his
opinion, would do well to tell us. This farther
I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay,
that he says, The mischief that is designed
them, the people may prevent before it be done :
whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is
but in design. Such designs as these (says he)
ivhen any king harbours in his thoughts and
seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all
care and thought of the commonwealth; so
that, according to him, the neglect of the
public good is to be taken as an evidence of
such design, or at least for a sufficient cause
of resistance. And the reason of all, he gives
in these words, Because he betrayed or forced
his people, tvhose liberty he ought carefully to
have preserved. What he adds, into the power

398 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

and dominion of a foreign nation, signifies no-
thing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss
of their liberty, which he ought to have preser-
ved, and not in any distinction of the persons
to whose dominion they were subjected. The
people's right is equally invaded, and their
liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to
any of their own, or a foreign nation ; and in
this lies the injury, and against this only they
have the right of defence. And there are in-
stances to be found in all countries, which
shew, that it is not the change of nations in the
persons of their governors, but the change of
government, that gives the offence. Bilson, a
bishop of our church, and a great stickler for
the power and prerogative of princes, does, if
I mistake not, in his treatise of Christian sub-
jection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit
their power, and their title to the obedience of
their subjects; and if there needed authority
in a case where reason is so plain, I could
send my reader to ^Br acton, Fortescue, and the
author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that
cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our go-
vernment, or enemies to it. But I thought
Hooker alone might be enough to satisfy those
men, who relying on him for their ecclesiastical
polity, are by a strange fate carried to deny
those principles upon which he builds it.
"Whether they are herein made the tools of
cunninger workmen, to pull down their own
fabric, thev were best look. This 1 am sure,

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 399

their civil policy is so new, so dangerous, and
so destructive to both rulers and people, that
as former ages never could bear the broaching
of it; so it may be hoped, those to come, re-
deemed from the impositions of these Egyptian
under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of
such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed
to serve their turn, resolved all government
into absolute tyranny, and would have all men
born to, what their mean souls fitted them for,
slavery.

§. 240. Here, it is like, the common ques-
tion will be made, Who shall be judge, whether
the prince or legislative act contrary to their
trust? This, perhaps ill-affected and factious
men may spread amongst the people, when the
prince only makes use of his due prerogative.
To this I reply, The people shall be judge ; for
who shall be judge whether his trustee or
deputy acts well, and according to the trust
reposed in him, but he who deputes him, and
must, by having deputed him, have still a power
to discard him, when he fails in his trust? If
this be reasonable in particular cases of private
men, why should it be otherwise in that of the
greatest moment, where the welfare of millions
is concerned, and also where the evil, if not
prevented, is greater, and the redress very dif-
ficult, dear, and dangerous?

§.241. But farther, this question (Who shall
be judge?) cannot mean, that there is no jndge
at all: for where there is no judicature on

400 OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

earth, to decide controversies amongst men,
God in heaven is judge. He alone, it is true,
is judge of the right. But every man is judge
for himself, as in all other cases, so in this,
whether another hath put himself into a state
of war with him, and whether he should appeal
to the Supreme Judge, as Jephtha did.

§. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a
prince and some of the people, in a matter
where the law is silent, or doubtful, and the
thing be of great consequence, I should think
the proper umpire, in such a case, should be
the body of the people: for in cases where
the prince hath a trust reposed in him, and is
dispensed from the common ordinary rules of
the law; there, if any men find themselves
aggrieved, and think the prince acts contrary
to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to
judge as the body of the people, (who, at first,
lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it
should extend? But if the prince, or whoever
they be in the administration, decline that way
of determination, the appeal then lies no where
but to heaven ; force between either persons,
who have no known superior on earth, or which
permits no appeal to a judge on earth, being
properly a state of war, wherein the appeal
lies only to heaven ; and in that state the in-
jured party must judge for himself, when he
will think fit to make use of that appeal, and
put himself upon it.

§. 243. To conclude, The power that every

OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. 401

individual gave the society *, when he entered
into it, can never revert to the individuals
again, as long as the society lasts, but will
always remain in the community ; because
without this there can be no community, no
commonwealth, which is contrary to the origi-
nal agreement : so also when the society hath
placed the legislative in any assembly of men,
to continue in them and their successors, with
direction and authority for providing such
successors, the legislative can never revert to
the people whilst that government lasts ; be-
cause having provided a legislative with power
to continue for ever, they have given up their
political power to the legislative, and cannot
resume it. But if they have set limits to the
duration of their legislative, and made this
supreme power in any person, or assembly,
only temporary ; or else, when by the mis-
carriages of those in authority, it is forfeited ;
upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of
the time set, it reverts to the society, and the
people have a right to act as supreme, and
continue the legislative in themselves ; or erect
a new form, or under the old form place it in
new hands, as they think good.

FINIS.

BW, & S. Gardiner, Printers, Princes Stie*t,Cavendish-squaie.

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